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Introduction
The Problem
What does it take for two individuals to disagree? That is a question that has
become relevant for the debate about contextualism and relativism. Proponents
of relativism have argued that, for a wide range of expressions, relativism does
better than contextualism when it comes to giving an account of disagreement.
There are cases in which contextualism incorrectly predicts that the speakers do
not disagree. Relativism is supposed to do better by delivering the prediction
that the speakers disagree.
The idea behind contextualism is familiar. The claim is that a sentence is
context-dependent in the sense that it express different propositions in different
contexts. This is the standard way to think about sentences that contain index-
icals like ‘I’ and ‘here’. A sentence like () expresses different propositions in
different contexts depending on who the agent or speaker of the context is.
() I am a student.
Contextualism, as a view about a certain class of expressions, is the view that
sentences that contain the relevant expressions express different propositions
Relativism has been proposed as a view of, among other things, deontic modals, epistemic
modals, future contingents, gradable adjectives, knowledge ascriptions, and predicates of taste.
See e.g. Kolbel (, ), MacFarlane (, a, , , forthcoming-a, forthcoming-
b), Richard (, ), Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (), Lasersohn (), Egan
(, ), Stephenson (), and Kolodny and MacFarlane ().
See Kaplan () for a classic treatment of indexicals along these lines.

in different contexts. For instance, let us consider a contextualist treatment of
‘tasty’. The relevant view is that sentences like () express different propositions
in different contexts, depending on whose taste that is relevant.
() Haggis is tasty.
This treatment of ‘tasty’ has come under criticism. The problem is that someone
who sincerely utters () and someone who sincerely utters () seem to disagree.
() Haggis is not tasty.
A contextualist treatment of ‘tasty’ is supposed to be unable to account for this.
If different standards of taste are in play, the relevant sentences express different
propositions. But then the worry is that the situation is just like a situation in
which someone sincerely utters (), and someone else sincerely utters ().
() I am not a student.
There is no pressure to say that the speakers disagree in this case. The speakers
just believe different and compatible propositions.
According to contextualism, sentences have different truth-values relative to
different contexts in virtue of expressing different propositions in different con-
texts. Proponents of relativism have suggested that we can do better if we take
truth to be relative in a more interesting sense. For instance, we can think of
sentences like (), not as expressing different propositions in different contexts,
but as expressing propositions that vary in truth-value across individuals or stan-
dards of taste. This view is supposed to do better than contextualism when it
comes to respecting the judgement that the speaker of () and the speaker of
() disagree. In particular, it allows us to say that there is a proposition such that
one party believes that proposition, and the other party believes its negation.
This is not meant to include any context-dependence not associated with the relevant expres-
sion, nor does it include any context-dependence associated with features like tense. There will
typically be a fairly speciﬁc sense in which the relevant expressions are supposed to be context-
dependent.
See e.g. Kolbel (, ), Lasersohn (), MacFarlane (), and Stephenson
().

The Plan
This challenge serves as the starting point for my discussion of the issues con-
cerning contextualism, relativism, and disagreement. Focusing on predicates of
taste and epistemic modals, I argue that the argument against contextualism is
problematic. In order to appreciate why the argument is problematic, we need
to think about what it takes for two individuals to agree or disagree. A recur-
ring theme in the discussion is that we should not assume a too restrictive view
of agreement and disagreement.
I argue that agreement and disagreement should not always be understood in
terms of what the parties believe. Whether two individuals agree or disagree can
depend on what they prefer, what they like, what they want, and so forth. Apart
from being philosophically interesting in their own right, these issues are rele-
vant for the debate about contextualism and relativism. I argue that if we reject
the view that disagreement is always a matter of there being a proposition such
that one party believes that proposition and the other party believes its negation,
there is more room for contextualists to explain the allegedly problematic cases
of disagreement.
My claim is that, at least in the case of predicates of taste and epistemic
modals, the disagreement data do not give us a reason for preferring relativism
over contextualism. For themost part, I focus on defending contextualism rather
than criticising relativism. The goal is to undermine the motivation for rela-
There are several reasons for focusing on predicates of taste and epistemic modals. These ex-
pressions have played a central role in the debate between contextualists and relativists. The views
in question are therefore fairly well-developed. A relativist treatment of predicates of taste has
been defended by Kolbel (, ), Lasersohn (), MacFarlane (), and Stephenson
(). A relativist treatment of epistemic modals has been defended by e.g. Egan et al. (),
Egan (), Stephenson (), and MacFarlane (forthcoming-a). Predicates of taste and epis-
temic modals are perhaps also less likely to be associated with long-standing philosophical debates
in aesthetics, epistemology, and moral philosophy, than, say, knowledge ascriptions or moral ex-
pressions.
The argument might be problematic in more than one way. See e.g. Glanzberg (),
Cappelen and Hawthorne (), and Schaffer (forthcoming-a) for relevant discussion.
In an important sense the focus is on contextualism rather than relativism. While relativism
allows us to bring the problem of disagreement into focus, the problem of disagreement is not
essential tied to relativism. There are other alternatives to contextualism and relativism that could
have played amore important role in the discussion. For instance, I could have paidmore attention

tivism by showing that contextualism can also account for the relevant cases of
disagreement. In light of the special role that considerations involving disagree-
ment have played in the debate, I take it that it would be highly signiﬁcant if it
turned out that these considerations do not motivate relativism after all.
It is still important to recognise that the problem of disagreement is not the
only problem for contextualism. It has also been argued that contextualist views
have problems with attitude and indirect speech reports. While I do not intend
to address every problem on behalf of contextualism, I think it is worth saying
something about how contextualists can deal with indirect speech reports. I ar-
gue that this problem, unlike the problem of disagreement, requires the contex-
tualist semantics to be modiﬁed in certain respects. However, this can be done
without violating the central commitments of contextualism as long as we pay
attention to the semantic implementation of contextualism.
Overview of the Chapters
What follows is a brief overview of the chapters. While the chapters are connected
in terms of the issues that they deal with, it is meant to be possible to read them
independently. They are supposed to stand on their own as individual essays.
That means that there is a certain amount of overlap and repetition.
Chapter  mainly serves as a more detailed introduction to the issues concerning
relativism and disagreement. I examine the basis for thinking that relativism is in
a better position to account for disagreement than contextualism. This involves
getting clear on how relativists ought to think about disagreement. I discuss an
argument against a simple relativist account of disagreement. The argument is
to invariantist and expressivist views.
I am interested in relativist views insofar as they are motivated by considerations involving
agreement or disagreement. There are ways of arguing that propositional truth is relative that have
nothing to do with agreement or disagreement. This has recently been emphasised byWeatherson
(). I am not in the business of arguing against someone who is impressed by Kaplan’s ()
so-called ‘operator argument’ or Lewis’ () account of self-locating or de se attitudes and thinks
that is a reason for taking propositional truth to be relative. See e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne
() for a more general criticism of attempts to argue that propositional truth is relative.
See e.g. Hawthorne (), Cappelen and Lepore (), Brogaard (), andMacFarlane
().

based on observations about what happens to disagreement if the relevant propo-
sitions are true or false relative to parameters like worlds and times. I consider
two lines of response on behalf of relativism. The ﬁrst response involves denying
that propositions are true or false relative to the parameters in question. The
second response amounts to the claim that the parameters that relativists want
to posit are different from parameters like worlds and times. Both lines of re-
sponse are viable in the sense that they allow relativists to avoid the conclusion
that relativism is no better off than contextualism when it comes to dealing with
disagreement. However, they are associated with different commitments.
Chapter  deals with more general questions about agreement and disagree-
ment. I argue against a view I call the ‘doxastic view’ of agreement and disagree-
ment. That is the view that whether to parties agree or disagree is always a matter
of what they believe. I argue that there are cases of disagreement that cannot
be adequately handled by the doxastic view. Instead I develop a more pluralist
view of disagreement, taking Stevenson’s (, , ) notion of ‘disagree-
ment in attitude’ as my starting point. According to this view, agreement and
disagreement can involve a wide range of attitudes. That is more or less how ex-
pressivists like Blackburn (, ) and Gibbard (, ) have thought
about agreement and disagreement, but I argue this way of thinking about agree-
ment and disagreement is not essentially connected with expressivism.
Chapter  is a discussion of contextualism and relativism about predicates of
taste. There are allegedly cases in which contextualism about predicates of
taste incorrectly predicts that the speakers do not disagree. This argument turns
out to rest on a problematic conception of disagreement. I argue that there are
other cases of disagreement, cases in which speakers are talking about what they
like, that we ought to take into account. If these cases are taken into account,
the original disagreement data are less surprising from a contextualist point of
view. Furthermore, I suggest that we can make sense of all of these cases if they
are understood as involving a conﬂict of non-doxastic attitudes. In other words,
the idea is to adopt something like the view of agreement and disagreement de-
Chapter  is a revised version of a paper forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
See Huvenes (forthcoming).

veloped in the previous chapter.
Chapter  is about contextualist and relativist treatments of epistemic modals.
Contextualism about epistemic modals allegedly has problems when it comes
to dealing with disagreement and retraction data. Following a suggestion from
von Fintel and Gillies (), I argue that the disagreement and retraction is
targeting the embedded proposition, not the modal proposition expressed by
the relevant sentence. Certain observations made by Stephenson () and
MacFarlane (forthcoming-a) might be seen as undermining this line of response.
However, that turns out not to be the case. In particular, I argue that we ought to
reject the constraint that disagreement and retraction can only target a proposi-
tion that is believed or asserted. I suggest that the basis for the disagreement is a
difference in credences or degrees of belief, not a difference in outright beliefs. I
also examine different ways of thinking about the pragmatics of epistemicmodals
as a means of providing a better understanding of the disagreement and retrac-
tion data. The idea is that sentences containing epistemic modals can be used to
perform two distinct speech acts. While this idea is promising, the conclusion is
that more research is needed.
Chapter  is different from the other chapters insofar as it is about indirect
speech reports and not about disagreement. I discuss whether contextualism
about knowledge ascriptions can deal with cases in which knowledge ascriptions
are embedded in indirect speech reports. I argue that accounts that appeal to
mixed quotation and salience are inadequate. Instead we need to make more
substantive assumptions about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. I present
two accounts that do a better job of getting the right results. However, both ac-
counts come with signiﬁcant commitments about the semantic implementation
of contextualism. The ﬁrst account is based on the idea of adding an epistemic
standard parameter to the index and treating ‘says’ as an operator that shifts
the value of that parameter. The second account is based on the idea of posit-
ing a covert variable associated with ‘knows’ that can be bound by a lambda op-
erator. While considerations involving indirect speech reports do not directly
undermine contextualism, these considerations are still relevant for the overall
assessment of contextualism.

Chapter 
Disagreement and Relative Truth
Introduction
There has been a lot of recent interest in the idea that some form of relativism
about truth can provide the basis for a successful semantics for a wide range of
expressions. This includes, among other things, epistemic modals, knowledge
ascriptions, and predicates of taste. An important motivation for these relativist
views is that they are supposed to be better suited for handling disagreement
than some of their rivals. This raises a general question about what happens to
disagreement if truth is relative. In particular, what happens to disagreement if
truth is relative in the sense that relativists like Kolbel (), Lasersohn (),
and MacFarlane (b, ) are talking about? The goal in this chapter is to
discuss relativist views of disagreement.
One might be more or less ambitious on behalf of relativism. A fairly modest
goal would be to show that relativists can respond to the objections that have
been raised against relativist accounts of disagreement. A more ambitious goal
would be to argue that the relativist picture is independently motivated. The
following discussion will focus on the more modest goal. This does not mean
that it is not important to be clear about the extent to which parts of the view
are independently motivated or not. Among other things, I am interested in
See e.g. Kolbel (, ), Richard (, ), Egan et al. (), Lasersohn (),
MacFarlane (b), Egan (, ) and Stephenson ().
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whether relativists can use the connection between disagreement and truth as
a means of motivating their view of disagreement. In any case, my goal is not
to settle whether relativists have a plausible account of disagreement. The main
purpose of this chapter is provide an introduction to some of the issues involving
relativism and disagreement, not to argue for or against relativism.
In x. I distinguish between different ways in which truth can be relative, and
offer a preliminary characterisation of relativism. In x. I talk about how con-
siderations involving disagreement are supposed to motivate relativism In x. I
discuss a problem for a simple relativist account of disagreement that is based on
what happens to disagreement if propositions are true or false relative to param-
eters like worlds and times. In x. I consider two lines of response on behalf of
relativism. In x. I brieﬂy discuss two positions, indexical relativism and nonin-
dexical contextualism, as potential alternatives to contextualism and relativism.
. Relative Truth
In order to get clear on what a relativist view amounts to, there are two questions
that one ought to consider. The ﬁrst question is what the relevant bearers of truth
and falsity are. In this context, it matters whether we are talking about the truth
of sentences, utterances, or propositions. The view that sentences are true or
false relative to contexts is not particularly controversial, and it does not amount
to an interesting relativist thesis. There is nothing surprising about the idea that
a sentence like () is true relative to some contexts, but false relative to others.
() I am hungry.
For the purpose of the following discussion I will assume that the relevant truth-
bearers are propositions. This excludes certain views from the discussion. In par-
ticular, I am not going to focus on views according to which sentences express
different propositions relative to different contexts of assessment or interpreta-
tion. I will only discuss these views brieﬂy in x.. Insofar as we are interested in
questions about disagreement, this simpliﬁes the discussion. If propositions are
the objects of belief, and disagreement is a matter of what we believe, it makes
See e.g. MacFarlane (b), Cappelen (a, b), andWeatherson () for relevant
discussion.
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sense to focus on propositional truth rather than, say, sentential truth or utter-
ance truth.
The second question is what truth is supposed to be relative to. Even if we
are only interested in views on which propositional truth is relative, this does
not guarantee that we end up with an interesting relativist view. For instance,
while it is not universally accepted, many take propositions to be true or false
relative to possible worlds. The view that there are tensed or temporally neutral
propositions, propositions that are true or false relative to times, is somewhat
more controversial. However, this still does not amount to anything like an
interesting relativist view in the sense that I am interested in.
Stanley () suggests that on a relativist view, propositional truth is rela-
tive to a ‘non-standard’ parameter. Without a clear idea of what counts as a ‘non-
standard’ parameter, this is perhaps not very helpful, but it is not easy to improve
on this characterisation. Relativists differ when it comes to what they take truth
to be relative to. For instance, Kolbel () takes relativism to be the view that
propositional truth is relative to perspectives. However, MacFarlane (b) ar-
gues that what matters is whether propositional truth is relative to contexts of
assessment. These differences will be relevant as the discussion proceeds, but
for now I am going to be content with something like Stanley’s admittedly vague
characterisation. In order to get a better grip on the relativist views that I am
interested in, we need to look at the way they are motivated.
However, there is an issue that I would like to ﬂag. It is natural to talk about
contextualism and relativism as views about the semantics of a certain class of
expressions, and I will continue to do so for the purpose of the following dis-
cussion. However, I will for the most part be talking about propositions as the
See Chapter  for further relevant discussion.
See e.g. Schaffer (forthcoming-b) for a defence of the view that propositions are not true or
false relative to possible worlds. On his view, propositions are speciﬁc with respect to features like
world and time. See e.g. also Cappelen and Hawthorne ().
For criticism of the view that propositions are true or false relative to times, see e.g. Richard
(), King (), and Cappelen andHawthorne (). See e.g. Recanati () for a recent
defence of the view that there are contents that are true or false relative to times.
Strictly speaking, MacFarlane (b) takes relativism to be the view that there is a sentence
that has different truth-values relative to different contexts of assessment. However, he seems to
prefer the version of the view he calls ‘propositional relativism’. According to this view, there are
propositions that have different truth-values relative to different contexts of assessment.
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objects of belief. As long as we assume that the propositions that serve as the
objects of the relevant beliefs are the propositions expressed by the relevant sen-
tences, these complications do not have to bother us too much. In any case, I will
assume that we can move back and forth between the level of language and the
level of thought without too much worry. While this assumption might prove to
be naive, it simpliﬁes the discussion.
. The Argument from Disagreement
What the relativist views that I am interested in have in common, is that they are,
at least to some extent, motivated by considerations involving disagreement. In
particular, they are supposed to do a better job than more traditional contextu-
alist views when it comes to dealing with disagreement. For the purpose of the
following discussion, I will simply ignore views that are not motivated by disagree-
ment in this way. In order to illustrate this, let us consider a relativist treatment
of sentences containing expressions like ‘beautiful’. On this view, propositions
are true or false relative to aesthetic standards. The basic idea is that a sentence
like () expresses a proposition that can be true relative to one set of aesthetic
standard, but false relative to another.
() Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
According to amore traditional contextualist treatment, a sentence like () would
express different propositions in different contexts. For instance, if the sentence
The assumption that we can move back and forth between the level of language and the level
of thought in this way, also holds for later chapters. I am also assuming that we do not have to
distinguish between what Lewis () called the ‘semantic value’ of a sentence and what he called
the ‘propositional content’. While the former is what is assigned to a sentence by a compositional
semantic theory, the latter is what serves as the objects of speech acts and propositional attitudes.
Lewis argued that these can come apart, but for the most part I will assume that we can identify
the semantic value of a sentence with its propositional content. However, I will return to this
assumption in Chapter .
This is only meant to serve as an illustration, and I will not engage in a substantive discussion
about the correct treatment of expressions like ‘beautiful’ either in this chapter or in later chapters.
For the purpose of the following discussion I will also assume that the only views on the table are
contextualism and relativism. This is obviously an enormous over-simpliﬁcation, but it simpliﬁes
the discussion signiﬁcantly and nothing important turns on it.
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is uttered by John, it might express the proposition that Picasso’s painting Guer-
nica is beautiful by John’s standards. However, if the sentence is uttered by Mary,
it might express the proposition that the painting is beautiful by Mary’s stan-
dards. There is a sense in which truth is relative on the contextualist picture, but
it is the familiar sense in which sentences are true or false relative to contexts
in virtue of expressing different propositions in different contexts. On the rel-
ativist picture, () expresses the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful,
but that proposition may be true relative John’s standards and false relative to
Mary’s standards.
A worry with the contextualist picture is that it fails to make the right predic-
tions about when speakers disagree. Suppose that John sincerely asserts () and
that Mary sincerely asserts ().
() Picasso’s Guernica is not beautiful.
It would seem that Mary and John disagree. However, a contextualist treatment
is supposedly unable to respect this judgement. The problem is that it is not
clear that there is a proposition such that one of them believes that proposition
and the other believes its negation. If John believes the proposition that the
painting is beautiful by his standards, and Mary believes the proposition that the
painting is not beautiful by her standards, this does not seem to amount to a
disagreement. While there are no doubt other ways of spelling out the argument
against contextualism inmore detail, this way of spelling out the argument seems
to capture the basic idea:
. The parties disagree. (Ass.)
. If the parties disagree, there is a proposition such that one party believes
that proposition and the other believes its negation. (Ass.)
. If contextualism is true, there is not a proposition such that one party be-
lieves that proposition and the other believes its negation. (Ass.)
. There is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition and
the other party believes its negation. (from  and  by modus ponens)
I am presenting the argument against contextualism as a deductive argument and one might
take issue with this, but as far as I can see, nothing substantial turns on that assumption here. See
e.g. Weatherson () for relevant discussion.
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) . Contextualism is not true. (from  and  by modus tollens)
The ﬁrst three premises are certainly not beyond question, and any of them
may be challenged. However, at this point, I am not interested in discussing
whether this amounts to a good argument against contextualism. The question
is whether relativism can do better than contextualism on the assumption that
the argument is sound. Insofar as the alleged problem with contextualism is
that it does not predict that there is a proposition such that John believes that
proposition andMary believes its negation, onemight think that relativism has an
advantage over contextualism. A relativist can say that John believes the propo-
sition that Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful, and that Mary believes the negation of
that proposition. On the other hand, it is unclear whether this amounts to a gen-
uine disagreement given that the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful
is true relative to John’s standards and false relative toMary’s standards. Whether
this counts as a disagreement depends on what happens to disagreement when
propositional truth is relative in the relevant sense.
It is worth pointing out that this is sometimes put in terms of relativists being
in a position to make sense of cases of so-called ‘faultless disagreement’. A case
of faultless disagreement is a disagreement in which neither party is making a
mistake. Kolbel (, ) has emphasised this point, and he has argued that
it is an important point in favour of relativism that it allows us to make sense of
faultless disagreement. Even if we take Mary and John to disagree, there is per-
haps a sense in which we want to say that neither of them is making a mistake.
Relativists can make sense of that by claiming that their beliefs are true relative
to their respective aesthetic standards. What John believes is true relative to his
aesthetic standards, and what Mary believes is true relative to her aesthetic stan-
dards. However, the notion of ‘faultless disagreement’ is contentious. It is also
not clear that we need to make essential use of it in order to motivate relativism.
For the most part, it will play a limited role in the following discussion.
There is a fairly natural view of disagreement which would seem to vindicate
relativism. On this view, disagreement is simply a matter of one party believing a
My preferred view would be to reject the second premise. See Chapter  for relevant discus-
sion.
For critical discussion of faultless disagreement, see e.g. Stojanovic () and Rosenkranz
().
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proposition and another party believing its negation.
() Two parties disagree if and only if there is a proposition such that one
party believes that proposition and the other party believes its negation.
For our purposes, what matters is the claim that it is sufﬁcient for two parties to
disagree that there is a proposition such that one of them believes that proposi-
tion and the other believes its negation. If () gives us a sufﬁcient condition for
disagreement, relativists can say that Mary and John disagree in virtue of John
believing the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful and Mary believing
its negation. That is true even though that proposition is true relative to John’s
standards and false relative to Mary’s standards. In other words, if relativists can
accept something like (), they are in a position to deliver the desired predictions
as far as disagreement is concerned. The question is whether this combination
of views is ultimately plausible. While it may be plausible that () gives us a suf-
ﬁcient condition for disagreement when propositional truth is not relative, one
might start to doubt that this is the case when propositional truth is relative. In
order to ﬁnd an answer to questions like these, it makes sense to look at what
happens to disagreement if propositional truth is relative to other parameters,
such as times and worlds.
. A Problem for the Simple Relativist Picture
A worry for the simple relativist picture is that the view of disagreement under
discussion looks less plausible if we look at other views on which propositional
truth is relative. MacFarlane () has argued that if there are tensed or
temporally neutral propositions, propositions that are true or false relative to
times, disagreement cannot simply be a matter of there being a proposition that
one party believes while the other party believes its negation. Suppose that
This argument plays a role in bothDreier’s () and Francen’s () discussion of relativist
accounts of disagreement. However, for the most part I will be basing my presentation of these
issues on MacFarlane’s () discussion.
MacFarlane () does not present the view he is arguing against as the view that it is suf-
ﬁcient for disagreement that there is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition
and the other believes its negation. Instead he prefers to talk about there being a proposition that
one party accepts and the others rejects. For the purpose of the present discussion, this does not

John at  p.m. believes the tensed proposition that Joe is sitting and that Mary
at  p.m. believes the tensed proposition that Joe is not sitting. While Mary
believes the negation of the proposition that John believes, this does not seem to
be sufﬁcient for them to disagree.
MacFarlane argues that this means that a view of disagreement like () needs
to be revised. He suggests that if we want to acknowledge the existence of tensed
propositions, a natural replacement for () would be something like ().
() Two parties disagree if and only if (i) there is a proposition such that one
party believes that proposition and the other party believes its negation
and (ii) the beliefs cannot both be accurate.
For our purposes, the precise details do not matter. The basic idea is that the
reason Mary and John do not disagree, is that there is nothing that prevents
both of them from being right. Even if John is right when he at  p.m. believes
that Joe is sitting, this does not prevent Mary from being right when she at 
make any difference.
I am willing to grant that there might be different senses of ‘disagree’. In that case we need
to be careful when we ask whether Mary and John ‘disagree’. However, as far as I can see, there is
no sense of ‘disagree’ such that it is sufﬁcient for the truth of ‘Mary and John disagree’ that John
at  p.m. believes the tensed proposition that Joe is sitting and Mary at  p.m. believes the tensed
proposition that Joe is not sitting.
MacFarlane () argues that () is not strictly speaking true as it stands. In fact, he argues
that both the right-to-left and the left-to-right direction of () fail. Suppose that Mary at noon
believes the proposition that the number of ﬂies in the room is either odd or even, and that
Tom at midnight believes the negation of that proposition. Their beliefs cannot both be accurate
since Tom’s belief cannot be accurate, he believes something that is necessarily false. However,
MacFarlane claims that this is not sufﬁcient for them to disagree. This means that () does not
give us a sufﬁcient condition for disagreement.
Furthermore, let us suppose that Mary at noon believes the tensed proposition that Socrates is
sitting and that Peter at midnight believes the tensed proposition that Socrates was sitting twelve
hours ago. In that case we want to say that they disagree, but according to () they do not. The
reason is that there is not a proposition such that Mary believes that proposition and Peter believes
its negation. This means that () does not give us a necessary condition for disagreement. How-
ever, for our purposes the important question is not what the replacement for () should look
like, but whether it needs to replaced. Whatever the right replacement for () turns out to be, it
cannot be sufﬁcient for two people to disagree that there is a proposition such that one of them
believes that proposition and the other believes its negation, at least not when the beliefs concern
different times.
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p.m. believes that Joe is not sitting. All it takes is that Joe is sitting at  p.m. and
that at  p.m. he is not sitting. We can follow MacFarlane and cash this out in
terms of accuracy. A belief is accurate in the relevant sense if the proposition
believed is true relative to the index that is relevant to assessment of the belief in
its context. In the case of tensed propositions, the index will at least include
the relevant time.
If we adopt () instead of (), we can avoid the unfortunate prediction that
Mary and John disagree when John at  p.m. believes the proposition that Joe is
sitting and Mary at  p.m. believes the negation of that proposition. However, it
is not clear that this goes well with the simple relativist treatment of () and ().
() Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
() Picasso’s Guernica is not beautiful.
On the simple relativist story we can say that John believes the proposition that
Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful and that Mary believes the negation of that propo-
sition. However, there is nothing that prevents their believes from both being
accurate. Indeed, the point was that the proposition is true relative to John’s stan-
dards, but false relative to Mary’s standards. If we adopt () instead of (), the
simple relativist account does not have any discernible advantages over a more
traditional contextualist account as far as disagreement is concerned.
.. Worlds Instead of Times
MacFarlane also argues that the same point can be made by relying on the less
controversial assumption that propositions are true or false relative to worlds.
Suppose that Jane, an inhabitant of the actual world, believes the proposition that
Mars has two moons, and that June, who is Jane’s counterpart and an inhabitant
of another possible world, believes the negation of that proposition. Even if this
means that there is a proposition such that Jane believes that proposition and
June believes its negation, it still seems that they do not disagree. Again, if that
is correct, it means that () cannot be right as it stands. Instead we may adopt
Insofar as I am talking about indices rather than circumstances of evaluation, I am using Lewis’
() terminology, not Kaplan’s (). For our purposes, we can treat these notions as equiv-
alent.
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something like (), but then it is unclear whether the simple relativist account
does any better than a contextualist account.
Since the assumption that propositions are true or false relative to worlds is
less controversial than the assumption that propositions are true or false relative
to times, it is worth spending some more time on this argument. It turns out to
be a somewhat tricky question whether the argument requires any realist assump-
tions about modality in order to go through. Cappelen and Hawthorne ()
have raised worries along these lines. They complain that, unless we accept a
realist view of modality of the sort endorsed by Lewis (), the situation de-
scribed is not a situation in which two individuals do not disagree even though
one of them believes a proposition and the other believes its negation. They
argue that one should not talk about an individual in another world as if it were
an individual in a different country. If one says that there is a world in which an
individual believes some proposition, this only means that it could be the case
that there is an individual that believes the proposition. It does not mean that
there is an individual that believes the proposition.
Even if it turns out that one must assume modal realism in order to get the
argument going, this does not in and of itself show that the argument is not
sound. However, since any realist assumptions about modality are likely to be
controversial, this would make the argument less dialectically effective.
MacFarlane anticipates this sort of worry and argues that he can make the
point without relying on any realist assumptions about modality. Instead of talk-
ing about Jane’s counterpart in some other possible world, we need to consider
whether Jane, in believing what she would have believed in a certain counter-
factual situation, would disagree with what she actually believes. According to
MacFarlane, it is not sufﬁcient for her to disagree with what she actually believes
that she would have believed the negation of the proposition she actually be-
lieves. However, as Cappelen and Hawthorne point out, this requires us to shift
the focus away from disagreement between individuals and to start talking about
Cappelen and Hawthorne () talk about agreement rather than disagreement, but for
our purposes it does not make any difference whether we are talking about agreement or dis-
agreement.
If one subscribes to presentism, the view that only temporally present objects exist, one might
have similar concerns about what MacFarlane says about tensed propositions. See e.g. Cappelen
and Hawthorne (forthcoming).
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disagreement with what someone says or believes. Insofar as we are more inter-
ested in the former, that is not unproblematic. More importantly, Cappelen and
Hawthorne argue that we should not be too quick to acceptMacFarlane’s verdicts
about the relevant counterfactuals. If June had believed the proposition that it
is not the case that Mars has two moons, there is at least some temptation to say
that she would have disagreed with what she actually believes, namely the propo-
sition that Mars has two moons. I am inclined to agree that it is not clear what
we ought to say about the relevant counterfactuals, and this makes MacFarlane’s
argument somewhat shaky.
Another, and potentially more promising, way of trying to avoid having to
talk about individuals inhabiting different worlds is to look for an individual who
has a belief that is evaluated with respect to a world other than the actual world.
The view of ﬁction explored by Predelli (, ch. ) suggests that this may
possible. He asks us to consider an utterance of () that takes place as a part of
a discussion of Milos Forman’s ﬁlm Amadeus.
() Salieri commissioned the Requiem.
Insofar as Salieri commissioned the Requiem in the ﬁlm it would appear that
() is true as uttered in a context like this. However, we may assume that in the
actual world Salieri did not commission the Requiem. In that case, () would be
false as uttered in a discussion about the actual events surrounding the Requiem.
One way of respecting these judgements is to say when () is uttered as a part
of a discussion of Milos Forman’s ﬁlm, it is not evaluated with respect to the
actual world, but with respect to some other world, or more likely a set of worlds,
determined by the ﬁction.
Predelli focuses on language, but for our purposes it is what is going on at
level of thought that matters. Suppose that John sincerely utters () as a part of
a discussion about the ﬁlm. In that case wemay want to say that () expresses the
proposition that Salieri commissioned the Requiem and that John believes that
proposition. However, the world that is relevant for the assessment of his belief is
not the actual world, but a world or set of worlds determined by the ﬁction. Let
There will most likely be a certain measure of indeterminacy when it comes to the world, or
worlds, determined by the ﬁction. However, it is not clear that this is should be more problematic
in this case than in other cases.
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us further suppose that Mary sincerely utters () as a part of a discussion about
who actually commissioned the Requiem.
() Salieri did not commission the Requiem.
In that case, we may want to say that () expresses the proposition that Salieri
did not commission the Requiem and that Mary believes that proposition. But
in this case, the world that is relevant for the assessment of her belief is simply
the actual world. If all of this is correct, and that is admittedly assuming quite a
lot, we would have a situation in which John believes the proposition that Salieri
commissioned the Requiem and Mary believes its negation. Still, we do not want
to be forced to say that Mary and John disagree.
The relevant view of ﬁction is obviously controversial, and there are a number
of alternatives. One might instead insist that () cannot be literally true, and
that it only serves to pragmatically convey something true in the relevant context.
Alternatively, one might take () to be elliptical for () with ‘It is true in the
ﬁlm Amadeus’ serving as a ﬁction operator.
() It is true in the ﬁlm Amadeus that Salieri commissioned the Requiem.
A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of present discussion. In any
case, the point is not to present a conclusive argument for the conclusion that
() cannot be true if propositions are true or false relative to worlds. There are
interesting issues here that deserve to be explored further, but as it stands there
does not appear to be a straightforward way of getting MacFarlane’s argument
to work without some rather controversial assumptions. Again, this does not
necessarily mean that the argument is not sound, but it does mean that it rests
on assumptions that not everyone will want to accept. For the purpose of the
following discussion, I will not assume that we need to reject () if propositions
are true or false relative to worlds, but I will not assume that () is compatible
with propositions being true or false relative to worlds either. Instead I will focus
on views on which propositions are true or false relative to other parameters that
are less likely to be associated with controversial metaphysical assumptions.
If one prefers to let propositions be speciﬁc with respect to the relevant world, one can say that
() and () expresses different propositions about different worlds. See Schaffer (forthcoming-
b) for a view on which propositions are world-speciﬁc in this way.
See e.g. Lewis ().
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.. Other Parameters
While MacFarlane () focuses on worlds and times, the same point can be
made if propositions are true or false relative to other parameters. The point
emerges quite clearly if propositions are construed as sets of centred worlds. This
view of propositions is typically associated with the picture of de se attitudes put
forward by Lewis (). Centred worlds can be thought of as pairs that consist
of a world and an individual. A centred world hx0; w0i is compatible with what
x believes in w just in case it is compatible with what x believes in w that she is
x0 in w0. One believes a propositions, a set of centred worlds, just in case every
centred world compatible with what one believes is a member of the set.
On this view, propositions can have different truth-values relative to differ-
ent individuals. For instance, the proposition that is the set of centred worlds in
which the centre is hungry, may be true relative to John, but false relative toMary.
However, if John believes this proposition and Mary believes its negation, that is
not sufﬁcient for them to disagree. To use Lewis’ terminology of self-ascription,
this would essentially be situation in which John self-ascribes the property of be-
ing hungry and Mary self-ascribes the property of not being hungry. That is not
enough for them to disagree. This is particularly interesting insofar as this pic-
ture has provided inspiration for contemporary relativists. While this does not
show that it is wrong for relativists to draw inspiration from such views, one should
be careful not to overstate the similarities between the views.
The point can also be clearly seen if there are propositions that have different
truth-values relative to different locations. One might claim that a sentence like
() expresses a location-neutral proposition, a proposition that is true relative
to some locations, but false relative to others.
Lewis () primarily talks about the objects of mental states as properties, but for our pur-
poses this does not make any difference whether we talk about the objects of mental states as
properties or sets of centred worlds. For the purpose of presenting the view, I am for the most
part following Ninan ().
Centred worlds are typically thought of as triples that consist of a world, an individual, and
a time. Since we have already discussed views on which propositions are true or false relative to
times, I will ignore the time coordinate for the purpose of the following discussion.
See e.g. Egan (, ) for a relativist account who is inspired by Lewis’ () work on
de se attitudes.
See e.g. Recanati () for relevant discussion of location-neutral propositions. See e.g. also

() It’s raining.
Suppose that John, who is in St Andrews, believes the location-neutral proposi-
tion expressed by () and that Mary, who is in Oslo, believes the negation of
that proposition. Still, that does not seem to be sufﬁcient for them to disagree.
After all, there is nothing that prevents Mary and John from both being right if
it is raining in St Andrews and not in Oslo.
Focusing on parameters like this allows us to avoid some of the metaphysical
issues involving modality. On the other hand, the view that there are proposi-
tions that have different truth-values relative to different times, individuals, or
locations, is more controversial than the view that there are propositions that
have different truth-values relative to different worlds. There is considerable op-
position to the idea that propositions can be time or location-neutral in this sense,
and some philosophers doubt that we can make sense of the idea that proposi-
tions are true or false relative to different times or locations. Frege () is a
classic example of a philosopher who denies that there are propositions that vary
in truth-value across times.
But are there not thoughts which are true today but false in sixmonths’
time? The thought, for example, that the tree is covered with green
leaves, will surely be false in six moths’ time. No, for it is not the
same thought at all. The words ‘This tree is covered with green
leaves’ are not sufﬁcient by themselves to constitute the expression
of a thought, for the time of utterance is involved as well. Without
the time-speciﬁcation thus given we have not a complete thought, i.e.
we have no thought at all. Only a thought with the time-speciﬁcation
ﬁlled out, a sentence complete in every respect, expresses a thought.
But this thought, if it is true, is true not only today or tomorrow but
timelessly. (Frege, , p. )
A more recent example of someone who does not think that we can make sense
of proposition that vary in truth-value across times is (King, ). He expresses
this sentiment quite clearly.
Kaplan ().

[...] though it seems correct to hold that the things I believe, doubt,
etc. can change truth value across worlds (i.e. some of the things
I believe are true though they would have been false had the word
been different), it is hard to make sense of the idea that the things I
believemay change truth value across time and location. What would
it be e.g. to believe that the sun is shining, where what I believe is
something that varies in truth value across times and locations in
the actual world? It seems clear that when I believe that the sun is
shining I believe something about a particular time and location, so
that what I believe precisely does not vary in truth value over times
and locations. (King, , p. )
This is not the time or place to attempt to adjudicate these disputes. It is sufﬁcient
to note that there is considerable controversy surrounding these issues. Having
said that, one would not expect a relativist to say that it does not make sense
for the things we believe to have different truth-values relative to different times
or locations. After all, one might have similar doubts about whether it makes
sense for the things we believe to be true or false relative to different aesthetic
standards.
Where does all of this leave us with respect to the simply relativist story? We
can state the general objection as follows: When we look at other views on which
propositions are true or false relative to some parameter, disagreement does not
work the way that relativists want it to work in the case of () and ().
() Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
() Picasso’s Guernica is not beautiful.
In particular, it does not seem to be sufﬁcient for two parties to disagree that
there is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition and the other
believes its negation. Why should we then expect disagreement to work the way
that relativists want it to work in the case of () and ()? Furthermore, if we
replace () with something like () across the board, it appears that the simple
relativist treatment of () and () no longer offers any advantages over a contex-
tualist treatment when it comes to dealing with disagreement. I take it that this
is a conclusion that relativists need to resist. In what follows I will discuss ways in
which relativists can respond to this argument.

. Two Relativist Replies
At this point I will explore two lines of response on behalf of the relativists. The
ﬁrst option is to argue that propositions are not true or false relative to parame-
ters like worlds, times, individuals, and locations. The second option is to argue
that the parameters that relativists are talking about are different from param-
eters like world, times, individuals, and locations. MacFarlane () can be
thought of as advocating something like the second response. However, I will
argue that the ﬁrst option should also be taken seriously.
.. The First Reply
While it might not be very sensible for relativists to claim that it does not make
sense for the things we believe to have different truth-values relative to different
times or locations, that does not mean that they have to think that propositions
are in fact true or false relative to such parameters. They could deny that propo-
sitions are true or false relative to times and locations, and continue to argue that
they are true or false relative to, say, aesthetic standards. As was noted earlier, it
is not clear whether this would also have to apply to worlds as well as times and
locations. However, even if it also applies to worlds, there does not appear to be
any special commitments associated with relativism that prevents relativists from
thinking of propositions as world-speciﬁc in the relevant sense. On this kind of
view, a proposition would be about a particular world in more or less the same
way that King (, p. ) argues that it is about a particular time and location.
This would allow relativists to hold on to () and the simple relativist treatment
of sentences like ().
() Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
One might worry that this somehow goes against the spirit of relativism. To a
certain extent relativists can be seen as building on views like Lewis’ () view
of de se attitudes and work in formal semantics by, among others, Lewis ()
and Kaplan (). However, even if relativists are inspired by views on which
truth is relative to, say, worlds and times, it is not clear why relativists need to be
committed to truth being relative to other parameters when the motivation for
positing these parameters is different from the parameters that relativists want to

posit. The lesson might be that we should not overstate the similarities between
the kind of relativists views that we are discussing here and views that look similar
from a formal point of view.
Furthermore, it may not be necessary to say that there is no sense of ‘propo-
sition’ such that there are propositions that are true or false relative to different
worlds, times, individuals, or locations. Instead one might adopt a view on which
there are multiple levels of content with different kinds of content serving dif-
ferent purposes. This would allow a relativist to leave room for something like
Lewis’ () view of de se attitudes. The level of content that relativists are in-
terested in, is the level of content that is relevant for assessing whether people
agree or disagree. In this sense of ‘proposition’, propositions are not true or false
relative to times and locations, and there is no reason to give up ().
This is not to say that this line of response is unproblematic. One way or
another, this line of response comes with signiﬁcant commitments. Either the
relativist will be committed to propositions not being true or false relative to
times and locations, or she will be committed to there being multiple levels of
content. Either way, a lot more work remains to be done.
Even if this is a plausible response to the argument that was presented in the
previous section, one might have other reasons for doubting that the relativist
picture of disagreement is on the right track. For instance, when one tries to
motivate the judgement that Mary and John do not disagree when John at  p.m.
believes the tensed proposition that Joe is sitting and Mary at  p.m. believes its
negation, one is likely appeal to the fact that Mary and John could both be right.
This is not a motivation that sits well with the simple relativist story. After all, that
could just as well be said about Mary and John when they have different aesthetic
standards. What John believes is true relative to his standards, and what Mary
believes is true relative to her standards.
However, it is doubtful whether any clear-cut argument against the relativist
picture of disagreement is likely to emerge from considerations like this. The
claim that Mary and John cannot disagree unless one of them is wrong, is likely
to be contested. As noted earlier, Kolbel (, ) has argued that an impor-
tant motivation of relativism is that it allows us to make sense of cases of so-called
For a defence of a view on which there are multiple levels of content, see e.g. Recanati ().

‘faultless disagreement’, cases of disagreement in which neither party is wrong.
Many have expressed doubts about whether there could be genuine cases of fault-
less disagreement, but it is a different matter to provide an argument against
faultless disagreement that does not just assume that it is a necessary condition
for disagreement that the parties cannot both be right.
While there might not be a decisive argument against the relativist picture of
disagreement, a further question is whether it is possible to offer any indepen-
dent motivation for this way of thinking about disagreement. What, if anything,
can be said in favour of thinking that Mary and John disagree when he believes
the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful and she believes its negation?
While () may provide a plausible sufﬁcient condition for disagreement when
propositional truth is not relative, it is not clear that this is the case if relativism
is true. If propositions are not true or false relative to any other parameters,
such as times or locations, it is hard to ﬁnd counterexamples to the picture of
disagreement that goes with the simple relativist story, but it is also hard to ﬁnd
independent evidence for it. After all, where is that evidence going to come
from? The only other cases of disagreement involve propositions that do not
vary in truth-value across any parameters.
One way of trying to motivate the relativist picture of disagreement, is to
argue that disagreement is tied to attributions of truth and falsity. According to
the relativists, the proposition that John believes is false relative to the aesthetic
standards that are in play in Mary’s context. They predict that () would be
true as uttered by Mary.
() What John believes is false.
On this picture it makes sense for Mary to believe that what John believes is false.
Furthermore, as Cappelen and Hawthorne (forthcoming) observe, it is really
strange to say things like ().
() Mary believes that what John believes is false, but she does not disagree
with him.
See e.g. Rosenkranz () for an attempt to construct an argument against faultless disagree-
ment.

This could be taken as evidence that disagreement is tied to attributions of truth
and falsity in such a way that Mary and John can be expected to disagree even
if relativism is true. If there was no such connection between disagreement and
attributions of truth and falsity, there would be no obvious reason to expect ()
to be an inappropriate thing to say. A principle like () would explain why ()
is such a strange thing to say and could be used to motivate the claim that Mary
and John disagree.
() For every x and every y, if x believes that what y believes is false, x disagrees
with y.
If there were propositions that are true or false relative to, say, times or locations,
() would be problematic. Insofar as we are already assuming that propositions
are not true or false relative to such parameters, that may not seem to be a prob-
lem. From this point of view, I am willing to grant that this provides some in-
dependent evidence for the claim that Mary and John disagree. However, if a
relativist wants to buy into the idea that there are multiple levels of content, she
would have to deny that expressions like ‘what she believes’ can pick out the con-
tents that have different truth-values relative to different times and locations.
Let us take stock. One way for relativist to respond to the argument that was
presented in x., is to deny that there are propositions that are true or false
relative to parameters like times and locations. This would allow relativists to
hold on to a simple view of disagreement. However, there are serious commit-
ments associated with this line of response. Relativists will either have to argue
that propositions are not true or false relative to parameters such as times and
locations, or to argue that there are multiple levels of content.
While this provides a response to the argument that was presented in x., it
is not clear how one can provide independent motivation for the relevant view
of disagreement. A promising way of doing that may be to appeal to the con-
In any case, we should not exaggerate the importance of considerations like this. While ()
may be plausible if propositional truth is not relative, one might have doubts about whether this is
still the case if relativism is true. After all, it is plausible that () provides a sufﬁcient condition for
disagreement when propositional truth is not relative, but that is not obvious if relativism is true.
Since propositional truth is only relative to the parameters that relativists want to posit, the only
other cases that we can take into consideration are cases in which the relevant propositions do not
vary in truth-value across any parameters.

nection between disagreement and attributions of truth and falsity, but insofar
as we are discussing views on which truth is relative, such a connection may be
contentious. It might be that we do not have much to go on when it comes to
providing independent evidence for or against the relevant view of disagreement.
.. The Second Reply
There might be all sorts of reasons why a relativist would not want to pursue the
ﬁrst reply. For instance, she might be committed to time and location-neutral
propositions and unwilling to countenance multiple levels of content. In that
case, another option is to argue that the different parameters that truth is relative
to, work differently with regard to disagreement. They may grant that it is not
sufﬁcient for Mary and John to disagree that he believes the location-neutral
proposition that it’s raining and she believes its negation. However, even if the
proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is true relative to John’s standards and false
relative toMary’s standards, it may still be sufﬁcient forMary and John to disagree
that John believes that proposition and Mary believes its negation.
As it stands, this response sounds blatantly ad hoc. Why should we think that
disagreement works differently when the relevant propositions have different
truth-values relative to different aesthetic standards rather than, say, times or
locations? However, a relativist does not have to leave it at that. To make the
move seem less ad hoc they can attempt to provide reasons for thinking that the
relevant parameters should be treated differently. MacFarlane (b, )
has developed a relativist framework that appears promising in this regard, and
for the purpose of the present discussion, I will focus on his account.
A central part of MacFarlane’s account is the distinction between the context
of use and the context of assessment. Roughly speaking, the former is a context in
which a sentence is used and the latter is a context in which the use of a sentence
is assessed. MacFarlane proposes that when we talk about sentences being true
or false, we need a doubly contextual truth-predicate. We need to talk about
a sentence being true, not just at a context of use, but at a context of use and
a context of assessment. According to MacFarlane (b), for relativism to
be true is for there to be a sentence that has different truth-values relative to
different contexts of assessment. For instance, () could be true relative to a

context of assessment in which John is the assessor, but false relative to a context
of assessment in which Mary is the assessor.
() Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
We can distinguish between two different roles that the context of use or the con-
text of assessment can play in determining the truth-value of a sentence. While
the truth-value of a sentence can depend on the context insofar as the context
plays a role in determining the proposition expressed by the sentence, it can also
depend on the context insofar as it plays a role in determining the value of a
parameter that the relevant proposition is true or false relative to.
Since we are focusing on propositional truth, it is the latter that is relevant for
our purposes. MacFarlane’s framework allows us to distinguish between parame-
ters that are initialised by the context of use and parameters that are initialised by
the context of assessment. According to a relativist view of this sort, propositions
are true or false relative to a parameter that is initialised by the context of assess-
ment rather than the context of use. In other words, if a relativist treatment of a
sentence like () is correct, it expresses a proposition that is true or false relative
to the aesthetic standards determined by the context of assessment.
Since some parameters are initialised by the context of use and some are
initialised by the context of assessment, there is perhaps a basis for saying that
disagreement works differently when different parameters are involved. In or-
der to provide an account according to which disagreement works differently
when different parameters are involved, MacFarlane () takes it to be an
assessment-sensitive matter whether a belief is accurate. To see how this works,
let us suppose that propositions are true or false relative to worlds and times,
in addition to aesthetic standards. The world and time are determined by the
context of use, and the aesthetic standards are determined by the context of as-
sessment. In that case, a belief is accurate relative to a context of assessment
just in case the proposition believed is true relative to the world and time of the
context of use and the aesthetic standards of the context of assessment. If we
adopt something like (), this would allow the relativists to make the desired
predictions.
() Two parties disagree relative to a context of assessment if and only if (i)
there is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition and

the other party believes its negation and (ii) the beliefs cannot both be
accurate relative to that context of assessment.
According to this view of disagreement, it matters whether the relevant parame-
ters are initialised by the context of use or by the context of assessment. If John
at  p.m. believes the tensed proposition that Joe is sitting and Mary at  p.m.
believes the negation of that proposition, their beliefs can both be accurate. It
does not matter what the context of assessment is like, since the relevant time is
determined by the context of use. However, if John believes the proposition that
Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful and Mary believes its negation, there is no context
of assessment such that their beliefs are both accurate. The proposition and its
negation cannot both be true relative to the same aesthetic standards.
If this is correct, there is some basis for treating the parameters that relativists
want to posit differently than parameters like worlds and times. This means that
the relativists have a response to the argument that was presented in x.. Even
if disagreement works in a certain way when different worlds, times, and loca-
tions are involved, that does not entail that it has to work in the same way when
different aesthetic standards are involved.
Again, it is a further question whether there is independent evidence for
this view of disagreement. In particular, are there any independent reasons for
thinking that () is the right view of disagreement when there are propositions
that are true or false relative to parameters that are initialised by the context of
assessment? One way of putting the question is to ask why we should adopt ()
instead of ().
() Two parties disagree if and only if (i) there is a proposition such that
one party believes that proposition and the other party believes its nega-
tion and (ii) the beliefs cannot both be accurate relative to the parties’
respective contexts of assessment.
What thismeans is that ifMary and John disagree, it cannot be the case that John’s
belief is accurate relative to his context of assessment and that Mary’s belief is ac-
curate relative to her context of assessment. That requirement is not satisﬁed in
Strictly speaking, this means that disagreement is assessment-sensitive. However, this turns out
to be irrelevant. As MacFarlane () points out, if two parties disagree relative to a context of
assessment, they disagree relative to every context of assessment.

a situation in which John believes the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beau-
tiful and Mary believes its negation if that proposition is true relative to John’s
context of assessment, but false relative to Mary’s context of assessment. In that
case, John’s belief would be accurate relative to his context of assessment and
Mary’s belief would be accurate relative to her context of assessment. From the
point of view of (), it does not matter whether the parameters are initialised
by the context of assessment or the context of use.
Perhaps it is too much to ask that MacFarlane should provide a reason for
adopting () instead of (). MacFarlane offers a view of disagreement that
allows us to make sense of apparent cases of disagreement that we may other-
wise ﬁnd it difﬁcult to make sense of, and perhaps we should not expect more.
Furthermore, even if there is no independent evidence that supports (), it is
not clear that there is any evidence against it either. Having said that, it would
certainly be interesting if there were any reasons for adopting () instead of
().
Could a relativist try to appeal to the alleged connection between disagree-
ment and attributions of truth and falsity? If we are talking about propositional
truth, there is a worry that this does not allow us to distinguish between the pa-
rameters that relativists want to posit and parameters like worlds, times, and lo-
cations. Suppose that John, who is in St Andrews, believes the location-neutral
proposition that it’s raining, and that Mary, who is in Oslo, at believes its nega-
tion. Furthermore, let us suppose that it is raining in St Andrews, but not in Oslo.
In that case, () would be true at as uttered by Mary in Oslo.
() What John believes is false.
What John believes is the proposition that it’s raining, and that proposition is
false relative to Oslo. However, even if Mary believes that what John believes is
false, we do not want to conclude that they disagree. As far these attributions of
propositional truth are concerned, there is no difference between propositions
that are true or false relative to contexts of use and propositions that are true or
false relative to contexts of assessment. It is true that Mary can say that what John
believes is false when he believes the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beau-
tiful, and that is false relative to her standards. However, that is true regardless
of whether the aesthetic standards are determined by the context of assessment

or the context of use. Furthermore, it cannot be sufﬁcient for Mary and John to
disagree unless one is prepared to accept that this is also true in cases involving
time or location-neutral propositions. MacFarlane () recognises that he
needs to give up () if he wants to countenance the existence of propositions
that are true or false relative to parameters like times or locations.
() For every x and every y, if x believes that what y believes is false, x disagrees
with y.
If a relativist ﬁnds that objectionable, she may take that to be a reason to go
with the ﬁrst reply and deny that there are propositions that are true or false
relative to times or locations. In any case, it makes it difﬁcult to use attributions
of propositional truth as a basis for arguing that Mary and John disagree when
different aesthetic standards are involved.
Perhaps it is more promising to look for a connection between disagreement
and attributions of truth as it applies to utterances, as opposed to propositions.
Following MacFarlane (), we can adopt () as a deﬁnition of utterance
truth.
() An utterance of a sentence s in a context of use c is true relative to a
context of assessment c if and only if the proposition expressed by s in
c is true relative to the world, time, and location of c and the aesthetic
standards of c.
In this case it makes a difference whether the parameters are initialised by the
context of assessment or the context of use. Suppose that () expresses a propo-
As a result of complications involving tense, matters are a bit more complicated in the case of
tensed propositions. See e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (forthcoming) for relevant discussion.
From the point of view of thinking about disagreement, it would perhaps make sense to talk
about truth as it applies to belief-states. However, I ﬁnd it easier to talk about utterance truth, and
I will continue to do so for the purpose of this discussion. As far as I can see, nothing substantial
turns on this.
MacFarlane (b, , ) does not seem to be too happy about applying truth to ut-
terances. He takes the notion of utterance truth to be a technical notion. His notion of ‘accuracy’
can play a similar role. However, given the way that he uses it, it is not clear that it is any less of
a technical notion than utterance truth. Furthermore, I am not entirely convinced that utterance
truth is a purely technical notion, in the sense that we have no independent grip on it. I will
therefore continue to talk about utterance truth.

sition that has different truth-values relative to different locations and that John
utters that sentence in St Andrews.
() It’s raining.
If Mary is in a location in which it is not raining, she can say what John said is
false. However, according to the deﬁnition of utterance truth we are working
with, () would still be false as uttered by Mary.
() John’s utterance of ‘It’s raining’ is false.
However, now we can see a difference between locations and aesthetic standards.
If () expresses a proposition that is false relative to Mary’s aesthetic standards
and John utters that sentence, Mary can say that his utterance is false. In that
case, () would be true as uttered by Mary.
() John’s utterance of ‘Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful’ is false.
Does this give us a reason to think that Mary disagrees with John? While I do not
want to deny that this is some evidence that they disagree, one should be careful
about relying too much on considerations like this. After all, why should we ex-
pect disagreement to be tied to attributions of utterance truth when it is not tied
to attributions of propositional truth? Even if there are no clear counterexam-
ples to the claim that disagreement is tied to attributions of utterance truth, we
have already acknowledged that our judgements about the connection between
disagreement and attributions of propositional truth might be mistaken. That
makes it somewhat questionable to rely on judgements about the connection be-
tween disagreement and attributions of utterance truth.
This suggests that it would be preferable to have an account that preserves
the connection between disagreement, propositional truth, and utterance truth.
That is possible if one denies that propositions are true or false relative param-
eters that are determined by the context of use. The only relevant parameters
are parameters that are determined by the context of assessment. In effect, this
would be an account that combines the ﬁrst and the second reply.
If you think that there is something strange about propositional truth and utterance truth com-
ing apart in this way, you are not alone. See e.g. Cappelen andHawthorne () andMacFarlane
() for relevant discussion. See also Chapter .

Let us take stock. One way for relativists to respond to the argument that
was presented in x. is to argue that disagreement works differently when dif-
ferent parameters are involved. While this may seem ad hoc, MacFarlane (b,
) has developed a relativist framework that allows us to distinguish between
parameters that are initialised by the context of assessment and parameters that
are initialised by the context of use. This provides a basis for treating different
parameters differently when it comes to disagreement.
However, the extent to which the relevant view of disagreement can be said
to be independently motivated is still not clear. While it is difﬁcult to appeal to
a connection between disagreement and attributions of propositional truth, it
might be possible to appeal to a connection between disagreement and attribu-
tions of utterance truth. However, it is not clear that it is a good idea to invest
too much in the connection between disagreement and attributions of utterance
truth, when it has already been acknowledged that the connection between attri-
butions of propositional truth and disagreement fails.
. Indexical Relativism and Nonindexical Contextualism
So far I have focused on views on which propositional truth is relative. However,
MacFarlane’s (b) distinction between contexts of assessment and contexts
of use allows us to identify another theoretical option. According toMacFarlane’s
preferred version of relativism, there are sentences that express propositions that
have different truth-values relative to different contexts of assessment. An alter-
native to this view, is the view that the relevant sentences express different propo-
sitions relative to different contexts of assessment. Weatherson () calls this
view ‘indexical relativism’, and he argues that it gives us a good treatment of in-
dicative conditionals. Cappelen (a, b) has explored a similar view
that he calls ‘content relativism’. It involves treating sentences as expressing dif-
ferent propositions relative to different contexts of interpretation. However, for
the purpose of the following discussion I will be sticking with Weatherson’s ter-
minology and I will be glossing over any differences between his view and Cap-
pelen’s view.
MacFarlane (b) calls the view ‘expressive relativism’, but I will not be using his terminol-
ogy here.
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While indexical relativismmay have lots of interesting applications, what mat-
ters for our purposes is how it deals with disagreement. The basic idea is that a
sentence like () expresses one proposition relative to John’s context of assess-
ment and a different proposition relative to Mary’s context of assessment.
() Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
This should not be confused with the standard contextualist view that treats ()
as expressing different propositions in different contexts of use. Even if we hold
the context of use ﬁxed, () would still express different propositions relative to
different contexts of assessment. Suppose that () is uttered by John. The propo-
sition expressed relative to John’s context of assessment is the proposition that
Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful relative to John’s standards. However, the propo-
sition expressed relative to Mary’s context of assessment is the proposition that
Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful relative to Mary’s standards. We may suppose that
the proposition expressed relative to John’s standards is true, while the proposi-
tion expressed relative to Mary’s standards is false.
Does this provide a basis for claiming that Mary and John disagree? If we
think about disagreement as a phenomenon at the level of thought, that is not
clear. The most natural way to characterise their beliefs is to think of John as be-
lieving the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful relative to John’s stan-
dards, and to think of Mary as believing the proposition that Picasso’s Guernica is
beautiful relative to Mary’s standards. If that is correct, indexical relativism is in
the same position as contextualism with respect to what is going on at the level of
belief. This suggests that indexical relativism is no better off than contextualism
when it comes to dealing with disagreement in this sense.
Having said that, indexical relativism appears to be better suited for dealing
with other kinds of data that have played an important role in the debate between
contextualists and relativists. For instance, if indexical relativism is correct, it
makes sense forMary to disagree with John’s utterance and to reject his assertion.
This could explain what is going in dialogues like ().
() a. John: Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful.
b. Mary: I disagree./No, it is not beautiful.
If John’s utterance of (a) expresses a false proposition relative to Mary’s con-

text of assessment, it would make sense for her to reject his assertion.
These kinds of dialogues are a useful way of eliciting judgements about dis-
agreement. But it is also possible to ask whether Mary and John disagree when
they are in different contexts and not speaking to each other. Insofar as this is a
matter of what Mary and John believe, this is more complicated from the point
of view of indexical relativism.
It is also worth noting that MacFarlane’s way of defending relativism leaves
room for a view he calls ‘nonindexical contextualism’. Relativists and nonindexi-
cal contextualists agree that propositional truth is relative. The difference comes
down to whether the relevant parameters are initialised by the context of assess-
ment or the context of use. According to relativism, the relevant parameters are
initialised by the context of assessment. According to nonindexical contextual-
ism, the relevant parameters are initialised by the context of use.
MacFarlane () does not take nonindexical contextualism to offer any
advantages over contextualism when it comes to dealing with disagreement. The
point of introducing contexts of assessment was to distinguish the parameters
that relativists want to posit from parameters like worlds, times, and locations. If
the aesthetic standard parameter was initialised by the context of use, it would be
no different from the world or the time parameter. It would not be sufﬁcient for
Mary and John to disagree that John believes the proposition that Picasso’s Guer-
nica is beautiful and Mary believes the negation of that proposition. Insofar as
I am mainly interested in questions about disagreement, this makes nonindex-
ical contextualism less interesting as an independent theoretical option. Still,
from the point of view of providing a taxonomy of the relevant views, it is a posi-
tion that should be recognised. If we accept MacFarlane’s way of construing the
debate, we are left with the following four positions:
 Contextualism
When Weatherson () attempts to motivate an indexical relativist treatment of indicative
conditionals using agreement data, he talks about speakers agreeing with an utterance. Indexical
relativism delivers the right predictions with respect to this kind of agreement data, but there
might be other kinds of agreement data that the view does not explain.
MacFarlane () suggests that nonindexical contextualism has other advantages over con-
textualism, such as being in a position to provide a better account of belief and indirect speech
reports. See e.g. also Brogaard ().
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 Relativism
 Indexical Relativism
 Nonindexical Contextualism
However, insofar as the focus is on considerations involving disagreement, I will
mainly be talking about contextualism and relativism. For the most part I will be
ignoring indexical relativism and nonindexical contextualism as independent
options.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the issues involving relativism
and disagreement. Beyond a commitment to propositions being true or false to
a ‘non-standard’ parameter, I have not attempted to offer a general and uniform
characterisation of relativism. What the relativist views I that am interested in
have in common, is that they are motivated by considerations involving disagree-
ment. In particular, relativism is supposed to do better than contextualism when
it comes to dealing with disagreement.
I have discussed an objection to relativist accounts of disagreement that is
based on how disagreement works when truth is relative to parameters like worlds
and times. The upshot of the discussion is that there are at least two ways for
relativists to respond to this argument. The ﬁrst is to deny that propositions are
true or false relative to parameters like worlds and times. The second is to say that
the parameters that relativists want to posit are somehow different from themore
traditional parameters. Both of these options seem to be viable, but in either
case there is a further question about whether the view can be independently
motivated. I have suggested that it might be possible for relativists to appeal to
a connection between disagreement and truth in order to provide independent
motivation for their account of disagreement, but such a connection might be
problematic when truth is relative.
Perhaps there is a way to argue that the relativist account of disagreement is
incorrect without relying on premises that the relativists are already committed
to denying. Or perhaps it is possible to show that the relativist account of dis-
agreement is independently motivated. At this point I am not going to make any

assumptions either way. In the following chapters I will focus on more general
questions about agreement and disagreement, and the argument from disagree-
ment as a problem for contextualism.

Chapter 
Agreement and Disagreement
S: What are the subjects of difference that cause hatred and anger?
(Plato, Euthyphro b)
Introduction
Discussions that concern agreement or disagreement on some level or another
are common in philosophy. For instance, there has been a lot of recent interest
among philosophers of language and linguists in the role that considerations in-
volving agreement and disagreement play in motivating a relativist semantics for
a wide range of expressions that includes epistemic modals, knowledge ascrip-
tions and predicates of taste. Among other things it has been argued that there
are cases of faultless disagreement, cases of disagreement in which neither party
is making a mistake, and that relativists are in a position to secure such faultless
disagreement.
While considerations involving agreement and disagreement have played a
particularly central role in these debates, there are lots of other debates in phi-
losophy in which questions about agreement and disagreement are relevant.
Moral philosophers discuss the alleged intractability of moral disagreement and
See e.g. Kolbel (, ), Richard (, ), Egan et al. (), Lasersohn (),
Egan (, ), Stephenson () and MacFarlane (a, b, , forthcoming-a,
forthcoming-b).
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whether certain theories about morality and moral thought and talk are incom-
patible or in tension with there being genuine moral disagreement. Epistemolo-
gists argue about the epistemic signiﬁcance of disagreement andmetametaphysi-
cians debate whether disagreements about ontology are merely verbal. Extend-
ing the list is probably more a matter of patience than anything else.
In light of all of this it seems that we could beneﬁt from a better understand-
ing of agreement and disagreement. I am not pretending that all of the philo-
sophical questions mentioned above will be answered if we succeed in achieving
a better of understanding of these phenomena, but perhaps some headway can
be made in certain areas. Therefore, what I want to do is to step back from
the philosophical debates in which considerations involving agreement and dis-
agreement play a role, and talk about agreement and disagreement in their own
right. The central question that I want to address concerns the attitudes that are
involved when we agree or disagree. Is it the case that agreement and disagree-
ment always involve a particular kind of attitude or can it involve different kinds
of attitudes? For instance, can all cases of agreement and disagreement be un-
derstood in terms of what the parties believe, or are there cases of agreement or
disagreement that involve other attitudes?
My main goal is to attempt to answer these question by developing a view
of agreement and disagreement that treats disagreement as involving conﬂict-
ing attitudes and agreement as involving converging attitudes. I will be taking
Stevenson’s (, , ) notion of ‘conﬂicting attitudes’ as my starting
point. According to the view that I want to defend, agreement and disagreement
is not exclusively a matter of what the parties believe. Agreement and disagree-
ment can involve a wide range of attitudes such as wanting, liking, approving,
and so forth. While this may sound like an ambitious project, I want to stress that
it does not have to take the form of a fully reductive theory or analysis in terms
of necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. It is still possible to say something inter-
esting about agreement and disagreement without engaging in such an overly
ambitious project.
As a part of this overall project I will be arguing against attempts to under-
stand all cases of agreement and disagreement in terms of what the parties be-
lieve. While this might appear to be an initially attractive view of agreement and
disagreement, I want to argue that there are cases of agreement and disagree-
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ment that are hard to reconcile with this view. Attempts to understand these
cases in terms of what the parties believe run into problems. There might be
ways of avoiding these problems while maintaining that agreement and disagree-
ment is always a matter of what the parties believe. However, in order to do
that it is necessary to take on board certain further commitments that are not
unproblematic in their own right.
In x. I distinguish between two questions concerning agreement and dis-
agreement, the attitude question and the object question, and Imake it clear that
I am mostly interested in the former question. In x. I discuss an answer to the
attitude question that is based on the view that agreement and disagreement is
always a matter of what the parties believe. In x. and x. I argue that there are
cases of disagreement that should not be understood in terms of what the parties
believe. In x. I discuss the possibility that someone who adopts a relativist view
may be able to avoid these problems. In x. I propose that we think about agree-
ment and disagreement in terms of converging and conﬂicting attitudes, and that
this forms the basis for a better view of agreement and disagreement. In x. I
say something about what it takes for two parties to have conﬂicting attitudes. In
x. I discuss the implications for the debate about faultless disagreement.
. The Questions
Some cases of agreement and disagreement are relatively straightforward. Let us
start with a fairly simple and uncontroversial case of disagreement. Suppose that
Harry, Mary, and John are having a discussion about th century Russian litera-
ture. Harry wants to know who wrote War and Peace and the following exchange
takes place:
() Harry: Who wrote War and Peace?
a. Mary: War and Peace was written by Tolstoy.
b. John: No, it was written by Dostoyevsky, not Tolstoy.
Let us assume that the parties are sincere and competent users of the language
who are not confused about what they believe in any relevant sense. In that case,
it seems clear that Mary and John disagree in this example. But what is going
on here? What can we say about the disagreement between Mary and John? An

initially reasonable reaction is to say that there is a proposition, the proposition
that Tolstoy wrote War and Peace, that Mary believes to be true and John believes
to be false. This may or may not be the whole story, but it goes at least some way
towards explaining why Mary and John disagree.
Let us also look at a similarly straightforward case of agreement. Suppose
that Harry, Mary, and John are talking about chess. They start talking about the
former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, and Harry wants to know when
he ﬁrst became world champion. He decides to ask Mary and John, and the
following exchange takes place:
() Harry: When did Kasparov become world chess champion?
a. Mary: Kasparov became world chess champion in .
b. John: Yes, he became world chess champion in .
I take it that Mary and John agree in this example. Moreover, something similar
to what was said about Mary and John’s disagreement in () can be said about
Mary and John’s agreement in (). In this case, there is a proposition, the
proposition that Kasparov becameworld chess champion in , that bothMary
and John believe to be true. Cases like () and () provide a useful point of
reference for the following discussion insofar as they provide us with relatively
simple and straightforward cases of agreement and disagreement.
The central question that I want to address concerns the attitudes that are in-
volved when we agree or disagree. For instance, it is natural to think of Mary and
John’s disagreement in () and Mary and John’s agreement in () as having
something to do with what the parties believe. In the case of Mary and John’s dis-
agreement in (), Mary believes the proposition that War and Peace was written
by Dostoyevsky while John believes the negation of that proposition. Similarly, in
the case of Mary and John’s agreement in () they both believe the proposition
that Kasparov became world chess champion in .
The question is whether there is anything general and interesting to be said
about the attitudes that we have when we agree or disagree. Is it the case that
agreement and disagreement always involve belief, as in the case of () and
(), or can there be cases of agreement and disagreement involving other atti-
tudes? Let us call this the ‘attitude question’.
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The Attitude Question: What kinds of attitudes may be involved when two par-
ties agree or disagree?
Behind this way of stating the question there is a presupposition that whether
two parties agree or disagree is at least partly a matter of which attitudes the
parties have. This presupposition may of course be challenged, but it seems to
be a reasonable assumption. There is certainly something plausible about the
thought that whether we agree or disagree somehow depends on our attitudes.
When we want to know whether two parties agree or disagree, we need to know
what their attitudes are like. This is not to say there cannot be other relevant
factors, but the attitudes of the parties are always relevant.
It is important tomake it clear that this means that I am thinking about agree-
ment and disagreement primarily as phenomena at the level of mental states, not
at the level of language. When we ask whether two individuals agree or disagree,
this is a matter of which attitudes they have towards the relevant objects, not a
matter of what they are saying. This point of view is endorsed by Jackson and
Pettit (). They put the point quite succinctly: ‘Moral disagreement, and in-
deed disagreement in general, is a psychological phenomenon. The production
of sentences make public our disagreements; it does not create them’ (Jackson
& Pettit, , p. ).
In order to evaluate this claim, we need to look at what happens when these
things come apart. In the case of () and (), we assumed that both Mary
and John were sincere. What happens if we suspend that assumption? Let us
suppose that John was insincere when he asserted thatWar and Peace was written
by Dostoyevsky, and that he believed thatWar and Peace was written by Tolstoy all
along. In that case, I am inclined to say that Mary and John do not disagree.
The same point holds in the case (). If either Mary or John turned out to be
insincere, they would not agree.
These judgements are admittedly somewhat delicate, and one should be care-
ful about generalising based on such a limited number of examples. Still, I take
this to be some evidence that what matters are not what Mary and John are say-
It is important to separate the question of whether Mary and John disagree from the question
of whether Mary disagrees with what John said. If John is being insincere, these things may come
apart.
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ing, but what they believe. I am therefore going to side with Jackson and Pettit
() and assume that agreement and disagreement are phenomena at the
level of mental states, not at the level of language. This does not mean that it is a
mistake to focus on examples at the level of language. This is useful for eliciting
clear judgements about agreement and disagreement as long as we can assume
that the parties are sincere. In general, judgements appear to be more robust
when there is no conﬂict between what is going on at the level of language and
what is going at the level of mental states.
While I am going to focus on the attitude question, there is a related question
concerning the objects of agreement and disagreement. I assume that if we agree
or disagree we might sensibly ask what the object, or objects, of our agreement
or disagreement is. In the case of (), an obvious candidate is the proposition
that Tolstoy wrote War and Peace. This is the proposition that Mary believes to
be true and that John believes to be false. Similarly, a good candidate in the
case of () is the proposition that Kasparov became world chess champion in
 since both Mary and John believe that proposition to be true. This raises
the question of whether there is anything that can be said in general about the
objects of agreement and disagreement. For instance, if it is true that the object
of the disagreement in () is a proposition, we might wonder whether this is
true in general. Let us call this the ‘object question’.
The Object Question: What are the objects of agreement and disagreement?
A lot of recent discussion about agreement and disagreement can be seen as con-
cerning the objects of agreement and disagreement. It has been argued that we
should take the objects of agreement and disagreement to be propositions that
are true or false only relative to, say, different individuals or different perspec-
tives. Kolbel (, ), among others, has argued that this allows us to make
sense of alleged cases of faultless disagreement, cases of disagreement in which
neither party is making a mistake.
However, here I am going to focus on the attitude question and I am only
going to address the object question insofar as it is a connection with the atti-
tude question. It is plausible that there is some kind of connection. Indeed, a
straightforward way of thinking about this is to take the objects of agreement and
disagreement to correspond to the objects of the attitudes that are involved when
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we agree or disagree. In that case, if one thinks that agreement and disagreement
can involve attitudes that are not attitudes towards propositions, there will also
be cases in which the objects of the agreement or disagreement are not a propo-
sitions. However, these questions are at most going to play a secondary role in
the following discussion.
. The Doxastic View
In light of the examples that we considered in the previous section, one might
wonder whether there is a simple answer to the attitude question. That is to say
that agreement and disagreement always involve belief. This might appear to be
a natural and plausible suggestion given what was said about Mary and John’s
disagreement in () and Mary and John’s agreement in ().
() Harry: Who wrote War and Peace?
a. Mary: War and Peace was written by Tolstoy.
b. John: No, it was written by Dostoyevsky, not Tolstoy.
() Harry: When did Kasparov become world chess champion?
a. Mary: Kasparov became world chess champion in .
There are two points of clariﬁcations regarding the scope of the present discussion that I want
to make at this point. More speciﬁcally, I want to set aside certain uses of ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’.
The ﬁrst point of clariﬁcation is that I am mainly interested in agreement and disagreement be-
tween two or more individuals. Sometimes we say that we agree or disagree with, say, a theory or
an opinion. In that case there may not be anyone that we agree or disagree with because there
might not be anyone who believes the proposition in question. For the most part, I am going
to ignore such uses of ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ and focus on agreement and disagreement between
individuals.
The second point of clariﬁcation concerns a distinction that Cappelen and Hawthorne ()
draws between two different uses of ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’. They argue that there is a performative
use that denotes an activity and a stative use that denotes a state of a plurality of individuals. It
is only the stative use that I am interested in here. Cappelen and Hawthorne observe that if we
are dealing with the performative use of ‘agree’, there is a sense in which I have agreed with you
simply if I say ‘I agree’ in response to something that you say. I therefore worry that the terms of
the debate would change considerably if we were talking about the performative use of ‘agree’ and
‘disagree’, and I will only be concerned with the states which are denoted by stative uses of ‘agree’
and ‘disagree’.

b. John: Yes, he became world chess champion in .
The idea is to take the initial observations about () and () at more or less
face value and attempt to understand all cases of agreement and disagreement
in the same way. This way of answering the attitude question forms the basis of
what I will call the ‘doxastic view’. The central thesis of the doxastic view can be
stated as follows:
Thesis : Whether two parties agree or disagree is always amatter of which propo-
sitions they believe.
Insofar as the objects of belief are propositions, and insofar as the objects of
agreement and disagreement correspond to the objects of the attitudes involved,
the doxastic view also comes with a commitment to the following thesis:
Thesis : The objects of agreement and disagreement are propositions.
More importantly, we can also ﬂesh out the view in order to say something about
which attitudes the parties need to have towards a proposition in order to agree,
and which attitudes the parties need to have towards a proposition in order to
disagree. The most straightforward way of doing this is to add the following nec-
essary conditions on agreement and disagreement:
Thesis a: Two parties agree only if there is a proposition that both parties be-
lieve.
Thesis b: Two parties disagree only if there is a proposition such that one party
believes that proposition and the other party believes the negation of that
proposition.
There are a lot of complications here, but the precise details are not what is im-
portant since I ammainly interested in is the basic idea behind the doxastic view,
that is, the commitment to viewing agreement and disagreement as a matter of
which propositions that we believe. For instance, if we want to have a primi-
tive attitude of rejection or denial, such that rejecting a proposition cannot be
According to MacFarlane (), we have to weaken these necessary conditions if we are
dealing with tensed or temporally neutral propositions, propositions that are true or false relative
to times. Suppose thatMary at noon believes the tensed proposition that Socrates is sitting and that

understood simply in terms of believing its negation, we can easily make room
for that. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will assume that the doxastic view
comes with a commitment to something like these necessary conditions on agree-
ment and disagreement, even though there is considerable room for discussion
when it comes to the details.
Looking at recent debates about relativist treatments of expressions such as
predicates of taste and epistemic modals, one easily gets the impression that the
doxastic view is widely accepted. One can ﬁnd both proponents and opponents
of relativism expressing support for the doxastic view. For instance, Kolbel, who
defends a version of relativism, makes the following claim:
A case of disagreement typically provides both communicators with a
reason to conduct a discussion. For in these cases there is a content p
such that one communicator believes p and the other believes not-p.
(Kolbel, , p. )
On a relatively straightforward reading this sounds like an expression of support
for the doxastic view. If two communicators disagree, there is a content or propo-
sition such that one of them believes that proposition and the other believes the
negation of that proposition.
MacFarlane () also endorses the doxastic view, or at least something very
close to it, while attempting to give a relativist account of disagreement. He talks
Peter at midnight believes the negation of the tensed proposition that Socrates was sitting  hours
ago. It certainly seems right to say that they disagree, but there is no proposition such that one of
them believes that proposition and the other believes its negation. Instead, MacFarlane proposes
that we should talk about suitably related propositions. This means that it is also misleading to
talk as if there is a single proposition that is the object of our agreement or disagreement. Similar,
considerations come up in the case in which the object of the belief is a centred propositions.
However, I am going to set these complications aside for the purpose of the following discussion.
See also Chapter  for relevant discussion.
See e.g. MacFarlane () who talks about disagreement in terms of acceptance of rejection.
See also x. for further discussion.
A notable exception is Weatherson () who explicitly rejects the doxastic view. See also
Huvenes (forthcoming).
This is notmeant to be an accurate description ofMacFarlane’s current views on disagreement.
In personal communication and recent unpublished work MacFarlane indicates that he favours a
different view about disagreement that is more similar to the view associated with Stevenson (,
, ). See MacFarlane (ms.).

about disagreement in terms of acceptance and rejection, but he is reluctant to
say that it is a necessary condition on disagreement that there is a proposition
that one party accepts and the other party rejects. However, his reasons for being
cautious mainly have to do with problems involving tensed propositions and the
like, and he wants to allow for cases of disagreement in which one party accepts
a proposition and another party rejects a suitably related proposition.
To get a fully general necessary condition [for disagreement], we
need to say what it is for two propositions to be ‘suitably related’
such that acceptance of one and rejection of the other constitute
disagreement. (MacFarlane, , p. )
Even if this is strictly speaking a weakening of the thesis that there must a propo-
sition that one party accepts and the other rejects in order for them to disagree,
it is clearly still in keeping with the spirit of the doxastic view.
We also ﬁnd endorsements of the doxastic view among those who oppose
relativism. Cappelen and Hawthorne () fall into this category. In passages
like the following it is clear that theymean to endorse something like the doxastic
view:
Thus, the natural picture of agreement we have endorsed above, ac-
cording to which agreement between a pair of individuals fundamen-
tally consists in their acceptance of the same proposition, is called
into question. (Cappelen & Hawthorne, , p. )
While I want to argue that the doxastic view is untenable as a view of agreement
and disagreement in general, I do not want to deny that the view has considerable
appeal. If we look at the examples of agreement and disagreement that we started
out with, it is easy to see why someonemight be tempted by the doxastic view. For
instance, in the case of Mary and John’s disagreement in (), it sounds right to
say that the object of their disagreement is the proposition that Tolstoy wrote
War and Peace. Whereas Mary believes the proposition that Tolstoy wrote War
It is also worth noting that Cappelen and Hawthorne () take the thesis that propositions
are the objects of agreement and disagreement to be one of the ﬁve theses that make up the view
they call ‘Simplicity’. They take Simplicity to be a ‘mainstream’ view and they go on to defend it
from various objections, including those of relativists like Kolbel and MacFarlane.
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and Peace, John believes its negation. As an explanation of why they disagree this
might be a bit simple, but something along these lines is surely not far off the
mark. Similarly, in the case of Mary and John’s agreement in (), it sounds
right to say that the object of their agreement is the proposition that Kasparov
became world chess champion in , a proposition that they both believe to
be true. Even if the details are not quite right, something like this better be on
the right track. Indeed, it is hard to deny that agreement and disagreement is at
least sometimes a matter of which propositions we believe.
I do not deny that the doxastic view may appear to be an initially attractive
view about agreement and disagreement. In fact, I think that we should give up
the doxastic view only if we have good reasons to do so. There is at least some
pressure to try to understand potentially problematic cases of agreement and
disagreement as involving beliefs if we can do so. Having said that, I think that
we do have reasons to give up the doxastic view. There are cases of agreement and
disagreement that do not easily ﬁt into the same mould as the cases we started
out with. These cases cannot be understood in terms of what the parties believe,
at least not without incurring further and potentially problematic commitments.
. A Problem for the Doxastic View
According to the doxastic view, all cases of agreement and disagreement can be
understood more or less along the same lines as the simple cases that we con-
sidered in x.. However, I want to argue that things are not quite as simple as
that. Even if the examples of agreement and disagreement that we considered
in x. are easily accommodated if we accept the doxastic view, there are other
examples of agreement and disagreement that are more difﬁcult to handle. In
this section I am going to focus on cases of disagreement that present a challenge
for the doxastic view.
Imagine that Mary and John are a couple who want to spend some time to-
gether, and that they are trying to ﬁgure out what to do. While they are talking
about how they could spend their evening, the exchange in () takes place.
() a. Mary: I want to go to the movies.
b. John: No, I would rather just stay at home.

There certainly seems to be a sense in which Mary and John disagree in the dia-
logue above. For instance, consider how natural it is for a third party to report
that they disagree by using ().
() Mary and John disagree about what to do.
I take it that there is nothing particularly strange or out of the ordinary about
Mary and John’s disagreement in () insofar as it is easy to come up with similar
examples. Mary and John could be talking about their upcoming holiday and
disagree about where to go, or they might be talking about where they want to go
for dinner and disagree about whether to go for Indian or Thai food. Moreover,
as we should expect, there are analogous examples of agreement. Consider, for
instance the following dialogue between Mary and John:
() a. Mary: I want to go to the movies.
b. John: Yes, I would like that too.
Just as Mary and John appear to disagree in (), they appear to agree in ().
In the following discussion I will be focusing on the disagreement between Mary
and John in (), but it is important to bear in mind that there are analogous
cases of agreement that we also need to make sense of.
The question is whether we can properly capture the disagreement between
Mary and John in () within the framework provided by the doxastic view. If
the doxastic view is correct, the disagreement betweenMary and John is to be un-
derstood in terms of the propositions that they believe. There must be a propo-
sition such that one of them believes that proposition while the other believes
its negation. But what is the relevant proposition in this case? In the cases that
we considered in x., it was a relatively straightforward matter to identify the
relevant propositions. However, in this case, matters appear to be much more
complicated.
It should be noted that examples like () are by nomeans new in the philosophical literature.
Stevenson (, p. ) offers the following example:
A: Let’s go to the cinema tonight.
B: I don’t want to do that. Let’s go to the symphony.
Stevenson takes this to be an instance of what he calls ‘disagreement in interest’ and distinguishes
it from what he calls ‘disagreement in belief’.
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What should someone who wants to defend the doxastic view say about an
example like ()? There is a natural response that is available to someone who
wants to defend the doxastic view and that is to say that Mary and John disagree
about whether they should go to themovies. In other words, the suggestion is that
the object of their disagreement is the proposition that Mary and John should go
the movies. Whereas Mary believes that proposition, John believes its negation.
This may sound like a plausible suggestion, but I want to argue that there are
good reasons to think that it is ultimately problematic. Moreover, what I have to
say about this speciﬁc proposal can hopefully also be extended to other similar
responses on behalf of the doxastic view. As far as I can see, nothing turns on
whether we are talking about what Mary and John should do, or what they ought
to do, or what they have reasons to do, and so forth.
There are twomain worries about this response on behalf of the doxastic view.
The ﬁst worry concerns the sense of ‘should’ that we are talking about. What
exactly is the proposition that is the object ofMary and John’s disagreement? The
basic problem is to come up with a sense of ‘should’ such that it is both plausible
that Mary believes the proposition that they should go to the movies and that
John believes the negation of that proposition. The worry is that proposition is
going to be too weak and they can both believe it, or it is going to be too strong
and neither of them has to believe it. Let us call this the ‘too strong or too weak’
worry.
It does not help us to capture the disagreement between Mary and John if
Mary only believes the proposition that they should to go the movies in view of
her preferences. John does not have to believe that proposition to be false, he
might very well believe that it is true. What John presumably believes to be false is
a different proposition, namely the proposition that they should to go themovies
in view of his preferences. But this is again not a proposition that Mary has to
believe to be true. Marymight very well believe that they should not go themovies
in view of John’s preferences.
Perhaps itmakesmore sense to say thatMary and Johndisagree about whether
I am assuming a view of deontic modals like ‘should’ and ‘ought’ according to which they are
effectively treated as restricted quantiﬁers over possible worlds. See e.g. Kratzer (). However,
the point probably goes through on a different view of deontic modals as long they are context-
dependent in the right way.
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they should go to the movies in view of their joint preferences or in view of what
is good for both them. The suggestion would be that Mary not only believes the
proposition that they should to go the movies in view of her preferences, she also
believes the proposition that they should go to themovies in view of both her and
John’s preferences.
I do not want to deny that Mary and John could have a disagreement like this.
The question is whether this is the only way we can understand Mary and John as
having a genuine disagreement. Does Mary have to believe that they should go
to the movies in view of both her and John’s preferences in order for there to be
a disagreement between her and John? There are good reasons to think that this
is not the case. Mary might know that John does not want to go the movies. In
that case it seems a bit strange to say that she still has to believe the proposition
that they should go the movies in view of both her and John’s preferences. While
she might think that her preferences somehow outweigh John’s preferences, she
certainly does not have to think that. However, even if Mary does not think
anything like that, we are left with the impression that they disagree.
This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive in the sense that I aim to talk
about every conceivable way of trying tomake sense of the disagreement between
Mary and John. However, I hope that the general point is reasonably clear. It is
not easy to identify a sense of ‘should’ such that it is reasonable to assume both
that Mary believes the proposition that they should go to the movies, and that
John believes its negation. Either we are left we a proposition that is too weak,
or we are left with a proposition that is too strong.
I also want to raise a second worry with the response that Mary and John
disagree about the proposition that they should go to the movies. The worry is
based on the observation that it is not clear whether it makes much sense to say
that either Mary or John is either right or wrong in this case. Let us call this the
‘no right or wrong’ worry. Manley () makes a point along these lines while
commenting on the following example:
() a. Christine: Let’s go to the beach today.
Moreover, as Jonathan Ichikawa (p.c.) has pointed out to me, we can add more parties to the
conversation. In that case it becomes even more strange to say that Mary has to think that her
preferences outweigh the preferences of all the other parties.
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b. Melissa: No, let’s go downtown instead.
He argues that while there is a sense in which Christine and Melissa disagree,
there is no sense in which either of them is right or wrong. There is something
strange about saying that one of them is right and the other is wrong. To the
extent that this is right in the case of Christine and Melissa’s disagreement in
(), it is presumably also right in the case of Mary and John’s disagreement in
().
This raises a worry concerning the suggestion that Mary and John disagree
about the proposition that they should go to the movies. If Mary believes the
proposition that they should go to the movies and John believes its negation, we
would expect one of them to be right and the other to be wrong. But this is not
the impression that we are left with. Indeed, it does not look like either Mary or
John is either right or wrong in this case.
While I have only considered one response on behalf of the doxastic view,
namely the response that Mary and John disagree because Mary believes the
proposition that they should go the movies and John believes its negation, the
worries that I have raised are hopefully sufﬁciently general to cast doubts on the
general project of trying to provide a response along these lines. Moreover, it is
not clear what an alternative response on behalf of the doxastic view would look
like if it was not something along these lines.
If what I have said here is on the right track, cases like () constitute a chal-
lenge for the doxastic view. That does not mean that we cannot ﬁnd similar cases
in which the parties disagree about, say, what they should do. Those will be cases
in which there is a proposition that one party believes to be true and the other
party believes to be false. What I am arguing against is the view that all cases of
disagreement are like that, and cases like () seem to present a problem for this
view.
Furthermore, cases like () cease to be a problem once we accept that dis-
agreement may involve conﬂicting non-doxastic attitudes like desires or prefer-
ences. A straightforward way of making sense of Mary and John’s disagreement
is to say that there is a conﬂict in what they want. What is going on in the case of
() is simply that Mary wants it to be the case that they are going to the movies,
and John wants it to be the case that they are not going to the movies. From this

point of view, there is no real problem here.
. Further Problems for the Doxastic View
In the previous section it was suggested that some cases of disagreement may be
characterised as involving conﬂicting desires rather than conﬂicting beliefs. In
this section, I will argue that two parties can also disagree as a result of having
different preferences, say, when it comes to food or humour. For instance, we
might want to say that there is a sense in which John and Mary disagree on the
basis of (a) and (b).
() a. John: I like Dave’s curry.
b. Mary: I dislike Dave’s curry.
It sounds like () is a natural way of reporting their disagreement.
() John and Mary disagree about Dave’s curry.
Some philosophers might feel a bit squeamish about saying that John and Mary
disagree, but I am not alone in drawing attention to this kind of disagreement.
For instance, Weatherson () makes the following observation:
[...] two people can disagree without there being any proposition
that one says is true and the other is false. (This should be familiar
from debates about non-cognitivism in ethics.) If A says ‘I like ice
cream’ and B says ‘I don’t like ice cream’, then there is a natural
sense in which they are disagreeing. (Weatherson, , p. )
Schroeder (), echoing Stevenson (), also seems to acknowledge that
there could be a disagreement like this while discussing speaker subjectivism as
a view in metaethics.
Speaker subjectivists can take advantage of a move made by Steven-
son () and insist that ‘murder is wrong’ and ‘murder is not
wrong’ are not like ‘I’m in Seattle’ and ‘I’m in New York’; rather,
It is worth point out that not everyone agrees that cases like () are cases of disagreement.
See e.g. Jackson (, p. ).
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they can say, they are more like ‘I’m for the Mariners’ and ‘I’m for
the Yankees’. Two people who say the latter, at least sincerely, are in a
kind of disagreement|disagreement in attitude. (Schroeder, ,
p. )
It is not hard to see why examples like () present a prima facie problem for the
doxastic view. The challenge facing the doxastic view is once again to identify
a proposition that John believes to be true and Mary believes to be false, but it
is far from clear that there are any suitable candidates. It is not enough that
John believes the proposition that he likes Dave’s curry and that Mary believes
the proposition that she dislikes Dave’s curry. Johnmight believe the proposition
that Mary dislikes Dave’s curry and Mary might believe the proposition that John
likes Dave’s curry. This does not explain why they disagree. If the doxastic view
is correct, there must be some other proposition such that one of them believes
that proposition and the other believes its negation.
The natural response is to argue that the object of the disagreement is the
proposition that Dave’s curry tastes good. This response is similar to the response
on behalf of the doxastic view that was discussed in the previous section, and it
turns out to be problematic for similar reasons. In the previous section I raised
two worries, the ‘too strong or too weak’ worry and the ‘no right or wrong’
worry, concerning this way of attempting to explain Mary and John’s disagree-
ment about what to do, and I will argue that there are similar problems with the
response that is under discussion in this section.
The ﬁrst worry is analogous to the ‘too strong or too weak’ worry. It is hard
to identify a proposition such that it is plausible that John believes that propo-
sition and Mary believes its negation. It is fair to assume that John believes the
proposition that Dave’s curry tastes good to him since he is willing to assert that
he likes the curry, but Mary does not have to believe that proposition to be false.
What she believes, is the proposition that Dave’s curry does not taste good to her.
But this is again something that John can believe too.
On the other hand, if we take the relevant proposition to be the proposition
that Dave’s curry tastes good to both of them, it is no longer clear that John has
to believe that proposition. He does not even have to have a view about whether

Dave’s curry tastes good toMary or not. Taking the object of their disagreement
to be something like the proposition that Dave’s curry tastes good to members of
the wider community, does not help. Even if we assume that there is a community
to which both John and Mary belong, there is not much of a basis for thinking
that John has to believe the proposition that Dave’s curry tastes good to members
of this community. After all, he is only asserting that he likes the curry.
The point is not that John and Mary could not have a disagreement like this.
The point is that there does not seem to be strong case for thinking that the
disagreement in () has to be understood in this way. Moreover, as far as I
can see, the judgement that John and Mary disagree is not contingent on John
believing anything stronger than the proposition that Dave’s curry tastes good to
him, and that is not enough to make sense of the disagreement if the doxastic
view is correct.
There is also a worry analogous to the ‘no right or wrong’ worry. If John and
Mary’s disagreement can be explained by there being a proposition such that
John believes that proposition and Mary believes its negation, we should expect
one of them to be right and one of them to wrong. Typically, when someone
believes a proposition and someone else believes the negation of that proposi-
tion, we expect one of them to be getting it wrong. But it does not look like John
or Mary have to be making a mistake in (). There is a sense in which neither
John nor Mary is getting it either right or wrong in this case. This suggests that
we should look for a different way of handling cases like this, one which does not
require there to be a proposition such that one of them believes that proposition
and the other believes its negation.
As in the previous section, these considerations do not amount to anything
like a decisive refutation. For one thing, I do not pretend that I have explored
In fact, we do not even have to assume that John and Mary are participants in the same con-
versation, or even that they know each other, to generate a sense of disagreement. If they do not
even know each other, it would be extremely odd for John to have to have a view about whether
the curry tastes good to Mary.
It is important to note that what is it at stake here is not whether matters of taste are somehow
more or less objective. Even if it turns out that matters of taste are perfectly objective, whatever
that may involve, that does not make it is easier to explain John and Mary’s disagreement in ().
If anything, it would be even harder to motivate the claim that John believes the proposition that
Dave’s curry tastes good if that was understood in a perfectly objective sense.
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every possible way ofmaking sense of the idea that there is a proposition that John
believes to be true andMary believes to be false and that this is why they disagree.
However, I hope that I have done enough to show that there are general worries
about this line of response that go beyond my criticism of the speciﬁc proposals.
Instead of trying to look for a proposition such that one of them believes that
proposition and the other believes its negation, we can deal with cases like ()
by taking them to involve a conﬂict of non-doxastic attitudes. We simply take
appearances at face value and say that John and Mary disagree because he likes
Dave’s curry and she does not like it. What we have is a case of conﬂicting non-
doxastic attitudes and not a case of conﬂicting beliefs.
. Relativism to the Rescue?
While the considerations that I have put forward in the previous sections put
signiﬁcant pressure on the doxastic view, someone might object that I have been
too quick. There is a possible response on behalf of the doxastic view that I
have been ignoring so far. Someone who wants to hold on to the doxastic view
could adopt a form of relativism in an attempt to get around the objections that
I have raised. Relativism has recently attracted a lot of attention as a means of
explaining allegedly puzzling disagreement data involving, among other things,
predicates of taste and epistemic of modals.
Different relativists have articulated their views in different ways. For the sake
of simplicity, I am going to more or less follow Egan () in taking relativism
to be the view that there are propositions that have different truth-values relative
to different individuals, but what I am about to say can be adapted to a different
versions of relativism. Let us consider the case ofMary and John’s disagreement
in () in light of this view. The idea is that the object of their disagreement
is the proposition that Mary and John should go to the movies. However, that
See e.g. Kolbel (, ), Egan et al. (), Lasersohn (), MacFarlane (b,
), Egan (), and Stephenson ().
Egan () formulates his relativist account in terms of there being propositions that deter-
mine a truth-value relative to a centred world, a <world, time, individual> triple, and not just a
possible world. See Chapter  for further discussion of relativism.
For a more worked out relativist treatment of predicates of taste such as ‘tasty’ that is relevant
with respect to the discussion in x., see e.g. Lasersohn () and Stephenson ().
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proposition is true relative to Mary and false relative to John. For instance, it
might be true relative to Mary in virtue of her preferences and false relative to
John in virtue of his preferences.
This line of response on behalf the doxastic view should not come as a sur-
prise to someone who has observed recent debates about relativism in philosophy
of language and linguistics. In fact, the style of argument that I have employed
against the doxastic view, is similar to the style of argument that is often used
to motivate relativism. It would therefore not be surprising if adopting a rela-
tivist position can give us some traction with the ‘too strong or too weak’ worry
and the ‘no right or wrong’ worry. Since the proposition that Mary and John
should go to the movies is true relative to Mary, it makes sense for her to believe
it and since the negation is true relative John it makes sense for him to believe
the negation. Moreover, since the proposition that Mary believes is true relative
to her and since the proposition that John believes is true relative to him, there
is a sense in which neither of them has made a mistake.
All of this is of course contingent on there being a plausible version of rela-
tivism available. This is both a speciﬁc question regarding the prospects of a rela-
tivist treatment of the relevant expressions, and a question regarding the general
prospects of relativism. One must both provide a plausible relativist treatment
of ‘should’ and show that such a relativist account can secure genuine disagree-
ment. These tasks are not trivial.
I do not have much to offer in the way of objections to relativism at this point,
either generally or with regard to the prospects of using relativism to provide a
defence of the doxastic view. A lot has been said on this subject by others, and
I am not going to repeat it here. I regard it as an open question whether it is
ultimately possible to offer a plausible account of disagreement along the lines
that relativists propose. What I want to emphasise is that this way of defending
the doxastic view comes with signiﬁcant commitments. If one is forced to adopt
a relativist position in order to hold on to the doxastic view, that might turn out
to be a high price to pay. There is at least something to be said for exploring
For a more sophisticated discussion of deontic modals, see e.g. Kolodny and MacFarlane
().
See e.g. Stojanovic (), Moruzzi (), Rosenkranz (), and Francen () for
some recent criticisms of relativist accounts of disagreement.
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other options.
What it is also important to recognise, is that the relationship between rela-
tivism and the doxastic view is not just a one way relationship. Relativism offers
a way of responding to the arguments against the doxastic view. But relativism
is also supposed to be motivated by considerations involving disagreement. We
have seen that Kolbel (, ) and MacFarlane () endorse something
like the doxastic view. Without the doxastic view it becomes more difﬁcult to
motivate relativism by appealing to considerations involving disagreement. If dis-
agreement can involve a wide range of attitudes, there is worry that it becomes
more difﬁcult to ensure that the relevant cases should be understood in the way
that relativists want them to be understood.
. Disagreement in Attitude
The picture of agreement and disagreement that I want to defend is closely tied to
a way of thinking about agreement and disagreement that goes back to Stevenson
(, , ). Stevenson distinguished between what he called ‘disagree-
ment in belief’ and what he called ‘disagreement in attitude’ or ‘disagreement in
interest’. There is disagreement in belief when there is a proposition such that
one party believes that proposition and another party believes its negation. This
is the kind of disagreement we ﬁnd in (). Disagreement in attitude contrasts
with disagreement in belief insofar as it involves a conﬂict of attitudes as opposed
to a conﬂict of beliefs.
Two men will be said to disagree in attitude when they have opposed
attitudes to the same object|one approving of it, for instance, and
the other disapproving of it|and when at least one of them has a
motive for altering or calling into question the attitude of the other.
(Stevenson, , p. )
It is this way of thinking about disagreement, and the notion of ‘disagreement in
attitude’ in particular, that I am interested in. According to this picture, agree-
See Chapter  for further discussion.
See also Stevenson (, ).
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ment and disagreement do not always have to involve belief. Sometimes agree-
ment and disagreement involve other attitudes, such as approval and disapproval.
This way of thinking about agreement and disagreement can also be found
in the works of contemporary expressivists like Blackburn (, ) and
Gibbard (). For instance, consider the following passage from Blackburn
():
If I am minded to permit smoking in our house, and my wife is
minded to forbid it, we do disagree. Only one of these practical
attitudes can be implemented, and I am for one, and she is for the
other. When we discuss ethics with each other, we are typically talk-
ing about ‘our house’, or in other words practical issues on which we
want to coordinate, or have to coordinate. In that case difference of
attitude means disagreement, just as surely as disagreement in belief
does. [...] the typical, default, position is that difference in attitude
is treated as disagreement. (Blackburn, , p. )
In this passage, Blackburn appears to be endorsing a view of disagreement that is
similar to the view proposed by Stevenson. But even if this way of thinking about
agreement and disagreement might be attractive from an expressivist point of
view, that does notmean one is committed to some kind of expressivist view if one
thinks about agreement and disagreement in this way. The picture of agreement
and disagreement that I want to defend, is compatible with the denial of any
sort of expressivism as a thesis about, say, the workings of normative thought
and talk. Thinking that agreement and disagreement can involve attitudes other
than belief, does not entail any sort of expressivist thesis. What matters for our
purposes are the attitudes of the parties, not how these attitudes are expressed
in language.
Even though I take Stevenson’s notion of ‘disagreement in attitude’ as my
starting point, I want to point out that my preferred way of thinking about these
Gibbard () focuses on the notion of ‘disagreement in plan’ and contrasts this with Steven-
son’s notion of ‘disagreement in attitude’. However, insofar as disagreement in plan also contrasts
with disagreement in belief, I do not think that there is any need to think that there is a fundamen-
tal conﬂict here. As far as I can see, there is room for both disagreement in plan and disagreement
in attitude as Gibbard construes these notions.
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matters differs from Stevenson’s in certain respects. Themain point of departure
from the picture that Stevenson presents, is that I do not take it to be an essential
part of the view that there are two different senses of ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’. If we
understand ‘attitude’ in a broader sense that also includes belief, we can think of
all agreement as involving converging attitudes and all disagreement as involving
conﬂicting attitudes. Having conﬂicting beliefs is just one way of having conﬂict-
ing attitudes. In effect, the proposal is that all agreement and disagreement is
agreement and disagreement in attitude, but with ‘attitude’ being understood in
a sufﬁciently broad sense that also includes belief.
It is not entirely clear in what way Stevenson thought that we needed to dis-
tinguish between disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude, and it is
therefore not clear how substantial these differences are. In any case, the point is
not that ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ cannot exhibit some form of context-dependence
or ambiguity. Whether ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ are context-dependent or ambigu-
ous is an empirical question about the semantics of English, and one would have
to examine the empirical evidence in order to settle that question. The point is
that we do not have to think there are two different senses of ‘agree’ and ‘dis-
agree’ in order to allow for cases of agreement and disagreement that involve
attitudes other than belief.
With these clariﬁcations in mind, I want to put forward the following two
theses:
Thesis *: Two parties agree just in case they have converging attitudes.
Thesis *: Two parties disagree just in case they have conﬂicting attitudes.
While this tells us something about agreement and disagreement, agreement
and disagreement involve converging and conﬂicting attitudes respectively, it
still leaves a lot of questions unanswered. What is it for attitudes to conﬂict or
converge? What are the attitudes in question? Are we dealing with a wide range
of attitudes or only a few special attitudes? At the very least these theses have to be
Another potential point of departure from Stevenson’s account is that he took it to be a neces-
sary condition on disagreement that one of the parties has to be motivated to change or challenge
the attitude of the other party. It is not clear how well-motivated this condition is, and I take it to
be an open question whether it is needed. However, note that Stevenson () also took this to
be a necessary condition for disagreement in belief and not just for disagreement in attitude.
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supplemented with the thesis that there are cases of conﬂicting and converging
attitudes that are not cases of conﬂicting and converging beliefs.
Pluralism: There is convergence and conﬂict among a wide range of attitudes
that includes both doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes.
This thesis, together with Thesis * and Thesis *, is the central thesis that I want
to defend. It captures the idea that agreement and disagreement may involve
other attitudes than belief. What are the relevant attitudes apart from beliefs?
Stevenson (, p. ) mentions purposes, aspirations, wants, preferences, and
desires. Other potential examples are liking, admiring, hoping, and so forth.
For instance, if someone desires or wants something to be the case and someone
else wants it not to be the case, there is a sense in which their attitudes conﬂict.
Similarly, two parties can be said to have conﬂicting attitudes if there is something
that one of them likes and the other dislikes. In these cases it sounds quite natural
to say that there is some sort of disagreement between the parties.
In light of this, it should be clear that the view should not have much trouble
with the cases of disagreement that we have discussed so far. There is nothing
that prevents this view from dealing with the cases in x. in more or less the
same way as the doxastic view. Moreover, if we can think about disagreement in
terms of what the parties want or like, the cases in x. and x. should also be
easier to deal with. For instance, it seems plausible to say that the disagreement
between Mary and John in () is a matter of Mary and John having conﬂicting
desires or preferences.
() a. Mary: I want to go to the movies.
b. John: No, I would rather just stay at home.
Examples like this are useful as a starting point for getting a better grip on what
conﬂicting and converging attitudes are, but it would be nice to be able to say
something more general, something that goes beyond particular examples. Is
there anything general to be said about what it is for attitudes to conﬂict or con-
verge? Again, we should not expect too much. After all, we are not aiming for a
fully reductive account of agreement and disagreement.
There does not have to be anything particularly mysterious about talking
about people as having conﬂicting or converging attitudes. For one thing, we
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routinely compare the attitudes of different people. We are often interested in
whether other people have the same attitudes as we do. On many occasions, it
also makes sense to ask whether our attitudes are in conﬂict or whether they are
compatible.
In light of this, I think that it is possible to say something about conﬂicting
and converging attitudes that might help us to get a better grip on the view of
agreement and disagreement under discussion. In the next section I will try to
say something more about conﬂicting attitudes with the goal of giving us a better
grip on this notion. In doing so, I will be focusing on conﬂicting attitudes instead
of converging attitudes. Once we have a better grip on conﬂicting attitudes this
will hopefully also give us a better grip on converging attitudes as well.
. Conﬂicting Attitudes
There are broadly speaking two ways in which two parties can be said to have
conﬂicting attitudes. The ﬁrst is that there is a proposition such that one of
the parties has a certain attitude towards that proposition, and the other party
has the same attitude towards the negation of that proposition. For instance,
when two parties have conﬂicting beliefs there is a typically a proposition such
that one party believes that proposition, and the other party believes its negation.
Along similar lines, theremight be a proposition such that one wants it to be true,
and the other party wants its negation to be true.
The second way in which two parties can have conﬂicting attitudes, is that
they have different and conﬂicting attitudes towards the same object. A possible
example of this would be if there is something that one party likes and the other
party dislikes. It is worth pointing out that, depending on one’s views about the
attitudes in question, the relevant object does not have to be a proposition. In-
sofar as this is the case, there is no reason to think that the objects of agreement
This distinction is similar to the distinction that Schroeder () draws between what he calls
‘A-type’ and ‘B-type’ inconsistency. Schroeder argues that there are no uncontroversial cases of
‘B-type’ inconsistency. That may be true if we are talking about inconsistency, but it does mean
that it has to be true if we are talking about disagreement.
For the purpose of the following discussion I will assume that propositions are true or false
simpliciter and not relative to any parameters. For instance, if there are propositions that have
different truth-values relative to different times, this would introduce further complications.
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and disagreement will always be propositions, contrary to what one might expect
if one is only paying attention to cases like () and ().
In certain respects, the ﬁrst way in two parties can have conﬂicting attitudes
is the most familiar. However, there are reasons for thinking that all cases of
conﬂicting attitudes should ultimately be understood in terms of the parties hav-
ing different and conﬂicting attitudes towards the same object. That is true even
in the case of belief. Consider the beliefs of someone who is a dialethist and
believes that the liar sentence is true and that the liar sentence is not true. Sup-
pose that she encounters another dialethist with exactly the same beliefs. If it
were sufﬁcient for having conﬂicting attitudes that one party believes a proposi-
tion and another party believes its negation, we would expect them to disagree.
But that does not seem right. One way of avoiding this problem is to introduce
a primitive attitude of rejection or disbelief. Two parties count as having con-
ﬂicting attitudes if there is a proposition that one party believes and the other
rejects. It is typically safe to assume that someone who believes the negation of
a proposition also rejects it, but occasionally it is necessary to keep these notions
apart.
For the purpose of the following discussion, I will assume that we can ignore
these complications and treat two parties as having conﬂicting attitudes if there
is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition, and the other party
believes its negation. More generally, I am going to continue to assume that there
are two different ways of having conﬂicting attitudes. There can be an object
such that one party has an attitude towards that object, and the other party has
a different and conﬂicting attitude towards the same object. But there can also
be a proposition such that one party has an attitude towards that proposition,
It is not sufﬁcient for two parties to have conﬂicting attitudes if one party has an attitude and
the other party lacks that attitude. For instance, this may happen if one of the parties may lack the
relevant concepts. Suppose that Mary likes her father’s cooking. If John has never tasted Mary’s
father’s cooking, he will presumably not share that attitude. However, that does not mean that
Mary and John have conﬂicting attitudes in the relevant sense. In order for Mary and John to have
conﬂicting attitudes, John would have to dislike Mary’s father’s cooking.
One might object that it is a problem with dialethism that is severs the connection between
negation and disagreement. Since I have no inclination to accept dialethism, I am not going to
take a stand on that. However, one does not have to be dialethist to think that two dialethists
should not count as having a disagreement in virtue of their beliefs about the liar sentence.
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and the other party has the same attitude towards its negation. By doing this
I am actually making matters more difﬁcult for myself by introducing further
complications and making the case of conﬂicting beliefs seem more special than
it is.
In any case, it is important to see that a difference in attitudes is not always
sufﬁcient to give us a conﬂict of attitudes. If someone supposes that there is an
odd number of atoms in the universe, and someone else supposes that there is
not an odd number of atoms in the universe, we do not want to say that their
attitudes conﬂict or that they disagree. However, there is a difference in attitude.
The same is true of wondering. It is arguably also true of imagining. We do not
want to say that two people disagree just because one of them is imagining that
there is an odd number of atoms in the universe while the other is imagining that
the there is not an odd number of atoms in the universe. If this is right, having
conﬂicting attitudes cannot just be a matter of having different attitudes. This
assumes that a conﬂict of attitudes can be a matter of there being a proposition
such that one party has a certain attitude towards that proposition, and the other
party has the same attitude towards the negation of that proposition. But insofar
as that assumption has already been granted, we are faced with the question of
how to distinguish between cases involving wondering and imagining, and cases
involving wanting and believing.
The question is when a difference in attitudes amounts to a conﬂict of atti-
tudes. One way of getting some traction with this question is to use intrapersonal
cases of conﬂicting attitudes as a starting point, and attempt to use them to get
a better grip on the interpersonal cases. That is going to be strategy that I will
pursue here. This is relatively easy to see in cases in which there is a conﬂict
among one’s beliefs. If one believes a proposition, it is clear that there would be
conﬂict if one also were to believe its negation. However, I take it that there can
also be conﬂicts among one’s non-doxastic attitudes. There could for instance
be a conﬂict among one’s preferences or desires. If one likes and dislikes chilli
at the same time, this will typically constitute a conﬂict of attitudes. Similarly,
MacFarlane (ms.) also appears to be suggesting something similar.
Saying that both liking and disliking something at the same time constitutes a conﬂict of at-
titudes is perhaps a bit simplistic. It is possible to like something in one respect and dislike it in
another respect without any real conﬂict. For instance, one can like the smell of the coffee and at
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there is typically a conﬂict among one’s attitudes if one both wants something to
be the case, and at the same time wants it not to be the case.
We do not have to look at actual conﬂicts. Even if it turns out that actual
conﬂicts of this sort are rare, we can recognise potential conﬂicts. For instance,
if one wants it to be the case that the number of atoms in the universe is odd,
one can recognise that there would be a conﬂict if one also were to want it to
be the case that the number of atoms in the universe is not odd. We can also
look at the difference between our current attitudes and our previous attitudes.
Suppose that Mary used to like chilli, but that she no longer likes it. In that case,
her current attitudes are in conﬂict with her previous attitudes. This suggests
that () can be used as a guide to whether we have a conﬂict of attitudes at the
intrapersonal level.
() If there is a conﬂict between two attitudes at the intrapersonal level, those
attitudes are also in conﬂict at the interpersonal level.
In the case of wondering and supposing we typically do not ﬁnd any such con-
ﬂicts among our own attitudes. This is perhaps easiest to see in the case of
wondering. When someone wonders whether a proposition is true, it is entirely
natural for them to also wonder whether the negation is true. However, the point
also applies in the case in which one is supposing that something is the case. For
instance, I can suppose that both a proposition and its negation is true in or-
der to see what follows. I might just be interested in seeing what follows from a
contradiction. This does not mean that there is any kind of conﬂict among my
attitudes. Insofar as we do not ﬁnd conﬂicts involving these attitudes on the in-
trapersonal level, it is not surprising that we do not ﬁnd them at the interpersonal
level either.
For the purpose of this discussion, ‘conﬂict’ should be understood in a rela-
tively broad sense. For instance, it does not have to entail that it is psychologically
impossible to have both attitudes at the same time. Even in the case of conﬂicting
beliefs, it is not clear that this is the case.
the same time dislike its taste.
The case of imagining is more complicated. However, there is a sense in which there is no
conﬂict between imagining that something is the case, and imagining that something is not the
case.
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It is also doubtful whether the relevant notion of ‘conﬂicting attitudes’ should
be cashed out in terms of which attitudes it is rationality permissible to have.
Again, the worry is that this would be too restrictive. Perhaps there is a sense
in which it is not rational to both like and dislike something, but that is not obvi-
ous. At the very least this would introduce some highly contentious issues about
rationality that I would prefer to avoid for the purpose of this discussion.
A more promising idea is that there is a conﬂict between two attitudes just
in case having both attitudes at the same time tends to lead to problems. For
instance, if one has a conﬂict among one’s desires or preferences one might
have trouble ﬁguring out what to do. One might also ﬁnd oneself in a situation
in which it is impossible for one’s desires or preferences to be satisﬁed. In the
case of conﬂicting beliefs, the problem could be that one’s beliefs could not both
be true. One would be guaranteed to end up with a false belief. Moreover, there
are no such problems associated with supposing or imagining. It is not the case
that imagining a proposition and its negation leads to problems like this. As a
guide to whether a difference in attitude counts as a conﬂict of attitudes, this
seems to be promising.
Finally, I want to stress that there are lots of problems involving agreement
and disagreement that are problems for everyone regardless of how they answer
the attitude question. For instance, how should we think about conﬂicting and
converging attitudes if the objects of the relevant attitudes are centred propo-
sitions, propositions that vary in truth-value across individuals? Does it make a
difference with respect to whether two parties have conﬂicting or converging at-
titudes if they are thinking about the relevant objects under different guises or
modes of presentation? These are interesting questions, but they are not ques-
tions speciﬁcally for someone who rejects the doxastic view. There is no reason
to think that someone who endorses the doxastic view will have an easier time
answering questions like this.
The question that I am mainly interested in is the attitude question. In par-
Dreier () suggests something along these lines.
It is also important to make sure that the relevant condition is not too permissive. It cannot
be sufﬁcient for there to be a conﬂict of attitudes that one cannot rationally have both attitudes.
That condition would be satisﬁed if was not rational to have one of the attitudes. Instead, the
relevant condition would have to be that one would fail to be rational solely in virtue of having
those attitudes.
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ticular, I want to argue that we should think about agreement and disagreement
as potentially involving a wide range of attitudes, and not just belief. I have there-
fore focused on issues that are fairly closely connected to these issues. In this sec-
tion I have tried to say something about how we can make sense of what it takes
to have conﬂicting attitudes, when we allow that there can be conﬂicts among
attitudes other than belief. As I have said, I do not think that this notion is par-
ticularly mysterious. However, to the extent that someone ﬁnds the notion of
‘conﬂicting attitudes’ problematic, I hope that what I have said can give them a
better grip on this notions.
. Faultless Disagreement
A potential beneﬁt and a potential worry with having a more pluralist view of
disagreement, is that it leaves room for faultless disagreement. It is not entirely
clear what faultless disagreement amounts to because there are many ways in
which someone can be said to be wrong or making a mistake. In the case of
belief, one might for instance be wrong because one believes something false
or because one believes something on the basis of inadequate or misleading evi-
dence. In what follows, I will understand faultless disagreement as disagreement
that is compatible with neither party making a mistake in a broad sense of ‘mak-
ing a mistake’. The fact that two parties disagree does not entail that one of them
is making any kind of mistake.
The more pluralist picture of disagreement that was developed in x. and
x., appears to be compatible with faultless disagreement in this broad sense.
If you can have a disagreement as a result of having, say, conﬂicting desires or
preferences, there is no reason to think that either party is wrong or at fault or
making any sort of mistake. If Mary wants it to be the case that she and John are
going to the movies, and John wants it to be the case they stay at home, neither of
them has to be making a mistake. In fact, when I was arguing that the doxastic
That is not to say that it is impossible for one of them to be making a mistake. Perhaps there
are circumstances in which John would be making some kind of mistake by wanting Mary and
him to stay at home. Nothing that I have said is inconsistent with this being a genuine possibility.
However, the stronger claim that this is true in general whenever someone is having a disagreement
like the one that Mary and John are having, looks much less plausible.
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view has a hard time dealing with cases like this, I argued that we do not want to be
forced to say that either Mary or John is making a mistake. Adopting a more plu-
ralist conception of disagreement allows us to avoid saying precisely that. From
this point of view, it is a virtue of this sort of account that it is compatible with
faultless disagreement.
However, it may also be argued that it is also a vice to predict that there are
cases of faultless disagreement. While proponents of a relativist semantics like
Kolbel (, ) and Lasersohn () have taken it to be an advantage of
their views that they can secure faultless disagreement, this is far from universally
accepted. In fact, the view that there is faultless disagreement has been met with
considerable scepticism. For instance, Glanzberg offers the following remarks
on the topic of faultless disagreement:
Lasersohn, and a number of other contemporary relativists, point
out that their notion of relative truth offers a notion of ‘faultless dis-
agreement’, where two utterances express disagreement, even though
neither is incorrect (cf. Kolbel ). From a traditional, non-
relativist, point of view, this idea is prima facie absurd: if two proposi-
tions express disagreement, one must fail to be correct. [...] My own
inclination is to side with the traditional view, and reject the notion
of faultless disagreement as absurd. (Glanzberg, , p. )
I take it that the sort of scepticism about faultless disagreement that Glanzberg
is expressing is not uncommon. But even if one is sceptical about the notion
of faultless disagreement that some relativists are trying to secure, that does not
necessarily translate into scepticism about the sort of faultless disagreement that
one gets if one thinks that disagreement may involve non-doxastic attitudes. It
is not clear what kind of disagreement Glanzberg has in mind when he is talk-
ing about faultless disagreement. His scepticism might be appropriate insofar as
he is talking about cases of disagreement in which the parties are believing con-
tradictory propositions, and perhaps that is how we should interpret him when
he talks about two propositions expressing disagreement. The assumption that
See e.g. Stojanovic (), Moruzzi (), and Rosenkranz () for various criticisms of
relativist attempts to make sense of faultless disagreement.
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faultless disagreement must involve contradictory beliefs is made even more ex-
plicit by Kolbel (, ). For instance, Kolbel makes the following claim
about faultless disagreement:
There are disagreements without error, or in other words, somepropo-
sitions are not objective. However, minimal constraints on truth
show that if it is true that p, then it is not true that not-p, and if it
is true that not-p, then it is not true that p. So if one thinker believes
that p and another believes that not-p, one of them makes the mis-
take of believing a proposition that is not true. The only way to allow
faultless disagreement is therefore to relativise truth to perspectives:
one disputant’s belief is true in his or her own perspective, and the
other disputant’s contradictory belief is true in his or her own per-
spective. (Kolbel, , p. )
Given the way he thinks about disagreement, it is not strange that Kolbel comes
to the conclusion that faultless disagreement requires truth to be relative to per-
spectives. He wants to be able to make sense of cases in which two parties have
contradictory beliefs without either of them being wrong. In the following def-
inition of ‘faultless disagreement’ from Kolbel (), he makes it explicit that
the notion of faultless disagreement he is talking about requires the parties to
have contradictory beliefs:
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a
thinker B, and a proposition (content of judgement) p, such that:
(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault).
(Kolbel, , p. -)
Kolbel goes on to claim that ‘most people have a healthy pre-theoretic intuition
that there can be and are faultless disagreements in this sense’. That may or
may not be true. The point is that one might well reject this sort of faultless dis-
agreement while accepting faultless disagreement involving conﬂicting desires
or preferences. Someone who supports a more pluralist conception of agree-
ment and disagreement can grant that there is something prima facie odd about

two parties having a disagreement as result of there being a proposition such that
one of them believes that proposition and the other believes its negation without
either of them being mistaken. But that does not necessarily mean that there is
something correspondingly odd about a case of faultless disagreement involving
conﬂicting desires or preferences.
It is useful to look at a more speciﬁc objection to faultless disagreement in
order to illustrate this point. Rosenkranz () presents a dilemma for rela-
tivists like Kolbel who want to make sense of faultless disagreement. Suppose
that there is a proposition p such that I assert that p, and that you assert that
not-p, and that p is true relative to my perspective, but false relative to your per-
spective. Rosenkranz argues that if I merely present p as true relative to my
perspective, and you merely present not-p as true relative to your perspective, we
do not really have a disagreement. On the other hand, if we present the propo-
sitions in question as true simpliciter or relative to every perspective, we do have
a disagreement, but it is not faultless because it is a mistake to present p as true
simpliciter if it is only true relative to my perspective.
I do not want to take a stand on whether the argument succeeds in raising
problems for Kolbel’s account of faultless disagreement. The initial reaction is
that relativists may not want to accept that there is no disagreement if I merely
present p as true relative to my perspective, and you present not-p as true relative
to your perspective. Alternatively, they might raise questions about the notion of
‘presenting a proposition as true’.
In any case, what I want to point out is that this sort of argument does not
even present a prima facie problem for the kind of faultless disagreement that
one gets if one has a more pluralist conception of disagreement. The dilemma,
if there is one, arises because relativists like Kolbel relativise propositional truth
to perspectives and therefore need to say something about the correctness of
assertions and beliefs when the propositions in question have different truth-
values relative to different perspectives. But it is hard to see what a corresponding
worry about faultless disagreement involving conﬂicting desires or preferences
would look like. The worry concerns the criteria for correctness of assertions
Rosenkranz () runs his argument mainly in terms of assertion, but I assume that it could
also be run in terms of belief. As long as the parties are sincere and not confused in some relevant
sense this should not make a difference.
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of beliefs, but the faultless disagreement that comes with a pluralist conception
of agreement and disagreement involves other kinds of attitudes. If we are only
concerned with cases of faultless disagreement that involve attitudes other than
belief, the objection would not even get off the ground.
This is of course not to say that faultless disagreement involving conﬂicting
desires or preferences is unproblematic. It would take a lot more arguing to es-
tablish that. What needs to be recognised is that the issues surrounding faultless
disagreement change if we give up the doxastic view and adopt a more pluralist
view of agreement and disagreement. There might be one set of challenges asso-
ciated with having faultless disagreements in which the parties have conﬂicting
beliefs, and a different set of challenges associated with having faultless disagree-
ments in which the parties have conﬂicting desires or preferences.
Conclusion
The starting point for this discussion was a question about the attitudes that are
involved when we agree or disagree. In an attempt to answer this question, I
have outlined what I take to be a promising way of thinking about agreement
and disagreement. According to this picture, agreement involves converging
attitudes, and disagreement involves conﬂicting attitudes. Whether we agree or
disagree is not just a matter of what we believe. Agreement and disagreement
can involve a wide range of attitudes such as wanting, liking, approving, and so
forth.
In terms of motivating this picture of agreement and disagreement my goals
have been fairly modest. My main concern has been to argue that the doxas-
tic view, which may appear to be an initially attractive view of agreement and
disagreement, faces serious problems. While it may be possible to rescue the
doxastic view by adopting some kind of relativist position, this is not unproblem-
atic. In particular, it is an open question whether it is possible to make sense
of agreement and disagreement in relativist terms. If the relativist account of
disagreement is problematic, the cure might well turn out to be worse than the
disease. In any case, it is a serious commitment on the part of someone who
wants to defend the doxastic view.
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Chapter 
Predicates of Taste
Introduction
Predicates of taste, such as ‘fun’ and ‘tasty’, have received considerable attention
in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations in-
volving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagree-
ment have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of pred-
icates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do
not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be
motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motiva-
tion is lacking. The argument against contextualism rests on a too simple and
narrow conception of disagreement that turns out to be problematic once we
consider a wider range of cases. If we reject the assumptions about disagreement
that the argument rests on, it no longer poses a threat to contextualism.
Supporters of relativism, such as Kolbel (, ), Lasersohn (),
MacFarlane (), and Stephenson (), have argued that contextualist treat-
ments of predicates of taste fail to deliver the right predictions about when speak-
ers disagree. Instead they argue that we should prefer a relativist treatment of
predicates of taste. I will argue that this line of argument is not as effective as it
initially appears to be. My main concern in this paper is to argue that there are
This is a revised version of a paper that is forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
See Huvenes (forthcoming).
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other cases of disagreement that we need to take into account. The examples I
have in mind are examples like ().
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
I will argue that examples like this do not call for a relativist treatment. Moreover,
once examples like () have been taken into account, the cases of disagreement
that were supposed to present a problem for contextualism seem to be less sur-
prising from a contextualist point of view.
In x. I outline the difference between contextualist and relativist treat-
ments of predicates of taste. In x. I explain why contextualist treatments al-
legedly have problems with disagreement. In x. I present some further dis-
agreement data, and argue that the cases that were allegedly problematic from
a contextualist point of view are less surprising in light of the new data. In x.
I try to assuage some doubts one might have about the data presented in x..
In x. I argue that focusing on other disagreement markers does not make the
argument against contextualism more effective. In x. I offer some preliminary
remarks about the possibility of understanding the disagreement data in terms
of conﬂicting non-doxastic attitudes.
. Contextualism and Relativism
The debate between contextualists and relativists that I am concerned with, is
a debate about the semantics of predicates of taste. In terms of characterising
these predicates, I will be content with saying that they are formed from adjectives
such as ‘fun’ and ‘tasty’. Instead of trying to come up with criteria for identifying
the relevant expressions, I will follow Lasersohn () and most of the other
participants in this debate and focus on the expressions ‘fun’ and ‘tasty’.
It is common ground between contextualists and relativists that there is some
sort of contextual variation in the truth-values of sentences containing ‘fun’ and
‘tasty’. The contextualist and relativist treatments of predicates of taste that I
am interested in, take the truth-values of such sentences to depend on whose
taste that is relevant in some way or another. However, they differ with respect
to how they account for this variation in truth-values. According to the semantic

framework of Kaplan (), which I will be assuming for the purpose of this
discussion, the content of an expression in a context can be represented as a
function from an index, a world-time pair on his view, to an extension. The
extension of a sentence is a truth-value, and the truth-value of a sentence can
depend on both the context insofar as it plays a role in determining the content
and the index with respect to which we evaluate the content. I will talk about the
content of a sentence in a context as a proposition.
Simply put, contextualism about predicates of taste is the thesis that sentences
containing predicates of taste express different propositions in different con-
texts. According to the kind of contextualist position we are concernedwith here,
different propositions are expressed in different contexts, depending on whose
taste that is relevant. What matters is that the contextual variation in truth-value
is explained by different propositions being expressed in different contexts.
A relativist account differs from a contextualist account in that it does not
take sentences containing predicates of taste to express different propositions
in different contexts. Instead, the relevant sentences express propositions that
are true or false relative to some appropriate parameter other than worlds and
times. Following Lasersohn (), relativists about predicates of taste can take
the truth or falsity of sentences containing predicates of taste to be relative to in-
dividuals. In terms of modifying the basic semantic framework from Kaplan this
means that indices are treated as world-time-individual triples rather than world-
time pairs. The upshot is that there can be a variation in truth-value without
different propositions being expressed.
This is Lewis’ () terminology. Strictly speaking, Kaplan () talked about circum-
stances of evaluation, not indices. However, in the interest of preserving a more or less uniform
terminology, I am sticking with Lewis’ terminology.
Kaplan () was careful when it came to identifying the content of a sentence in a context
with a proposition. As he pointed out, ‘This functional notion of the content of a sentence in
a context may not, because of the neutrality of the content with respect to time and place, say,
exactly correspond to the classical notion of a proposition’ (Kaplan, , p. ).
I am using ‘relativism’ in a broader sense than MacFarlane (b, ) insofar as I am not
distinguishing between views according to which the relevant parameters are determined by the
context of utterance and views according to which they are determined by the context of assess-
ment. Moreover, distinguishing between the context of utterance and the context of assessment
also allows us to identify a view according to which the proposition expressed depends on the
context of assessment. See e.g. Cappelen (a, b) and Weatherson () for relevant
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. The Problem of Disagreement
Supporters of relativism have argued that contextualism has problems making
sense of disagreement involving predicates of taste. For instance, take a context
in which Mary and John are riding a roller coaster. They both recognise that
while John is enjoying the ride, Mary is not, and the conversation in () takes
place.
() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: I disagree, this is not fun.
It is easy to construct similar examples involving ‘tasty’. Imagine that Mary and
John are at a party, and that the dialogue in () takes place as they are having
some chilli.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: I disagree, this chilli is not tasty.
In both () and (), it appears correct for Mary to report that she disagrees
with John. However, it is not clear that contextualism respects this judgement.
The worry is that if contextualism is correct, and the relevant sentences express
different propositions in different contexts, the proposition expressed by the
sentence uttered by Mary will not contradict the proposition expressed by the
sentence uttered by John. In that sense, Mary will not be denying the proposi-
tion expressed by the sentence uttered by John. But then in what sense do they
disagree?
discussion. Since I am primarily interested in defending a traditional form of contextualism, these
distinctions are not crucial to my overall line of argument. See also Chapter .
I also acknowledge that it is somewhat arbitrary to start out by taking indices to be world-time
pairs rather than just worlds or world-time-location triples. However, as far as I can see, nothing
substantial depends on this.
For a more detailed presentation of the argument against contextualism see e.g. Lasersohn
().
The use of ‘I disagree’ may be a bit stilted, but insofar as we want to focus on issues concerning
disagreement it makes sense to start out by looking at cases in which one of the parties explicitly
reports that she disagrees with the other party. The possible stiltedness of ‘I disagree’ will be
relevant in x. and . when I discuss examples like (). I will look at other disagreement
markers in x..

The problembecomes particularly clear if we consider a rather simple-minded
version of contextualism according to which it is always just the tastes of the
speaker that are relevant. In order to appreciate the point it is worth looking
at an example which does not involve predicates of taste, but which involves the
ﬁrst-person pronoun ‘I’. The following example is a slightly modiﬁed version of
an example that Lasersohn () uses to make a similar point:
() a. A: I am hungry.
b. B: I disagree, I am not hungry.
The response in (a) is clearly inappropriate. It is hard to make sense of the
response except as a misunderstanding of what the speaker of (a) said. If the
simple-minded version of contextualism were correct, we might expect (b)
and (b) to be bad in the same way as (b), but that does not seem to be the
case.
On the other hand, if relativism is correct, the proposition expressed by
(a) and the proposition expressed by (b) cannot both be true relative to the
same index, and in that sense the proposition expressed by (a) contradicts the
proposition expressed by (b). While more needs to be said before it becomes
clear that relativism offers a genuine explanation of the apparent disagreement
in () and (), the main question that I am interested in is how problematic
examples like () and () are from a contextualist point of view. I will argue
that these examples are less problematic from a contextualist point of view once
we take into account a sufﬁciently broad range of cases of disagreement.
. More Disagreement Data
As it has been presented here, the argument against contextualism rests on the
assumption thatMarymust be denying the proposition expressed by the sentence
I am not going to discuss the extent to which contextualists can avoid this problem altogether
by adopting a more sophisticated version of contextualism. For attempts to defend contextualism
in this way, see e.g. Glanzberg (), Recanati (, ch. ), Cappelen andHawthorne (),
and Schaffer (forthcoming-a). See e.g. Lasersohn () and MacFarlane () for critical
discussion.
For a discussion of how to develop a relativist account of disagreement see e.g. MacFarlane
().
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uttered by John in order for them disagree. While I am going to argue that we
have good reasons to reject this assumption, it might seem plausible if one is only
looking at a fairly limited range of cases of disagreement. It is perhaps tempting
to think that the examples that we considered in x., should be understood in
more or less the same way as the disagreement in examples like ().
() a. Robert: The Cuban missile crisis took place in .
b. Bobby: I disagree, it took place in , not .
On the assumption that Robert and Bobby are talking about the actual history
of the world and are referring to the same historical event, I think it is safe to
say that Robert and Bobby disagree about when the Cuban missile crisis took
place. By uttering (b), Bobby is denying the proposition expressed by (a),
the sentence uttered by Robert. More precisely, the proposition expressed by
the sentence uttered by Bobby and the proposition expressed by the sentence
uttered by Robert cannot both be true.
This is a clear and uncontroversial example of disagreement. Indeed, it
might be tempting to think that we can understand all cases of disagreement
in dialogues of this form along the same lines as (), that is, in terms of one of
the speakers denying the proposition expressed by the sentence uttered by the
other speaker. However, it does not seem that we can ﬁt all cases of disagreement
into this mould. I am primarily interested in examples like ().
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
We can imagine the conversation in () as taking place while Mary and John,
as in x., are having some chilli at a party. I take it that John disagrees with
Mary when he asserts (b) in response to (a) even though the truth of (a)
as uttered by Mary is consistent with the truth of (b) as uttered by John. If
John was denying the proposition expressed by (a), he would have to think
that Mary was somehow insincere or mistaken or confused about her own tastes.
Apart from this being odd under normal circumstances, it would be hard tomake
sense of him saying that the chilli is too hot for him. In other words, we seem
to have a case of disagreement in which John is not denying the proposition
expressed by the sentence uttered by Mary.

Judgements about examples like () are liable to vary to some extent. Even
though some ﬁnd John’s use of ‘I disagree’ a bit stilted, I will assume for now that
we want to take the example at face value and say that Mary and John disagree.
In x. I will address some potential concerns about examples like (), and
argue that such examples should be taken seriously.
Examples like (), if taken at face value, are relevant in the context of evalu-
ating the extent to which the original data present a problem for contextualism.
Insofar as it is being assumed that the cases of disagreement that are allegedly
problematic from a contextualist point of view have to be understood on the
model of (), examples like () show that this cannot be true in general. It
is not always the case that disagreement in dialogues of this form is a matter of
one of the speakers denying the proposition expressed by the sentence uttered
by the other speaker. In that case, we should not necessarily expect that to be
true of () and () either.
() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: I disagree, this is not fun.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: I disagree, this chilli is not tasty.
Even if we grant that there may be something stilted about the use of ‘I disagree’ in (), it is
not clear what this shows. The point that the use of ‘I disagree’ may be stilted does not only apply
to examples like (). These are among the issues that will be addressed in x..
Examples like () are not the only examples of disagreement that cannot easily be under-
stood along the same lines as (). Suppose that Pierre and Marie are conducting a series of
experiments in order to test a scientiﬁc hypothesis that they both believe to be false and that the
following conversation takes place after one of the experiments:
Pierre: The hypothesis is false.
Marie: I disagree, we need to do further testing.
In this case we do not need to understand Marie as denying the proposition expressed by the
sentence uttered by Pierre. Indeed, since she herself believes that the hypothesis is false, and thus
accepts the proposition expressed by the sentence uttered by Pierre, it is more plausible to take
her to disagree with Pierre on the grounds that there is insufﬁcient evidence for him to assert
that the hypothesis is false without further testing. In other words, Pierre and Marie disagree even
though Marie is not denying the proposition expressed by the sentence uttered by Pierre.

Furthermore, examples like () and () are much less surprising from a con-
textualist point of view if we take examples like () at face value. There are two
important points here. The ﬁrst point to note is that examples like () do not
lend any kind of support to relativism. Indeed, it is not clear how a plausible
account of this kind of disagreement along relativist lines could be constructed.
While there may be difﬁcult questions pertaining to the correct semantics for
‘likes’, there does not seem to be any further need for a relativist or contextu-
alist semantics of the sort that has been proposed for predicates of taste. This
means that we have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the disagreement in
examples like ().
The second point is that if we ﬁnd disagreement when speakers use sentences
like ‘I like this chilli’ to express their personal tastes, it is not surprising, even
from a contextualist perspective, that the same is true in the cases involving ‘fun’
and ‘tasty’. It seems reasonable to assume that whatever the right explanation of
Mary and John’s disagreement in () is, that explanation can be extended to
cover examples like () and () as well.
If all of this is correct, it seems to undermine the argument against contex-
tualism. The presence of disagreement in cases involving ‘fun’ and ‘tasty’ is to
be expected given that we have disagreement in cases involving ‘likes’. More-
over, the presence of disagreement in the latter case does not call for a relativist
explanation and once this is recognised it is hard to see why it should do so in
the former case either. At least the relativists owe us an account of why the cases
should be treated differently.
This does not mean that there is nothing to be gained by pursuing other
ways of defending contextualism. In particular, it might still be a good idea to
improve on the simple-minded version of contextualism according to which it is
only the tastes of the speaker which matters. What is relevant may be the tastes of
the members of some group that is determined by the context and not just the
tastes of the speaker. For instance, it may sometimes be the standards of the wider
community that are relevant Recanati (, ch. ). This would make it easier
to explain why we takeMary and John to disagree, because we can interpret them
as making claims about what is fun and tasty for members of their community.
This will become relevant in x..
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Still, I think it is important to recognise that contextualists are not necessarily
committed to thinking about the disagreement in these terms. Mary and John
may disagree even if Mary is not denying the proposition expressed by the sen-
tence uttered by John. This gives contextualists a certain amount of ﬂexibility
when it comes to responding to worries about disagreement.
. Doubts about the Data
All of this requires that one takes the data from the previous section at face value.
While I am not alone in drawing attention to examples of disagreement like
(), some may be inclined to dismiss examples like (), outright and argue
that, contrary to appearances, Mary and John do not disagree after all.
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
In response to an objection along these lines, it makes sense to compare exam-
ples like () with examples in which it really does seem wrong to report that
the parties disagree. While judgements about the appropriateness of John’s re-
sponse in () might be somewhat delicate, it is useful to consider the difference
between () and ().
() a. A: I am hungry.
b. B: I disagree, I am not hungry.
As noted earlier, the response in (b) is clearly inappropriate and it is hard to
make sense of it except as a misunderstanding. On the other hand, dialogues
like () do not seem to exhibit this kind of inappropriateness. We do not have
the same problem making sense of John’s response in (). I take this to count
against someone who wants to say that there is no disagreement in examples like
(). At the very least, one would have to explain why John’s response in () is
more natural and appropriate than the response in ().
In x. I acknowledged that some ﬁnd the use of ‘I disagree’ in () a bit
stilted. But to the extent that I am willing to grant that, I also think that to some
extent can be said of () and () as well.
See e.g. Weatherson () who points out that this sort of disagreement is known from
debates about non-cognitivism in moral philosophy.
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() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: I disagree, this is not fun.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: I disagree, this chilli is not tasty.
It is not clear that there are sufﬁcient grounds for dismissing examples like ()
while continuing to treat examples like () and () as evidence against con-
textualism. In general, it is problematic to be dismissive of examples like ()
if one wants to make positive use of other disagreement data. There might very
well be reasons to conclude that examples like () are not cases of genuine or
real disagreement in some interesting sense, but then we should be prepared to
say the same thing about other putative cases of disagreement as well. In this con-
text it is also worth noting that some philosophers have expressed doubts about
the judgements about disagreement that relativists rely on. While I am not ad-
vocating this line of response on behalf of contextualism, it makes it somewhat
awkward from a dialectical point of view for relativists to be dismissive of other
putative cases of disagreement. In the absence of a more signiﬁcant difference
between examples like () and examples like () and (), it is not clear that
relativists are warranted in dismissing examples like () while treating examples
like () and () as unproblematic.
Even if one does not want to outright dismiss examples like (), one might
think that since the denial in (b) cannot plausibly be interpreted as target-
ing the proposition expressed by (a) it could target some other proposition
conveyed by Mary’s utterance. Perhaps a relativist could argue that Mary’s utter-
ance conveys the proposition that the chilli is tasty, with this being understood in
relativist terms as having different truth-values relative to different individuals.
Insofar as relativists are in a position to explain the disagreement in examples
like () and (), they could extend that explanation to examples like ().
On this picture, relativism would be needed to make sense of the disagreement
after all.
While this is an interesting suggestion that deserves further investigation,
there are some questions that need to be addressed. For one thing it is not
obvious why we should take Mary to convey this particular proposition by her
See e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (, ch. ) and Stanley (, p. ).
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utterance. It is tempting to think of this in terms of a conversational implica-
ture, but how does this implicature arise? A natural suggestion is to appeal to
considerations involving relevance. While there might be other explanations
available, this looks like the most obvious strategy. The basic idea is that what is
relevant is whether the chilli is tasty and not just whether Mary likes, it and that
is why she is understood as conveying that the chilli is tasty.
However, given the context in which Mary utters (a), it is not clear why her
contribution to the conversation should not count as sufﬁciently relevant unless
she is understood as conveying something beyond that she likes the chilli, and
more speciﬁcally, that the chilli is tasty. If they had been talking about what kind
of food they ﬁnd tasty, that might be a reasonable assumption, but that does not
have to be the case. They could just as well have been talking about what they
like about the party or what is happening there. Moreover, this does not seem to
affect the judgement that Mary and John disagree in (). This is not to rule out
an explanation in terms of relevance, but only to say that the availability of such
an explanation cannot be taken for granted.
Another question is whether the presence of a conversational implicature
would be sufﬁcient to explain the disagreement data. It is not clear whether it
An anonymous referee for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy pointed out to me that the
dialogue in () gets worse if we replace ‘it’s too hot for me’ with ‘I am tired’, even though the
latter may also be a good reason for not enjoying the chilli. A possible explanation is that the taste
of the chilli is somehow at stake, and being tired does not bear on that. However, even if it is true
that the taste of the chilli is somehow at stake, it is far from clear that this shows that an account
of the sort that would favour the relativists is correct.
The same referee suggested that another possible relativist response is to say that (a) entails
that Mary ﬁnds the chilli tasty and that allows the denial to target the proposition that the chilli
is tasty. I will continue to focus on implicature-based proposals, but it is worth noting that this is
might be an interesting alternative. However, more work remains to be done before it is clear that
the suggestion is plausible, and I will not pursue it here.
If we take Grice’s (a) framework as a starting point, it seems natural to appeal to the
maxim of Relation. As far as the maxim of Quality and the maxim of Manner are concerned,
Mary’s contribution to the conversation is presumably both true and based on good evidence, and
it is not obscure or ambiguous. Matters aremore complicated in the case of themaxim of Quantity.
However, to the extent that it makes more sense to appeal to the maxim of Quantity, this strategy
seems to face the same questions as a strategy based on the maxim of Relation. In particular, it is
not clear why Mary’s contribution to the conversation should not count as sufﬁciently informative
even if she is only conveying that she likes the chilli.
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is always appropriate to use ‘I disagree’ when rejecting an implicature. Let us
consider a case inspired by one of Grice’s (a, p. ) original examples. A
and B are private detectives hired by Mrs. X to spy on her husband, Mr. X, and
they are talking about what he is up to.
() a. A: Mr. X is meeting a woman tonight.
b. B: I disagree, he is meeting his wife.
Following Grice, I take it that A is implicating that the woman Mr. X is meet-
ing is not his wife, and B is naturally understood as rejecting that implicature.
Still, there seems to be something awkward about B’s use of ‘I disagree’ in (b).
These judgements are admittedly fairly subtle, and I am reluctant to put too
much weight on a single example, but the point is to raise a question about
whether the use of ‘I disagree’ is always appropriate when rejecting an impli-
cature in this way. If it is not, there is at least some additional work to be done
to explain why it is appropriate in the case of (). If one is not impressed by
examples like (), this may not be a particularly pressing worry, but insofar as
one ﬁnds John’s response in () appropriate and the response in () inappro-
priate, this is something that deserves further investigation.
These considerations are not meant to rule out the possibility of saying that
what is going on in () is that John is rejecting an implicature. The point is that
relativists are not entitled to assume that the disagreement can be explained in
this way. There are questions that need to be answered and it remains to be seen
whether there is a satisfactory story to be told.
. Other Disagreement Markers
Even if one accepts a lot of what I have said so far, there is still a worry that
needs to be addressed. The worry is that I have been focusing on the wrong sort
of data, and that the relevant data involve a more restricted notion of disagree-
ment. The cases which I have been concerned with involve the use of ‘I disagree’,
This does not amount to the claim that the use of ‘I disagree’ is never appropriate when tar-
geting an implicature. Given that there are signiﬁcant differences between different kinds of im-
plicatures, it would perhaps not be surprising to ﬁnd that the use of ‘I disagree’ is more or less
appropriate in cases involving other kinds of implicatures. However, that would only illustrate the
need to get clear on the details of the account.

but there could be other disagreement markers in English that are more suited
to the argumentative purposes of the relativists by allowing us to focus on a more
restricted notion of disagreement. While relativists do not have to claim that the
relevant notion of disagreement is always tied to the use of a speciﬁc disagree-
ment marker, it would be useful for them if they had a way of showing that our
judgements are tracking the relevant notion of disagreement. If it turns out that
our judgements about cases involving other disagreement markers differ from
our judgements about cases involving ‘I disagree’, there might be a concern that
it will be difﬁcult to extend the contextualist response that I have proposed to
these cases. I will look at two such proposals and I will argue that neither of them
provides relativists with the desired results.
One option is to argue that the relevant cases involve the use of ‘that’s not
true’ or ‘that’s false’. Insofar as we want to focus on cases of disagreement in
which what is being denied is the proposition expressed by the sentence that is
uttered, this looks like a plausible candidate. Furthermore, this appears promis-
ing from a relativist perspective given that John’s response in () is clearly in-
appropriate.
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: That’s not true, it’s too hot for me.
In this respect () differs from ().
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
This does not seem to get the relativist very far though. The problem with this
approach is that there is also something unnatural about () and ().
() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: That’s not true, this is not fun.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: That’s not true, this chilli is not tasty.
For instance, we can consider the dialogue in () as taking place in the same
context as before. John is enjoying the ride, whereas Mary is scared and sick and

clearly not enjoying it. In this context, there seems to be something unnatural
about Mary’s response in (). Similarly, if Mary and John are just trying the
chilli at a party, there is something awkward about Mary’s response in (). In
this respect () and () differ from () and ().
() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: I disagree, this is not fun.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: I disagree, this chilli is not tasty.
But () and () are examples of the sort that were meant to present a problem
for contextualism. If these dialogues do not sound natural, I assume that this
should not be taken as evidence against contextualism insofar as this is just what
we would expect if contextualism were true. Judgements may vary somewhat with
respect to these examples and the extent to which the responses in () and
() are inappropriate, but I do not take these examples to be very impressive as
evidence for relativism, and that is what is important for our present purposes.
While it needs to be acknowledged that () sounds worse than () and
(), that is not necessarily unexpected from the point of view of a reasonably
ﬂexible and sophisticated version of contextualism. For instance, in the case of
(), we can try to make sense of Mary’s behaviour by taking her to be interpret-
ing John as making a stronger claim about what is fun for both of them even if
that is not natural given the context. However, in the case of (), Mary makes
it explicit that she is talking about what she likes and that means that such a
stronger reading is unavailable.
There are cases involving predicates of taste in which a response of this sort
is more natural. If Mary and John are opening a restaurant in a reasonably
civilised location, and they are talking about what they are going to serve in the
restaurant, it seems more natural for Mary to respond to John’s utterance of
(a) with (b).
() a. John: Rotten shark is tasty.
b. Mary: That’s not true, rotten shark is not tasty.
Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for making me appreciate this point.

While Mary’s response in (b) sounds more natural than the response in (b),
this is not a problem for contextualism. Given a very reasonable contextualist
story, this is just what we should expect. In this context, it is reasonable to think
that is not just the tastes of the speaker which are relevant, but the tastes of the
members of a larger community of which Mary is also a member. In this case the
contextualists can simply understand Mary as denying the proposition expressed
by the sentence uttered by John. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what a relativist
explanation of the difference between this example and examples like () and
() would look like. Given the relativist position we have been considering
so far, there does not seem to be too much of a difference between them. In
other words, there is no threat to contextualism from examples like (), and
the examples which would pose a threat to contextualism, examples like () and
(), do not sound very convincing in the ﬁrst place. If anything, our judgements
about these cases seem to ﬁt well with what we would expect if contextualism were
true.
Having said that, there are other disagreement markers that are worth exam-
ining. Stephenson () is for instance careful to point out that she is focusing
on a more restricted notion of disagreement that is tied to the use of expres-
sions like ‘nuh-uh’ and ‘no’, and she allows for the possibility that whether two
speakers disagree or not is a broader phenomenon. Kolbel (, ) and
Lasersohn () also focus on examples of this sort. Initially this seems more
promising, since there is no problem about either () or ().
() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: Nuh-uh/No, this is not fun.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: Nuh-uh/No, this chilli is not tasty.
However, it is not clear that focusing on disagreement markers like ‘nuh-uh’ or
‘no’ is going to be enough for the relativists. Consider the dialogue in ().
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: Nuh-uh/No, it’s too hot for me.
Again we can again imagine that the conversation in () takes place while Mary
and John are having some chilli at a party. Is John’s response appropriate in this

context? While some may be uneasy about this example, the response does not
seem to be altogether unnatural in the relevant context. Moreover, as I stressed
earlier, I think it is important to compare the relevant examples with examples
such as ().
() a. A: I am hungry.
b. B: Nuh-uh/No, I am not hungry.
I take the dialogue in () to be more natural than the one in (), even though
one might expect () to be just as bad as (). This is at least something which
requires explanation and there does not seem to be any reasons to think that
this explanation would ultimately give us any reason for preferring relativism
over contextualism, for reasons that we have already discussed.
If one is still not convinced about examples like (), that does not mean
that the use of disagreement markers like ‘no’ and ‘nuh-uh’ in examples like
() or () show that Mary must be denying the proposition expressed by the
sentence uttered by John. There are other examples that one might want to take
into account. For instance, consider an example like ().
() a. Mary: I recommend this chilli.
b. John: Nuh-uh/No, it’s too hot for me.
John’s response in () seems to be appropriate. However, it is implausible to
interpret him as denying the proposition expressed by the sentence uttered by
Mary. Moreover, it is plausible to think of ‘fun’ and ‘tasty’ as often being used to
recommend something. This suggests that it would be a mistake to focus exclu-
sively on examples like ().
In the end, it I am far from convinced that the use of ‘nuh-uh’ or ‘no’ as a
disagreement marker instead of ‘I disagree’ makes enough of a difference for
the relativist to be able to mount an effective argument against contextualism.
There are bound to be issues regarding when it is preferable to use ‘I disagree’
and when it is preferable to use ‘no’ and ‘nuh-uh’, but in the absence of more
clear-cut data I would be wary of investing too much in this distinction. On the
overall assessment of the disagreement data considered in this section, I do not
think that contextualism fares too badly. When it is less natural to use a disagree-
ment marker in examples like (), as in the case of ‘that’s not true’, it also less

natural in examples like () and (). However, when it is more natural to use
a disagreement marker in examples like () and (), as in the case of ‘nuh-uh’
and ‘no’, that is also true of examples like (). While I do not pretend that these
matters are in any way clear-cut, I do not think that this amounts to anything like
a good case for preferring relativism over contextualism.
. Conﬂicting Attitudes
My main concern in this paper is to argue that there are other cases of disagree-
ment that we ought to take into account when we are evaluating the claim that
considerations involving disagreement give us a reason for preferring relativism
over contextualism. Examples like () do not call for a relativist treatment.
() a. Mary: I like this chilli.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
Furthermore, once we take examples like () into account, examples like ()
and () are less problematic from a contextualist point of view.
() a. John: This is fun.
b. Mary: I disagree, this is not fun.
() a. John: This chilli is tasty.
b. Mary: I disagree, this chilli is not tasty.
While this does not presuppose any speciﬁc explanation of the data, I want to of-
fer some speculations as to what an explanation that is compatible with a contex-
tualist treatment of predicates of taste might look like. The idea I am interested
in is to view disagreement as a matter of the parties having incompatible or con-
ﬂicting attitudes. Two parties disagree just in case there is something that they
have conﬂicting attitudes towards. This sometimes means that there is a propo-
sition such that one party believes that proposition and the other party believes
its negation, but that does not always have to be the case. Just as two parties may
have conﬂicting beliefs, they may also have conﬂicting desires or preferences.
A detailed examination of the relevant issues is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter, and the goal is only to present the basic idea. Still, if these speculations turn
See Chapter  for further discussion.
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out to be on the right track, it would lend further support to the main point by
showing that there is a way of thinking about the disagreement in the relevant
examples that does not favour relativism, or any other semantic theory for that
matter.
To the extent that disagreement may involve different sorts of attitudes there
is a sense in which there are varieties of disagreement. It would therefore be a
mistake to think that all disagreement should be understood in exactly the same
way as examples like (), in which there is a proposition such that one party
believes that proposition and the other party believes its negation.
() a. Robert: The Cuban missile crisis took place in .
b. Bobby: I disagree, it took place in , not .
Furthermore, having a more liberal view of disagreement makes it easier to make
sense of puzzling examples like (). If this suggestion is on the right track, we
can say that Mary and John disagree in virtue of having conﬂicting attitudes to-
wards the chilli, and not in virtue of John denying the proposition expressed
by the sentence uttered by Mary. We can also approach Mary and John’s dis-
agreement in () and () in much the same way since they presumably have
conﬂicting attitudes towards the roller coaster ride and the chilli in those cases
as well. On this picture, it is the attitudes of the parties that matter, and this
way of thinking of the disagreement is to a large extent independent of the se-
mantic issues. In particular, it does not matter whether we adopt a contextualist
or relativist semantics for predicates of taste.
There is something prima facie plausible about the thought that the disagree-
ment in () has something to do with Mary liking the chilli and John disliking
the chilli. Moreover, this way of thinking about disagreement is not entirely with-
out precedent. It is similar to ideas usually associated with expressivist theories
of the sort that ﬁgure prominently in debates in moral philosophy. Roughly
The idea that the disagreement in cases involving predicates of taste can be understood in
terms of incompatible attitudes towards something that is not a proposition, has also been sug-
gested by Maudlin ().
See e.g. Stevenson (, , ) who distinguishes between what he calls ‘disagreement
in belief’ and what he calls ‘disagreement in attitude’. The way that I think about examples like
() is very closely related to his notion of disagreement in attitude. See e.g. also Blackburn (,
).

speaking, expressivists take certain expressions to express attitudes, say, approval
or disapproval, praise or resentment. This can be contrasted with the sort of
truth-conditional semantics that I have been presupposing throughout this dis-
cussion, according to which the content of an expression is represented by a
function from indices to extensions. Since I am mainly interested in the de-
bate between contextualists and relativists, I do not want to enter into a discussion
about whether expressivism could provide a viable alternative to a contextualist
or relativist semantics for predicates of taste. However, it is interesting to note
that expressivists have claimed to be in a good position to make sense of disagree-
ment by taking it to involve a conﬂict of attitudes in more or less the same way
that I am suggesting.
Having said that, it is important to recognise that thinking about disagree-
ment in this way still does not force us to adopt a particular semantic theory.
One can think about disagreement in this way without endorsing expressivism.
In order for the speakers to disagree, they need to have certain attitudes, but
there is no requirement that the relevant expressions express these attitudes in
the sense that expressivists are interested in. In the case of (), Mary is re-
porting that she likes the chilli, and it is also reasonable to suppose that a sincere
utterance of (a) or (b) is typically, though not invariably, accompanied by
the speaker having a certain attitude towards the roller coaster ride or the chilli.
Even if this suggestion enjoys some prima facie plausibility and has some
precedent in the literature on expressivism, there are many outstanding ques-
tions. Apart from clarifying the notion of ‘conﬂicting attitudes’, there is also
more work to be done when it comes to relating what is going on at the level
Blackburn and Gibbard are often mentioned as prominent contemporary defenders of ex-
pressivism in moral philosophy. See e.g. Blackburn (, ) and Gibbard (, ).
However, I will not delve into the subtle issues about how to interpret their views.
Commenting on a case of moral disagreement over contraception, Blackburn claims that the
expressivist theory ‘locates the disagreement where it should be, in the clash of attitudes towards
contraception’ (Blackburn, , p. ). See also e.g. Blackburn (, p. ).
To the extent that expressivists are in a position to tell a plausible story about disagreement in
terms of conﬂict attitudes, it is not clear why a contextualist, or a relativist for that matter, cannot
tell more or less the same story. Dreier () makes a similar point with respect to contextualism
and expressivism in moral philosophy. He argues that a contextualist about moral judgements can
follow the expressivist when it comes to explaining moral disagreement, for instance by talking
about disagreement in attitudes or norms. See e.g. also Jackson and Pettit ().

of mental states to what is going at the level of language and discourse. For
instance, it would be interesting to see how this way of looking at disagreement
can be integrated into a more general account of agreement and disagreement
in discourse.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to answer a speciﬁc challenge to contextualist treat-
ments of predicates of taste, namely that such treatments leave us unable to ac-
count for certain cases of disagreement. It has been argued that the disagree-
ment data favour a relativist account of predicates of taste. Contrary to this line of
argument, I have attempted to show that considerations involving disagreement
ultimately do not provide evidence for relativism. Once we look at a broader
range of cases, the original cases of disagreement that were meant to lend sup-
port to relativism seem much less surprising from a contextualist perspective.
While this does not show that a relativist treatment of predicates of taste is incor-
rect, I take it to be signiﬁcant in light of the emphasis that relativists have placed
on considerations involving disagreement.
No doubt there is muchmore that can be said about these matters, but I offer
these considerations as a challenge to those who think that a relativist treatment
of predicates of taste is to be preferred over a contextualist treatment for reasons
having to do with disagreement. I also hope that what I have said suggests further
avenues that can be explored in this debate.
An anonymous referee for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy suggested an example which
illustrates some of the difﬁculties concerning when it is legitimate to appeal to a conﬂict of attitudes
when characterising a case of disagreement. Suppose that it is possible to like or dislike something
without being aware of it, and that there is amachine that can detect these attitudes. If the dialogue
in () took place solely on the basis of Mary and John checking the machine, it seems that John’s
response would be less natural. If that is right, there must be a difference between the cases that
gives rise to different judgements about disagreement.
See e.g. Geurts (), Maier and van Der Sandt (), and Asher and Lascarides ().

Chapter 
Epistemic Modals
Introduction
In this paper I will be defending traditional contextualist treatments of epistemic
modals against certain objections that have recently been raised against this view.
According to contextualism, epistemic modals are context-dependent in the fa-
miliar sense that they express different propositions in different contexts. While
a contextualist treatment of epistemic modals is often regarded as at least having
some initial attraction, it has been argued that such a view yields incorrect predic-
tions about cases involving disagreement and retraction. If we assume that con-
textualism is correct, we are supposedly unable to explain apparently mundane
cases of disagreement involving epistemic modals. Furthermore, it is argued that
contextualism predicts that it would be wrong for speakers to retract their earlier
claims in situations in which such retractions seem to be perfectly natural. Sev-
eral critics of contextualism have therefore suggested an alternative semantics
for epistemic modals. In particular, several recent critics of contextualism have
advocated some kind of relativist treatment of epistemic modals.
See e.g. Egan et al. (), Egan (), Stephenson () and MacFarlane (forthcoming-
a) who have defended a relativist treatment of epistemic modals. However, it should be noted that
there are some differences between the positions that they defend. For various attempts to defend
amore traditional contextualist approach, see e.g. Papafragou (), Hawthorne (), Wright
(), Schaffer (forthcoming-a), and von Fintel and Gillies (, forthcoming).

I want to argue that these problems have been exaggerated, and that they do
not force us to abandon the familiar contextualist treatment epistemic modals.
There might be other reasons for giving up the simple contextualist picture, but
alleged problems having to do with disagreement and retraction do not provide
us with reasons to look for a different semantics. In order for these considerations
to provide an argument against contextualism, the disagreement and retraction
in question would have to target the proposition expressed by the relevant sen-
tences. However, there are reasons for being suspicious of this assumption. For
instance, as von Fintel and Gillies (, ) have observed, there are im-
portant similarities between epistemic modals and ﬁrst person uses of attitude
verbs like ‘thinks’ when it comes to disagreement data. The general worry is that
the disagreement and the retraction are targeting the embedded proposition. In
that case, the data does not tell us much about the semantics of epistemicmodals.
My goal is to pursue this as a general line of response on behalf of contextualism
and to evaluate its general merits and shortcomings.
In x. I outline the difference between contextualist and relativist treat-
ments of epistemic modals. In x. I present the disagreement and retraction
data that allegedly present a problem for contextualist treatments of epistemic
modals. In x. I present some further data that are meant to show that these
matters are also complicated from a relativist point of view. In x. I brieﬂy dis-
cuss the possibility that the relevant patterns of disagreement and retraction can
be the result of a more general psychological bias. In x. I propose that the
disagreement and retraction should be seen as targeting the embedded proposi-
tion and not the proposition expressed by the relevant sentence. In x. I discuss
an observation made by Stephenson (), and argue that it does not present
any additional problems for contextualism. In x. I argue that it is not a plausi-
ble constraint on disagreement that disagreement can only target a proposition
that is believed or asserted. In x. I also reject the corresponding constraint
for retraction. In x. I suggest that we can understand the relevant cases of dis-
agreement involving epistemic modals in terms of the parties having conﬂicting
credences rather than conﬂicting beliefs. In x. I discuss the view that sen-
tences containing epistemic modals may be used to perform two distinct speech
acts, and suggest that this can be a way of getting a better grip on the retraction
data. In x. I brieﬂy address problems involving agreement and some further

problems involving probability operators like ‘probably’.
. Contextualism and Relativism
In this chapter, I will be focusing on issues having to do with epistemic uses of
modal expressions like ‘might’ and ‘must’. For the most part, the discussion
will focus on possibility modals like ‘might’. In this section, I will brieﬂy sketch
how epistemic modals like ‘might’ can be understood along contextualist and
relativist lines within a fairly standard framework in which modals are treated as
quantiﬁers over possible worlds, setting the stage for the following discussion.
What does it mean to say that the relevant modality is epistemic? Loosely
speaking, we can think of epistemic modality as somehow being connected with
what is compatible with a certain body of knowledge or evidence. According
to a familiar account of modals that I will be working with here, modals can be
thought of as quantiﬁers over possible worlds. In the case of epistemic modals,
the set of possible worlds we are quantifying over are those which are compati-
ble with the available information. It will be convenient to identify the available
information with what is known, and I will do so for the purpose of the follow-
ing discussion. Simplifying somewhat, we can then construe an epistemic use of
‘might’ as involving existential quantiﬁcation over the possible worlds compat-
ible with the available information. The idea behind this can be illustrated by
means of an example. Take () as involving an epistemic use of ‘might’.
() It might be raining.
Simply put, the idea is that () is true in a possible world w just in case there is
some possible world w0 which is compatible with the available information in w
in which it is raining. But what is the relevant information?
According to the standard contextualist treatment of epistemic modals, the
relevant information is determined by the context of use. Sentences like ()
express different propositions in different contexts, depending on what the rel-
evant information is.
For some important work on modality within the possible worlds framework, see Kratzer
(, , b). See Portner () for an introduction to this kind of framework and
linguistic theories of modality in general.

A very simple and straightforward version of contextualism would be the view
that the information is to be identiﬁed with what is known by the speaker at the
time of the utterance. Suppose that Sally utters (). In that case, () is true
just in case there is a possible world compatible with what she knows in which it
is raining. However, there are other ways of implementing the basic idea behind
the contextualist proposal. One could for instance identify the relevant infor-
mation with the combined knowledge of the conversational participants. That
would make the truth of () dependent on what is known by the conversational
participants in general and not just the speaker. The details do not matter at
this point. A different choice point is whether one wants to say that it is what
is known or what the speaker or the conversational participants could come to
know through some further, but presumably limited, investigation. For the sake
of simplicity I will be assuming that we are dealing with a simple version of con-
textualism unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. This will allow me to focus on
the issues that I want to focus on, but it does not mean that I endorse this version
of contextualism. What matters is that contextualism makes epistemic modals
context-dependent in the familiar sense that sentences that contain epistemic
modals express different propositions in different contexts.
Relativism has emerged as an important competitor to contextualism in re-
cent debates about epistemic modals. Relativist treatments of epistemic modals
differ from contextualist treatments insofar as they do not take sentences like
() to express different proposition in different contexts. Instead they express
propositions that are true or false relative to an appropriate parameter. For the
purpose of this discussion we can think of the relevant propositions as having
different truth-values relative to different information states. According to the
version of relativism proposed by MacFarlane (forthcoming-a), the relevant in-
formation is not determined by the context of use, but by the context of assess-
ment. Roughly speaking, a context of use is understood as a context in a which
See e.g. Hacking () and DeRose () for discussion about these and related matters.
If we accept this way of construing the debate, the difference between contextualism and rela-
tivism comes down to two things. First, it comes down to whether sentences containing epistemic
modals express different propositions in different contexts or whether they express propositions
that vary in truth-value. Second, it comes down to whether the relevant information is determined
by the context of use or the context of assessment. These things can come apart and that means
that there other possible views that one might want to explore. For the purpose of the following

a sentence is used, whereas a context of assessment is understood as a context in
which the use of a sentence is being assessed. In other words, epistemic modals
are context-dependent, but in the less familiar sense that they are sensitive to fea-
tures of the context of assessment. MacFarlane and others have argued that this
allows us to make sense of certain cases of disagreement and retraction involving
epistemic modals which contextualists are supposedly unable to explain. In the
following discussion, it will be convenient to focus on relativism as an alterna-
tive to contextualism. However, my main concern is not going to be relativism
as such, or indeed any other alternative to contextualism, but the general prob-
lems involving disagreement and retraction facing a contextualist treatment of
epistemic modals.
. The Data
While I am open to the possibility that there are all sorts of problems facing a
simple contextualist account of epistemic modals, I am going to focus exclusively
on issues having to do with disagreement and retraction. One worry concerning
contextualist treatments of epistemic modals is that they cannot handle cases of
disagreement in a satisfactory manner. Such worries have been raised by, among
others, Stephenson () and MacFarlane (forthcoming-a). Even simple cases
of disagreement seem to be problematic from a contextualist point of view. In
order to illustrate this point, von Fintel and Gillies () use an example from
Kratzer (a).
Suppose a man is approaching both of us. You are standing over
there. I am further away. I can only see the bare outlines of the man.
In view of my evidence, the person approaching might be Fred. You
know better. In view of your evidence, it cannot possibly be Fred, it
must be Martin. If this is so, my utterance of [()] and your utter-
ance of [()] will both be true.
() The person approaching might be Fred.
discussion, I will be ignoring these possibilities. See also Chapter .
For other problems facing a simple contextualist treatments of epistemic modals, see e.g.
Yalcin (, forthcoming).

() The person approaching cannot be Fred.
Had I uttered [()] and you [()], both our utterances would be
false. (Kratzer, a, p. , original emphasis)
What von Fintel and Gillies observe, is that there appears to be a sense in which
the speaker of () and the speaker of () disagree. However, it is not clear that
this is something we predict if we adopt a very simple version of contextualism
according to which the relevant information is what is known by the speaker.
In that case, () would be true as uttered by the ﬁrst speaker just in case it is
compatible with what the ﬁrst speaker knows that the person is Fred. On the
other hand, () would be true as uttered by the second speaker just in case it is
incompatible with what second speaker knows that the person is Fred. But then
() and () would express compatible propositions. There does not appear
to be a proposition such that the ﬁrst speaker believes that proposition and the
second speaker believes its negation.
In order to elicit judgements about disagreement, it is useful to look at what
happens in a dialogue between speakers who have access to different informa-
tion. These kinds of cases have played a central role in the debate, and they will
play an important role in my discussion as well. Suppose that Mary and John are
trying to ﬁnd out where Harry is and that they have so far been unable to ﬁnd
him. John does not know that Mary has just been looking for Harry in the ofﬁce
and that he was not there.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
Mary seems to disagree with John in the dialogue above. Indeed, her response
seems perfectly natural. But if we assume a contextualist treatment of ‘might’
according to which the relevant information is what is known by the speaker,
it is not clear that we can make sense of this. In that case, it would be wrong
for Mary to deny John’s claim. If the contextualist treatment is correct, (a) is
true as uttered by John since it is compatible with what he knows that Harry is
in the ofﬁce. Of course, it is not compatible with what Mary knows that Harry is
in the ofﬁce, but this does not solve the problem as far as the contextualists are

concerned, since they take that to be perfectly compatible with the truth of what
John said.
This is not to say that we never disagree with and correct other people re-
garding their own mental states. Sometimes it may be reasonable to assume that
someone is mistaken in that way. However, in this case there does not seem to
be any reason to think that this is what Mary is doing. Why would she think that
John is mistaken about what he knows? We can even imagine that Mary knows
that John is not aware of her having looked for Harry in the ofﬁce. In that case,
it would be extremely odd for her to deny that it is compatible with what John
knows that Harry is in the ofﬁce, but her response still seems to be ﬁne. For the
sake of simplicity, I am simply going to assume throughout the following discus-
sion that the speakers are not being insincere or mistaken about their mental
states.
If we instead adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modals, we seem to
be in a better position to explain what is going on. In that case, the truth-value
of (a) depends on the information available in the context of assessment. As-
suming that we are dealing with a fairly simple version of relativism, it is what the
assessor knows that is relevant. In Mary’s context of assessment, (a) is false,
since it is not compatible with what she knows that Harry is in the ofﬁce. There-
fore, her response is appropriate. She is right to deny (a), since it is false as
assessed by her. We are then supposed to conclude that cases like () provide
support for a relativist treatment of epistemic modals.
In addition to the cases involving disagreement or correction presented above,
cases of retraction are also cited as a potential problem for contextualism. MacFarlane
(forthcoming-a) makes important use of such cases of retraction when arguing
against contextualism and in favour of relativism.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
Note that Stephenson () has a different view of the retraction cases. She does not ap-
peal to retraction data in the way that MacFarlane does. In fact, she treats the retraction data as
presenting a potential problem for her view. I am not going to discuss her views on retraction
here.

As MacFarlane and others have pointed out, it seems quite natural for John to
retract his original claim when confronted withMary’s response. In addition, the
opponents of contextualism also tend to emphasise that it appears to be strange
for him to stand by his original claim and refuse to retract it. Compare John’s
response in (c), which sounds natural, with his response in (c), which is not
very natural.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then he can’t be in his ofﬁce. But I still stand by what I
said a second ago.
Contextualism seems to be ill-suited to explain this data. If contextualism were
correct, the proposition expressed by (a) would be true and there would ap-
parently be no reason for John to retract it in the face of Mary’s response. Fur-
thermore, it is not clear why John could not stand by his original claim. Contex-
tualism seems to yield the incorrect prediction that the response in (c) should
be ﬁne whereas it is in fact at best stilted and unnatural.
Again, proponents of relativism claim to be in a position to offer an explana-
tion of what is going on. Since John’s epistemic position has improved, it is no
longer compatible with what he knows that Harry is in the ofﬁce. In the new con-
text of assessment, the original claim is false, and hence it makes sense for John
to retract it. Thus it seems that relativism is better suited than contextualism to
explain the retraction data.
. More Data
There is reason to think that what was said in the pervious section is a bit too quick
as a characterisation of the relevant data. The picture is more complicated, at
least as far as the retraction data is concerned. As von Fintel and Gillies ()
point out, it sometimes sounds appropriate for the speaker to stand by her ini-
tial claim. For instance, Alex’s response in (c) sounds quite appropriate and
natural.
() a. Alex: They keys might be in the drawer.
See e.g. Hacking () for a similar observation.

b. Billy: [Looks in the drawer, agitated.] They’re not. Why did you say
that?
c. Alex: Look, I didn’t say they were in the drawer, I said they might be
there|and they might have been. Sheesh.
This is not very surprising from a contextualist point of view. On this view, (a) is
predicted to be true as uttered by Alex and it makes sense that she is in a position
to defend her assertion. Matters are somewhat more complicated if we look at
cases like this from a relativist perspective. Once Alex learns that the keys are not
in the drawer, (a) is predicted to be false relative to her context of assessment.
It is therefore unclear how she could continue to defend her assertion. However,
one might wonder whether Alex is really defending the truth of her assertion or
only its appropriateness given what she knew at the time. If it is only the latter,
relativists might still be able to make sense of what is going on. For one thing,
it is not clear that the second occurrence of ‘might’ in (c) is epistemic. This
gives relativists some leeway when dealing with cases like this. What matters for
our purposes is that an explicit retraction is not always called for. Indeed, it looks
like the speaker has a choice in the cases under discussion. She can either retract
or she can stand by her original claim. One way or another, this is presumably
something that we want a plausible account of the data to capture.
Interestingly, there are also cases involving epistemicmodals in which it sounds
less natural for a speaker to retract her original claim. For instance, consider the
following dialogue between Mary and John:
() a. John: Joe might be coming to the party, but it would be very surpris-
ing if he did.
b. Mary: Actually he won’t be coming to the party. I just talked to him
a minute ago.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
There is nothing odd about John’s original utterance in (a), but the retraction
in (c) is somewhat odd. At the very least, it comes across as being extremely
concessive. Insofar as the retraction is inappropriate, that is surprising from a
As Josh Dever (p.c.) pointed out to me, there are still difﬁcult problems, even for a contextu-
alist, when it comes to making sense of the interaction between tense and modals.
See e.g. MacFarlane (forthcoming-a) for relevant discussion.

relativist point of view. At least at ﬁrst sight, (a) appears to be a conjunction
in which the ﬁrst conjunct contains an epistemic modal. After John learns that
Joe is not coming to the party, the ﬁrst conjunct is predicted to be false relative
to his context of assessment. But then we would expect it to be appropriate for
him to retract his original claim. No doubt there are things to be said on behalf
of relativism at this point, but the take home message is that the data is more
complicated than one might initially have supposed, and it is not even clear that
the relativists get all the cases right. A successful account of the retraction data
would at least have to account for the appropriateness of John’s retraction in
(), the appropriateness of Alex defending her original assertion in (), and
possibly even the inappropriateness of John’s retraction in ().
Even if one is not particularly convinced by the relativist treatment of the data,
there is at least something that calls for an explanation here if one is attracted to
the fairly simple contextualist picture that I sketched earlier. If anything, it looks
like the data is more complicated and harder to explain than one might have
thought. In the following I will discuss and defend a possible answer on behalf
of contextualism.
. Psychological Bias
Before I turn to the main discussion of the disagreement and retraction data,
there is another worry concerning the data that I want to mention. The worry is
that some sort of general psychological bias could be at work in the cases under
discussion. If that is the case, it is not clear whether the data should be taken to
provide evidence against contextualism. After all, we might not want the pres-
ence of a general psychological bias to be reﬂected in our semantics for epis-
temic modals. In recent work on knowledge ascription, Nagel () has drawn
attention to a phenomenon known as ‘epistemic egocentrism’. This is a robust
psychological bias that affects our ability to accurately represent the epistemic
perspectives of less informed subjects. Apparently, we have a hard time suppress-
ing information that is available to us, but not to the subjects we are thinking
about, when evaluating their judgements. This includes, but is not restricted to,
situations in which we evaluate our own past mental states.

The broader problem of epistemic egocentrism affects not only our
efforts to reconstruct our own past mental states, but also our efforts
to judge the mental states of less informed others: we overestimate
the extent to which they share our beliefs, attitudes and concerns,
even in the face of feedback to the contrary, and are surprisingly
unaware of the extent to which we do this. (Nagel, , p. )
If such a bias could affect our judgements involving epistemic modals, it might
at least go some way towards explaining the data. The cases under discussion
involve a more well-informed subject evaluating a claim made by a less informed
subject. Perhaps Mary is evaluating John’s claim as if he had the same infor-
mation as she does. That would include the information that Harry is not in his
ofﬁce. If she did, that could explain why she responds in the way that she does.
Moreover, when John is evaluating his past claim, it could be that he is subject to
the same bias. He would then be evaluating his earlier assertion as if his earlier
self had the same information as his current self. In that case, it would not be
surprising if he took himself to have been wrong.
There is obviously a lot more that needs to be said and done before we can
determine whether there is a real worry here. For one thing, there is the question
of whether it is plausible that the bias is operative in the cases under discussion.
There are also questions having to do with when we are affected by this kind of
bias and whether there are circumstances in which we are more likely to over-
come it. If there are situations in which the subjects are not affected by this kind
of bias, what happens in those situations? Do we see different patterns of data
those cases? In order to answer these question one would probably have to have
a closer look at the relevant psychological research, and perhaps it is even nec-
essary to carry out further research. That is beyond the scope of the present
discussion, but it is something that deserves to be investigated further.
For a discussion of so-called ‘ignorant assessor’ cases in which a less informed subject evaluates
the assertion of amore well-informed subject, see e.g. Dietz () andMacFarlane (forthcoming-
a).

. More on Disagreement and Retraction
Even if we acknowledge that the data needs to be taken seriously and cannot
be dismissed as the result of a general psychological bias, it is not clear what
conclusions we can draw about the semantics of epistemic modals. As bad as
things might look at ﬁrst glance, I do not think that we should be too quick to
abandon contextualism. The issues involving disagreement and retraction are
more subtle than they initially appear to be. I am going to start by looking at
some potential worries about the disagreement data, and then I am going to
argue that there are similar problems with the retraction data.
In order for the disagreement data to be a problem for contextualism, it
needs to be shown that the disagreement targets the proposition expressed by
the sentence that is being uttered. There are general reasons for thinking that
this assumption is dubious. Disagreement is not always that simple.
Consider a situation in which Pierre and Marie are conducting a series of
experiments in order to test a scientiﬁc hypothesis. They both believe the hy-
pothesis to be false, but they have been unable to conclusively establish that it is
false. After one of the experiments, the following conversation takes place:
() a. Pierre: The hypothesis is false.
b. Marie: No, we need to do further testing.
There is some sort of disagreement going on in (), but we do not want to say
that Marie is denying that the hypothesis is false. That would be odd as long as
we are assuming that she believes that the hypothesis is false. It is more plausible
to take her to be disagreeing with Pierre on the grounds that there is insufﬁcient
evidence for him to assert that the hypothesis is false without conducting further
experiments.
More importantly, there are more speciﬁc reasons to doubt that the disagree-
ment in the cases under discussion must target the proposition expressed by the
sentence uttered. As von Fintel and Gillies () point out, in the case of ﬁrst
person uses of attitude verbs like ‘thinks’ or ‘believes’, the disagreement does not
have to target the proposition expressed by the attitude report. To illustrate this
point, we can start by considering the difference between (bi) and (bii).
See e.g. von Fintel and Gillies (, p. ) for a similar observation.

() a. A: I think it’s raining.
b. i. B: No, it isn’t.
ii. B: No, you don’t.
In the case of (bi), B is denying that it is raining, not that A thinks that it is
raining. The response in (bi) differs from B’s response in (bii), which con-
cerns the attitude report itself. It is convenient to talk about the disagreement
as targeting a certain proposition. In the case of (bi), the disagreement is tar-
geting the proposition that it is raining. But in the case of (bii), it is targeting
the proposition that A thinks that it is raining. In the former case we can say that
the disagreement is targeting the embedded proposition, and in the latter case
we can say that it is targeting the attitude proposition.
Having made the observation that the disagreement can target the embed-
ded proposition in cases like (), von Fintel and Gillies go on to suggest that
something similar may be going on in cases like ().
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
Instead of interpreting Mary as denying the proposition expressed by (a), we
may interpret her as denying that Harry is in the ofﬁce. If this is what Mary is
doing, there is no problem for contextualism. In this case, we can talk about
this in terms of the disagreement targeting the embedded proposition rather
than the modal proposition. What the opponents of contextualism need to do,
is to ﬁnd a way of ensuring that the disagreement targets the modal proposition.
However, that might prove difﬁcult. In what follows, I will defend the hypothesis
that we can understand the allegedly problematic cases of disagreement by taking
the disagreement to be targeting the embedded proposition.
So far the discussion has concerned the disagreement data, but I want to
argue that the retraction data is problematic in much the same way as the dis-
agreement data. Again, the critical assumption is that the retraction targets the
modal proposition. Since the corresponding assumption turned out to be dubi-
ous in the cases involving disagreement, it is perhaps not surprising that it turns
out to be questionable when we are considering cases of retraction as well.
It is easy to come up with cases of retraction involving attitude verbs like
‘thinks’ that seem to be analogous to the cases of retraction involving ‘might’.

() a. John: I think that Harry is in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
Again, it is quite natural for John to retract his original claim. His response in
(c) sounds perfectly appropriate in light of Mary’s observation. Not only is his
retraction appropriate, his attempt to stand by his original claim in (c) is again
very stilted and unnatural.
() a. John: I think that Harry is in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then he can’t be in his ofﬁce. But I still stand by what I
said a second ago.
Having said that, I do not think that it is plausible to interpret John as retracting
the attitude proposition. He presumably did think that Harry was in the ofﬁce,
and there is no apparent reason for him to retract the attitude report. Further-
more, this kind of example will probably not make us revise the semantics for
‘thinks’, say, along relativist lines. It is much simpler and much more plausible
to interpret the retraction as targeting the embedded proposition. What John is
retracting is the proposition that Harry is in the ofﬁce, not the proposition that
he thought that Harry was in his ofﬁce.
The worry that is emerging is analogous to the problem facing attempts to
argue against contextualism by appealing to cases of disagreement. Why should
we be impressed by the retraction data involving epistemic modals when we get
similar retraction data involving attitude verbs like ‘thinks’? Why not conclude
that the same thing is going on in both cases? Assuming that this is the correct
way to think about cases like (), that would amount to treating the retraction
in the case of () as targeting the proposition that Harry is in the ofﬁce.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
I am arguing that we should think of the disagreement and retraction data along
similar lines. Just as it has been suggested that we should think of the disagree-
ment as targeting the embedded proposition, I want to suggest that we should

think of the retraction as targeting the embedded proposition. In effect, I am
putting forward the following hypothesis about what is going on in cases like ()
and ():
The Hypothesis: In the cases under discussion, the disagreement and the retrac-
tion is targeting the embedded proposition.
In what follows, I will be discussing and defending this hypothesis. If the hy-
pothesis is correct, it would allow contextualists to make sense of what is going
on in the allegedly problematic cases of disagreement and retraction. Even if the
modal proposition is true, as contextualists claim, the embedded proposition can
still be an appropriate target of disagreement and retraction. It also provides the
basis for an explanation of why it is also possible for the speaker to stand by her
original claim. In that case, what is at issue is the modal proposition, not the
embedded proposition. What she is defending is the truth of the modal propo-
sition that she asserted. If contextualism is correct, that proposition is true. It is
therefore natural for her to be in a position to defend her assertion on that basis.
One way of illustrating the point is by considering the following argument:
. If a contextualist semantics for epistemic modals is correct, cases like ()
and () are not cases of appropriate disagreement and retraction.
. Cases like () and () are cases of appropriate disagreement and retrac-
tion.
) . A contextualist semantics for epistemic modals is not correct.
Perhaps this argument is a bit crude, and I am not claiming that this is what
opponents of contextualism actually have in mind, nor that this is the best way
of stating the case against contextualism. Be that as it may, the argument is still
useful for the purpose of illustrating the point I ammaking. The second premise
can be seen asmotivated by taking our judgements about cases like () and ()
at face value. This is not beyond dispute, but I want to focus on the motivation
for the ﬁrst premise. One reason for thinking that a contextualist semantics is
incompatible with there being disagreement and retraction in the cases under
discussion is that themodal proposition expressed by the ﬁrst sentence uttered by

John is such that it would be strange to think that the disagreement and retraction
could be targeting that proposition. Thinking along these lines, one could offer
the following argument for the ﬁrst premise of the original argument:
. If a contextualist semantics for epistemic modals is correct, there is no dis-
agreement and retraction in () and () that target the modal proposi-
tion.
. If there is no disagreement and retraction in () and () that target the
modal proposition, cases like () and () are not cases of appropriate
disagreement and retraction.
) . If a contextualist semantics for epistemic modals is correct, cases like ()
and () are not cases of appropriate disagreement and retraction.
Again, neither the ﬁrst nor the second premise of this argument is beyond dis-
pute, but it is the second premise of this argument that I will focus on. I want
to argue that even if we grant the ﬁrst premise of this argument, we have good
reasons to reject the second premise. If we allow for the possibility of disagree-
ment and retraction that target the embedded proposition and not the modal
proposition, it is possible for there to be disagreement and retraction in ()
and () even if contextualism is true and the disagreement and retraction can-
not target the modal proposition. Furthermore, once we allow for the possibility
of disagreement and retraction that do not target the modal proposition, we
should be hesitant to accept the ﬁrst premise of the original argument. Even if
a contextualist semantics is correct, and even if that rules out that there is dis-
agreement and retraction that target the modal proposition, there can still be
disagreement and retraction targeting the embedded proposition. We can thus
view the hypothesis that the disagreement and retraction are targeting the em-
bedded proposition as offering a way of resisting this argument by undermining
the motivation for the ﬁrst premise of the original argument.
What the case of ‘thinks’ shows, is that it is sometimes possible to understand
disagreement and retraction as targeting an embedded proposition. I have been
assuming that there is a relevant sense in which the behaviour of attitude verbs
can cast light on the behaviour of epistemic modals. If it can be shown that there
are reasons for thinking that attitude verbs like ‘thinks’ and epistemic modals

should be treated differently with respect to disagreement and retraction, that
would cast doubts on the hypothesis. For one thing, it is not obvious that attitude
verbs like ‘thinks’ provide the best point of comparison for epistemic modals like
‘might’. In what follows, I will discuss further issues and try to answer some poten-
tial objections along these lines. In particular, I will discuss some relevant points
that have been raised by Stephenson () and MacFarlane (forthcoming-a).
In the end, I will argue that the issues I consider do not show that we need to
treat attitude verbs and epistemic modals differently with respect to the relevant
issues involving disagreement and retraction. I will also argue that we ﬁnd sim-
ilar patterns of data in a fairly wide range of cases, and not just in the case of
epistemic modals like ‘might’ and attitude verbs like ‘thinks’.
. Stephenson on Disagreement
In the previous section, I followed von Fintel and Gillies in pointing out the sim-
ilarities between attitude verbs like ‘thinks’ and epistemic modals when it comes
to disagreement data. But this is not the only useful point of comparison for epis-
temic modals. Indeed, there are other constructions in English that one would
expect to be even more relevant in this respect. Stephenson () raises an
issue concerning contextualist treatments of epistemic modals along such lines.
She argues that if contextualism were true we might expect Mary’s response in
(b) to be just as appropriate as her response in (b).
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
() a. John: I don’t know that Harry is not in his ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
But there is a clear difference between the two dialogues. Whereas Mary’s re-
sponse in (b) is perfectly natural, there is something awkward about Mary’s
response in (b). Stephenson notes that this is something that requires expla-
nation. If we assume that the simple contextualist treatment of epistemic modals
is correct, (a) and (a) will have the same truth-conditions since the latter is
true just in case it is not ruled out by what John knows that Harry is in the ofﬁce.
The upshot of this is that someone who defends a contextualist semantics for

epistemic modals needs to explain both the presence of disagreement in ()
and the contrast between that case and ().
However, it is not clear what the difference between () and () really
shows. If we change the example slightly, we seem to get a different verdict.
() a. John: For all I know Harry is in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
Again we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between the cases. Whereas (b) is ad-
mittedly awkward, (b) is much better. But then it is just as much a question
of how we can explain the difference between () and () as it is a question
of how we can explain the difference between () and (). When looking
at the question in this way, it is far from obvious why this is only a question for
contextualists.
However, I also want to gesture towards an explanation of this difference that
ﬁts well with the hypothesis that the disagreement can be explained by taking the
disagreement to be targeting the embedded proposition. It is worth observing
certain differences between () and () on the one hand, and () on the
other. The complement clause in (a) is different from the complement clauses
in (a) and (a) insofar as the former is negated, whereas the latter are not.
This difference is made explicit in () and ().
() It might be that [CPHarry is in the ofﬁce].
() I do not know that [CPHarry is not in the ofﬁce].
If we assume that what is going on in these cases is that the disagreement is tar-
geting the embedded proposition, this makes it less surprising that the cases are
different. In order for the disagreement to be targeting the embedded propo-
sition in the case of (), that is, the proposition expressed by the complement
clause, Mary would have to deny that Harry is not in his ofﬁce, but that is not
what she is doing. Insofar as she is denying anything, she is denying that Harry
is in the ofﬁce. It is therefore not surprising that her response in () sounds
strange if we interpret her as trying to deny that Harry is not in his ofﬁce.
At worst these considerations appear to be inconclusive with respect to the
prospects of holding on to a contextualist semantics for epistemic modals, but
it is also tempting to draw a more optimistic conclusion. For one thing, it looks

like the data pattern in a way that one would expect if the hypothesis that the dis-
agreement is targeting the embedded proposition is correct. It is also interesting
to observe the difference between () and (). Cases like () will turn out to
be important in the discussion that follows.
. The Disagreement Constraint
MacFarlane (forthcoming-a) also points to disagreement data as a motivation for
abandoning contextualism in favour of relativism. He argues that a conversation
could be centred around the question of whether Joe might be in Boston rather
than the question of whether Joe is in Boston. As MacFarlane puts it:
A conversation might center, for a time, on the question whether
Joe might be in Boston. The issue is not whether Joe is in Boston;
everyone present acknowledges that he might be in Berkeley, and so
no one thinks that there are going to be grounds for asserting that
he is in Boston. The point of the conversation is to settle whether he
might be in Boston. Reasons are offered on both sides, disputes are re-
solved, and perhaps a consensus is reached. (MacFarlane, forthcoming-
a, p. )
In this conversation, nobody would think that they are going to establish that
Joe is in Boston since they cannot rule out that he is in Berkeley. But we could
still ﬁnd apparent disagreements between the participants as they debate Joe’s
whereabout. Suppose that Mary and John are participants in the conversation.
Whereas Mary knows that Joe is in California, it is compatible with what John
knows that Joe is in Boston. In that case, it would be natural for an exchange like
the one in () to take place.
() a. John: Joe might be in Boston.
b. Mary: No, he can’t be. He isn’t allowed to leave the state.
However, even if consider a conversation in which the participants recognise that
they cannot rule out that Joe is in Berkeley, we should not be too quick to assume
that the disagreement concerns the modal proposition. It is not clear what Mac-
Farlane has in mind when he says that the conversation is centred around the

question of whether Joe might be in Boston. Presumably the conversational par-
ticipants are still mainly interested in Joe’s whereabouts, and they may be able to
rule out certain possibilities without being able to rule out certain other possibil-
ities. Even if nobody thinks that they are going to establish that Joe is in Boston,
they can still think that it is possible to establish that Joe is not in Boston.
We can think of what is going on in such a conversation as an attempt to
narrow down a set of locations. It is therefore relevant whether a particular
participant in the conversation can or cannot rule out that Joe is in a certain lo-
cation, and it would also be relevant if someone could offer reasons for thinking
that Joe is or is not in a certain location. We should therefore be careful about
reading too much into MacFarlane’s description of the conversation as one that
is centred around the question of whether Joe ‘might’ be in Boston. For all that
MacFarlane has said, we can still take the conversational participants to be pri-
marily interested in Joe’s whereabouts and the proposition that Joe is in Boston.
However, there is an objection that can be raised at this point. An important
feature of the conversation that MacFarlane describes, is that it is reasonable to
assume that the conversational participants do not take themselves to be in a
good enough position to believe or assert that Joe is in Boston. After all, they
take themselves to be unable to rule out the possibility that Joe is in Berkeley. In
particular, Mary cannot assume that John believes that Joe is in Boston when he
utters (a). This is relevant if we adopt the following necessary condition on
disagreement:
The Disagreement Constraint: Disagreement can only target a proposition that
is believed or asserted.
I do not want to attribute this principle to MacFarlane, but it is nevertheless in-
teresting to discuss. It makes it problematic to argue that what is going on in
the conversation under discussion is that the disagreement in () concerns the
proposition that Joe is in Boston. If we are assuming that John does not believe or
assert that Joe is Boston, we cannot say that the disagreement targets that propo-
sition. In fact, if the disagreement constraint is correct, it is hard to see how one
This is more or less how we would think about the case if we adopt Stalnaker’s () picture
of assertion.

could hope to explain all the allegedly problematic disagreement data by argu-
ing that the disagreement targets the embedded proposition. Presumably, we
are often prepared to make a modal claim like (a) without wanting to either
assert or believe the embedded proposition.
The question is whether the disagreement constraint is plausible. Consider
a case in which the speaker is just making a guess and presumably neither asserts
or believes the proposition in question. For instance, suppose that A, B, and C
are watching a card game. While they are waiting for the dealer to reveal the
next card, A and B are trying to guess whether the next card will be a spade, a
heart, a diamond or a club.
() A: Can you guess which suit the next card will be?
a. B: I don’t know. I am guessing that next card will be a spade.
b. C: No, it won’t. The deck is stacked and the next card is the queen
of hearts.
If we assume that C is right about what the next card is, his response sounds ﬁne.
What he is denying is the proposition the that next card will be a spade. No other
obvious candidate is available. He is surely not denying that B is guessing that the
next card will be a spade, regardless of whether that proposition is even asserted
or not. However, since B was just guessing, we cannot assume that he believes
that the next card will be a spade. Understood in those terms, () appears
to be a counterexample to the disagreement constraint. Moreover, if a mere
guess will do, it is not at a surprise that we get similar data involving epistemic
modals. Of course, someone could contest that this should be described as a
case of disagreement, but then it is not clear that we need to describe the cases
involving epistemic modals as cases of disagreement either. Describing the case
one way or another does not solve the problem.
To make matters even more difﬁcult for the opponents of contextualism, it
was observed in the previous section that we can have an exchange like the one
I do not take myself to b committed to treating guessing as a sui generis speech act, but if one
wants to say that cases like () are actually cases of assertion in order to get around this objection
to the disagreement constraint, I would also be more inclined to say the same thing about a case
in which someone is using an epistemic modal.

in () even if one of the speakers makes it explicit that she is talking about what
is compatible with what she knows.
() a. John: For all I know Harry is in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
If the disagreement constraint is correct, we cannot understand the disagree-
ment as targeting the embedded proposition, since John does not believe or as-
sert that proposition. But (a) is not very amenable to a relativist treatment.
The point about (a) is precisely that John makes it explicit that he is talking
about what is compatible with what he knows. From that point of view, we seem
to be much better off treating Mary as denying that Harry is in the ofﬁce. How-
ever, then it is strange to think that this could not happen in () as well, and to
claim that we need to view cases like () as providing evidence for some kind of
alternative semantics for epistemic modals.
The point here is mainly negative. We should reject the disagreement con-
straint in favour of some less stringent requirement on disagreement. A further
question is what the replacement for the disagreement constraint is going to be.
What examples like () and () indicate, if anything, is that the requirement
will not be very strict, and there is no reason to think that a plausible requirement
will rule out the possibility of disagreement targeting the embedded proposition
in cases involving epistemic modals.
. The Retraction Constraint
So far I have been focusing on the issues having to do with the disagreement
data. However, similar issues arise in the case of retraction data. This sort of data
is also central to MacFarlane’s case against contextualist treatments of epistemic
modals. In particular, he offers speciﬁc reasons for thinking that cases like ()
and () are different, and that the retraction in cases like () cannot target
the embedded proposition.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.

() a. John: I think that Harry is in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
He points out that in the case of (), John does not assert that Joe is in the ofﬁce,
and we can easily imagine a situation in which he does not believe it either. In this
sense, () is different from (). In the latter case, it is at least safe to assume
that he believes that Joe is in the ofﬁce. MacFarlane seems to think that this
shows that he cannot be retracting the proposition that Joe is in the ofﬁce in
(). It would seem that in order for this to rule out that the retraction targets
the embedded proposition, something like the following necessary condition on
retraction needs to be correct:
The Retraction Constraint: Retraction can only target a proposition that is be-
lieved or asserted.
Of course, as MacFarlane is aware, we sometimes retract other speech acts than
assertion, and it is therefore natural to think that this is not a very plausible neces-
sary condition for retraction. However, it is not always clear that the retraction
involves a proposition in those cases, and it is also important that we are mainly
interested in a fairly speciﬁc form of retraction data following the pattern in ()
and ().
But even setting aside these general concerns, how plausible is the retrac-
tion constraint? The retraction constraint is the analogue of the disagreement
constraint for retraction, and as we saw in the previous section, the disagree-
ment constraint turned out to be dubious. I will argue that there are also good
reasons to think that the retraction constraint does not hold as a necessary con-
dition on retraction. This will hopefully be clear once we look at some speciﬁc
cases. Consequently, one cannot simply claim that John cannot be retracting the
proposition that Joe is in the ofﬁce because he does not believe or assert that
proposition.
There is a further question about whether John asserts that Joe is in the ofﬁce by uttering ().
I suspect that the answer will depend on how one thinks about assertion, but I am not going to
pursue this question further at this point.
MacFarlane () points out that we sometimes retract questions, commands, and apologies.

Pretend that Holmes andWatson are investigating some heinous crime. Wat-
son harbours certain suspicions towards Smith, but he does not yet believe that
Smith is the culprit, as there are many other suspects. He has still not made up
his mind. As a matter of fact, there is also certain strong evidence in favour of
Smith’s innocence that he has not yet uncovered. Watson proceeds to discuss the
matter with Holmes who has had the opportunity to review the evidence.
() a. Watson: I have a suspicion that Smith did it.
b. Holmes: No, he couldn’t have done it. He was in the Far East.
c. Watson: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
It seems appropriate for Watson to retract his original claim in light of the evi-
dence presented by Holmes. I am assuming that in doing so he is retracting the
proposition that Smith did it, and not the proposition that the he had a suspicion
that Smith did it. After all, that proposition is true, and that was not what Holmes
was challenging. However, we were also taking it to be a part of the scenario that
Watson did not believe that Smith did it. He only had a suspicion towards Smith,
and I am assuming that suspicion is compatible with lack of outright belief. The
retraction constraint incorrectly predict that Watson cannot be retracting the
proposition that Smith did it.
Again, it also makes sense to look at cases in which the speaker is merely
making a guess. Consider the following dialogue:
() a. A: Can you guess when Napoleon was born?
b. B: I don’t know. I am guessing that he was born in .
c. A: No, he wasn’t. He was born in .
d. B: Okay, then I was wrong.
The response in (d) sounds appropriate, but since B is only making a guess
we cannot assume that B either believes or asserts that Napoleon was born in
 on the basis of her utterance of (a). Moreover, it would clearly be odd
for B to stand by her guess once she is appropriately corrected. If the retraction
constraint is correct, we cannot say that what A is retracting is the proposition that
Napoleon was born in . But then how do we make sense of her retraction?
Perhaps we are better off if we give up the original formulation of the retrac-
tion constraint in terms of belief and assertion, and instead try to state a weaker

necessary condition on retraction that allows for cases in which the speaker is
performing a speech act other than assertion or has an attitude other than belief
towards the relevant proposition. This may well be the right thing to do, but it
is not clear that this will do the work that the original constraint was intended
to do in terms of ruling out the possibility that John is retracting the embedded
proposition in (). The worry is that a weaker constraint does not allow us to
distinguish the retraction cases under discussion from the retraction cases involv-
ing epistemic modals. This sort of worry is even more pressing if one takes John’s
retraction in () to be appropriate.
() a. John: For all I know Harry is in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he can’t be. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
As far as I can see, it does not sound altogether unnatural for John to retract his
original claim. But there is no more reason to think that John believes or asserts
that Joe is in the ofﬁce on the basis of his utterance of (a) than there is in the
case of ().
All of this seems to amount to a fairly strong case against the retraction con-
straint. It is not necessary for a proposition to be the target of retraction that the
proposition is asserted or believed. In light of these considerations, it looks like
it is not enough to establish that the speaker does not believe or assert the em-
bedded proposition in order to show that the retraction in cases like () cannot
be targeting that proposition.
. Disagreement and Credences
So far the point of the discussion has beenmainly negative. The requirement that
a proposition must be believed or asserted in order for it to be the target of dis-
agreement or retraction is too strong. However, we are still left with the question
of why the disagreement and retraction can target the embedded proposition in
the cases under discussion. What makes the embedded proposition available as
a target for disagreement and retraction? If it is not the fact that the proposition
is believed or asserted, then it must be something else. In this section the focus
will be on disagreement. Insofar as the disagreement cannot be understood in

terms of what the parties believe, a natural thought is that it has something to
do with the degrees of belief or credences that the parties have in the embedded
proposition. The idea is that if two parties have different credences in a propo-
sition, there is a sense in which their doxastic states are in conﬂict and they can
be said to disagree. This is captured by ().
() Two parties disagree if there is a proposition such that they have different
credences or degrees of belief in that proposition.
As a sufﬁcient condition for disagreement, () is likely to be somewhat contro-
versial. To illustrate the idea, consider a situation in which two detectives are
investigating a murder. The only suspect is Smith, but the detectives have not
made up their minds as to whether he is the murderer or not. They have not
formed the outright belief that he is the murder, but they have not formed the
outright belief that he is not the murderer either. However, the ﬁrst detective
has a higher credence in the proposition that Smith is the murder than the sec-
ond detective. If we represent credences numerically, we can represent the ﬁrst
detective as having a credence of . in the proposition that Smith is the murder,
while the second detective has a credence of . in the proposition that Smith is
the murderer. This difference will most likely be reﬂected in their behaviour
in various ways. For instance, the detectives might differ with respect to the bets
they are willing to make, and with respect to how they react to new evidence. In
this case, it is natural to regard the difference in credences as sufﬁcient for the
detectives to disagree.
See e.g. Cappelen and Hawthorne (forthcoming) who seem reluctant to talk about disagree-
ment when it comes to degrees of belief or credences. They note that it is more natural to talk
about disagreement as applying to beliefs rather than weighted credences, but beyond that they
do not offer any further arguments. However, in ordinary speech it is rare to ﬁnd speakers talking
explicitly about their credences, so it is not clear that this is a major concern.
I am assuming that having a relatively high credence, such as ., is compatible with not having
an outright belief in the relevant proposition. For the purpose of the following discussion I am
also assuming that credences are precise, though as far as I can see, nothing here turns on whether
we allow credences to be imprecise. See e.g. Joyce () and White () for recent discussion
of imprecise credences.
In a realistic scenario, it will typically be the case that if two parties have different credences in
a proposition, they also have different beliefs regarding related propositions. This makes it harder
to get clean judgements about whether the disagreement is a result of a difference in credences.

An immediate worry with this view is that it predicts too much disagreement.
If the slightest difference in our credences entail that we disagree, that might
be seen as problematic. While I recognise that someone might be worried about
this, it is not clear that this is an unacceptable consequence. It is true that insofar
as the differences in credences are too small to be noticeable, we are not likely to
think of the parties as disagreeing. However, that is something we might be able
to live with. After all, there might be all sorts of propositions that we disagree
about without anyone ever noticing. That is true regardless of whether we allow
a difference in credences to constitute a disagreement. Furthermore, when the
differences are noticeable, it is seems natural to think that there is a sense in
which the parties disagree.
If one is still worried about predicting too much disagreement, a possibil-
ity is to say that we have disagreement only if there is a signiﬁcant difference
in credences. What counts as ‘signiﬁcant’ will presumably depend on the con-
text. While I am not in principal opposed to introducing an additional element
of context-dependence or vagueness, a worry is that it makes it harder to de-
termine whether the relevant condition is satisﬁed. In the interest of keeping
things as simple as possible, I will therefore assume that () is adequate as it
stands. For the purpose of the present discussion, this ought to be sufﬁcient, but
a more realistic view might one that introduces an additional element of context-
dependence or vagueness.
If one wants to use () to explain cases of disagreement involving epistemic
modals, we also have to assume that the parties have different credences in the
relevant propositions. In the case of () and (), this seems to be a plausible
assumption.
() The person approaching might be Fred.
() The person approaching cannot be Fred.
In this case one would probably expect the speaker of () and the speaker of
() to have different credences in the proposition that the person approaching
is Fred. However, if one is looking for additional reasons for thinking that the
speakers have different credences in the relevant proposition, one possibility is to
exploit the connection between beliefs, credences, and knowledge. The speaker
of () takes it to compatible with what she knows that the person approaching

is Fred, while the speaker of () takes this to be ruled out by what she knows.
If one thinks that speakers ought to adjust their credences based on what they
know, and one assumes that the speakers are trying to observe the relevant rule,
this would give us some grounds for thinking that their credences will be dif-
ferent. This line of argument requires some fairly controversial assumptions
about the relationship between knowledge, belief, and credences, but the point
is mainly to give a rough idea of how one can provide evidence for a difference
in credences even though that is not entailed by a contextualist semantics for
epistemic modals.
We can also understand the disagreement between Mary and John in () as
based on a difference in credences.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
We can account for the disagreement between Mary and John in terms of Mary
and John having different credences in the proposition that Harry is in the ofﬁce.
It has already been observed that it is implausible to hold that it is necessary for
the disagreement to be targeting the embedded proposition that John believes
that Harry is in the ofﬁce. Instead, the proposal is that it is sufﬁcient that John
has a certain positive credence in the embedded proposition and that he conveys
that by his utterance of (a). This is a fairly weak condition, but in light of the
preceding discussion this seems appropriate.
It is useful to compare contextualism to a view that Yalcin (, , forth-
coming) calls ‘credal expressivism’. A simple way of thinking about this view is
to say that when a speaker utters a sentence containing an epistemic modal, she
expresses her credence in the embedded proposition. In the case of ‘might’ this
could simply be a positive credence in the embedded proposition, whereas in the
case of ‘must’ it would probably be a high credence in the embedded proposi-
tion. In the case of (), John would express his positive credence in the propo-
sition that Harry is in the ofﬁce, while Mary would express a high credence in the
proposition that Joe is not in his ofﬁce. A credal expressivist could then argue
See (Williamson, ) for relevant discussion. If one accepts the view defended by
Williamson that one’s evidence consists in what one knows, it is natural to think that people ought
to try to adjust their credences based on what they know.

that the reason why we take Mary and John to disagree is that their credences in
the relevant propositions are different.
The contextualist does not treat epistemic modals as having such a direct
connection to credences. It is not a part of the contextualist picture that speakers
express credences when using epistemic modals. However, what is relevant for
our purposes is that contextualists can tell more or less the same story about
disagreement as credal expressivists. It does not matter whether the speakers
express the relevant attitudes in the way that credal expressivists are talking about.
What matters is what credences the speakers actually have. In the case of (), it
seems plausible that Mary and John have different credences in the proposition
that Harry is in the ofﬁce. For our purposes, that should be enough.
The upshot of this is that if something like () is correct, it offers a basis
for thinking that the speaker of () and the speaker of () disagree without
committing one to the idea that this must be cashed out in terms of a conﬂict of
outright beliefs. The basic idea is to understand the disagreement in terms of a
difference in credences and not in terms of a difference in beliefs.
. The Pragmatics of Epistemic Modals
In the previous section I dealt with issues involving disagreement. In this section
I will focus on issues involving retraction. While it is doubtful whether a speaker
must assert or believe a proposition in order for retraction to be appropriate, a
possible rejoinder is that there must be some story about why it is appropriate for
a speaker to retract a proposition. So far I have been talking about retraction as
targeting a proposition, but it is plausible to think that of retraction as targeting
a speech act. A natural question is whether sentences containing epistemic
modals can be used to perform a speech act involving the embedded proposition,
in addition to being used to assert the modal proposition, and whether this can
shed some additional light on the retraction data. Insofar as we want to connect
what is going on at the level of mental states with what is going on at the level of
Dreier () makes a similar point with respect to expressivism in moral philosophy. Insofar
as an expressivist is in a position to tell a plausible story about disagreement, it is not clear why the
contextualist cannot tell more or less the same story. See e.g. also Jackson and Pettit ().
See e.g. MacFarlane ().

language and discourse, this can also contribute towards a better understanding
of the disagreement data.
The idea is that there are two speech acts performed, one involving the asser-
tion of the modal proposition and another speech act involving the embedded
proposition. Proposals along these lines have been put forward by von Fintel
and Gillies (, ) and Portner (). My goal here is not to settle on
a deﬁnitive view, but rather to sketch what I take to be live options and indicate
promising avenues of further investigation.
The view that epistemic modals can be used to perform two distinct speech
acts has certain prima facie promising features. Insofar as it is sometimes possible
to appropriately stand by one’s original assertion, this is not surprising if there are
two distinct speech acts involved. In those cases, it is the assertion of the modal
proposition that is at issue. However, we often focus on a speech act involving
the embedded proposition. In the terminology of Simons (), it is the ‘main
point’ of the utterance. That is what the retraction is targeting when the speaker
chooses to retract.
This kind of view might also give us a better grip on examples like (), in
which retraction seems inappropriate.
() a. John: Joe might be coming to the party, but it would be very surpris-
ing if he did.
b. Mary: Actually he won’t be coming to the party. I just talked to him
a minute ago.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
It is not entirely clear how relativists can deal with examples like this. Perhaps we
can do better if we adopt a view on which sentences containing epistemic modals
can be used to perform two distinct speech acts. A natural suggestion is that
adding ‘but it would be surprising if he did’ results in the relevant speech act
involving the embedded proposition being canceled. In that case, it would not
be possible for the retraction to be targeting that speech act. But if contextualism
is correct, we already have reasons for thinking that it would not be appropriate
to retract the assertion of the modal proposition. These points suggest that there
is something to be said for exploring whether sentences containing ‘might’ can
be used to perform a speech act involving the embedded proposition in addition

to an assertion of the modal proposition.
More generally, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that there are many
situations in which it is not appropriate for a speaker to retract a speech act, even
if the proposition in question turns out to be false. The cases discussed in the pre-
vious section indicate that there is a fairly wide range of cases in which it sounds
natural and appropriate for a speaker to retract in light of new information, even
if the speaker does not believe or assert the proposition in question. But it is also
important to look at situations in which it is not natural and appropriate for a
speaker to retract. This indicates that, say, raising a possibility to salience can-
not be sufﬁcient to make a proposition an appropriate target for retraction. For
instance, MacFarlane (forthcoming-a) offers the following example:
() a. A: It is rumored that you are leaving California.
b. B: That’s completely false!
c. A: Okay, then I was wrong. I take back what I said.
We can imagine that A has heard a rumour to the effect that B is leaving Califor-
nia, but that he has not made up his mind as to whether he should believe the
rumour or not. In that case, A’s retraction sounds odd. Assuming that the pos-
sibility that A is leaving California was not already salient, it will surely be made
salient by A’s utterance of (a). Since it would be strange for A to retract once
it turns out that A is not leaving California, the mere fact that a speaker is raising
the possibility that his interlocutor is leaving California to salience, cannot be
sufﬁcient to make it appropriate for the speaker to retract the previous speech
act if it turns out that this is false. Insofar as it is not sufﬁcient in the case of (),
we cannot assume that it is sufﬁcient in the case of () either.
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.
c. John: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
This is something that we need to take into account when we evaluate different
proposals regarding what kinds of speech acts epistemic modals can be used to
perform. I will look at suggestions put forward by von Fintel and Gillies (),
Portner (), and Swanson (). The main goal is to achieve a better un-
derstanding of our options, and to identify the options that look promising from

the point of view of making sense of the retraction data.
.. Proffering
One proposal that has been put forward by von Fintel and Gillies (), follow-
ing a similar suggestion made by Simons (), is that epistemic modals can be
used to perform two speech acts. The ﬁrst is an assertion of the modal propo-
sition as on the standard possible worlds semantics for epistemic modals. The
second is a proffering or putting forward of the embedded proposition. Admit-
tedly, von Fintel and Gillies do not say much about what proffering amounts to
in this context. While the basic idea is intuitive, it is not clear whether their pro-
posal provides the resources to explain the appropriateness of retraction in cases
involving epistemic modals. To illustrate the need for clariﬁcation, consider the
following example from Simons ():
() a. A: Who was Louise with last night?
b. B: Henry believes that she was with Bill.
Simons proposes that B can be understood as proffering that Louise was with Bill
last night as an answer to A’s question in (). This is a natural thing to say, but
consider how strange the following continuation of the dialogue would be:
() a. A: No, Louise couldn’t have been with Bill. He was in Princeton.
b. B: Okay, then I guess I was wrong.
There is surely something odd about B’s retraction in (b). If Simons is right to
describe B as proffering that Louise was with Bill as an answer to A’s question, it
does not sufﬁce to say that John was proffering that Harry is in the ofﬁce in order
to explain why it is appropriate for him to retract and say that he was wrong once
it turns out that Harry was not in the ofﬁce.
This result should not be seen as too discouraging though. Proffering might
involve varying degrees of commitment to the truth of the proposition in ques-
tion, and the commitment might be weaker when the speaker is explicitly report-
ing on a rumour or what someone else thinks. Simons thinks that (a)-(f) are
ways of proffering that Louise was with Bill as an answer to the question of who
Louise was with last night, but in that case the speaker is surely conveying varying

degrees of certainty and commitment with respect to the proposition that Louise
was with Bill.
() Who was Louise with last night?
a. I’m convinced that she was with Bill.
b. I think that she was with Bill.
c. I imagine that she was with Bill.
d. I heard that she was with Bill.
e. Henry said that she was with Bill.
f. Henry suggested that she was with Bill.
It would be nice to have a story about the varying degrees of commitment in-
volved in the different ways of proffering, but that is of more general interest
and not a speciﬁc problem involving epistemic modals. I am not going to offer
such a story here, but it is at least plausible that the cases in which the speaker
is making it explicit that she is relying on a rumour or what someone else says
or thinks are cases in which the speaker is conveying a weaker commitment to
the embedded proposition. Simons argues that in cases like (e), the speaker
is conveying that it is Henry’s belief that is the source of the proffered answer.
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the speaker is not taking responsibility
for the answer in the same way as if she was using (a)-(c).
.. The Common Propositional Space
Portner () attempts to offer a more worked out proposal along more or
less the same lines as von Fintel and Gillies. According to the familiar picture
of assertion developed by Stalnaker (), the effect of an assertion is to add
a proposition to the common ground. For our purposes, we can think of as
the set of propositions being presupposed by the conversational participants.
In addition to this familiar notion of a ‘common ground’, Portner introduces
the notion of a ‘common propositional space’. He characterises the common
propositional space as `the set of propositions in which the participants in the
Note that I will continue to talk in terms of the common ground, the set of propositions that
are being presupposed, rather than the context set, the set of worlds compatible with what is being
presupposed.

conversation are mutually interested' (, p. ). On the picture he puts
forward, the common ground is a subset of the common propositional space.
The common propositional space also includes propositions that are candidates
for inclusion in the common ground.
Portner suggests that we can use the notion of a common propositional space
to understand the behaviour of epistemic modals. Like von Fintel and Gillies,
Portner argues that an epistemic use of a sentence involving ‘might’ can be used
to perform two distinct speech acts. It can be used to add the modal proposi-
tion to the common ground, and to add the modal proposition and the embed-
ded proposition to the common propositional space. In other words, the modal
proposition is being asserted as one would expect, but the embedded proposition
is also being added to the common propositional space.
While Portner’s proposal looks interesting, there are still certain aspects of
the view that are not entirely clear, and this makes it hard to evaluate. In partic-
ular, it is not clear to what extent adding a proposition to the common propo-
sitional space involves more than merely raising it to salience. Assuming that it
is not sufﬁcient to license retraction that the speaker was raising a possibility to
salience, this means that it is not clear whether Portner’s proposal puts us in a
position to explain the retraction data. This is not a criticism of the view. It is
merely to point out that more might be needed if we want to make use of this
view in order to explain the retraction data.
.. Doxastic Advice
What I take to be the most interesting and promising possibility is to follow
Swanson (), and to think of the speech act involving the embedded proposi-
tion as a kind of doxastic advice. This possibility is also entertained by von Fintel
and Gillies (). Simplifying somewhat, we can say that an epistemic use of a
sentence containing ‘might’ conveys the advice not to overlook the possibility
It is important to note that the overall treatment of epistemic modals defended by Swanson
() is different from the one that I am defending. However, I am not going to delve into
the details of his probabilistic semantics. Even though Swanson is engaged in a more ambitious
project of offering an alternative to a traditional semantics for epistemic in terms of quantiﬁcation
over possible worlds, it is not clear why someone working with a more standard possible worlds
semantics could not take certain aspects of his view on board.

that the embedded proposition is true, and to have a certain positive credence
in the proposition in question. I take it that we have at least some independent
grip on the notion of giving advice, though for theoretical purposes one might
hope that it will ultimately be possible to offer a more informative and rigorous
characterisation.
Can this give us any traction with respect to the retraction data? There is
some reason for optimism here, since we are routinely prepared to retract advice
if we gain new and relevant information. Let us suppose that you are looking for
advice about where to go on holiday and I advise you to go to somewhere based
on certain information I have. I later acquire new information that makes it clear
that the advice I gave you was bad, and that it would be a bad idea to go where
I advised you to go. In that case, it would be appropriate for me to retract my
advice, and to say that I was wrong. As Swanson points out, we do not have to say
that I am subject to criticism in the sense that I could have been doing my best
given the information that was available to me. Still, it seems appropriate for me
to retract my previous advice in light of the new information that has been made
available to me.
Another nice feature of this account is that it connects well with the account
of disagreement that was discussed in x.. If we think of the disagreement in the
relevant cases in terms of the parties having different credences, it would make
sense to think that this also plays a role when it comes to retraction. The current
proposal does a good job in this respect. What is going on in the case of (),
is that John is advising Mary to have a certain positive credence in the proposi-
tion that Harry is in the ofﬁce. Once Mary provides him with new information
regarding Harry’s whereabouts, he retracts the advice.
This is not yet to show that this is what is going on in the case of epistemic
modals, but I think it looks like a promising area for further research. In any
case, this is not meant to be the ﬁnal word on the matter. My goal has been
A worry is that the claim that that the speaker is advising her interlocutor to have a certain
minimal credence in the embedded proposition is too strong. The proposal would make certain
uses of ‘might’ inappropriate. However, in many cases in which the speaker knows that her inter-
locutor is better informed than she is, it is not appropriate to use an epistemic modal like ‘might’.
For instance, in the case of (), it sounds awkward if we replace ‘It is rumored that you are leaving
California’ with ‘You might be leaving California’. This is something we can explain if epistemic
modals are used to give doxastic advice.

to outline various ways of developing the idea that epistemic uses of sentences
involving ‘might’ can be used to perform more than one speech act. While it is
to some extent an open question whether this helps us to explain the retraction
data, both an account in terms of proffering as suggested by von Fintel andGillies
() and an account in terms of giving advice inspired by Swanson (),
look promising. Perhaps one way to think about the retraction data, is that it does
not really teach us anything signiﬁcant about the semantics of epistemic modals.
Instead it teaches us something about the pragmatics of epistemic modals in the
sense that it teaches us something about the speech acts that we perform when
we use epistemic modals.
. Further Problems
So far I have focused on considerations involving disagreement and retraction.
The basic response I have offered on behalf of contextualism is to say that the
disagreement and retraction target the embedded proposition. However, there
are reasons to think that considerations involving agreement cannot be straight-
forwardly handled in the same way. The worry can be illustrated by an example
discussed by von Fintel and Gillies (forthcoming). Let us suppose that Alex and
Billy are looking for Billy’s keys when the conversation in () takes place.
() a. Alex: You might have left them in the car.
b. Billy: You’re right. Let me check.
If the modal proposition is a proposition about what is compatible with Alex
knows, it is not clear that it makes sense for the agreement to be targeting that
proposition. According to von Fintel and Gillies, Billy is not in a position to com-
ment on what is compatible with what Alex knows. However, it is also not clear
that it makes sense for the agreement to be targeting the embedded proposition.
It does not look like Billy agrees that the keys are in the car. After all, we may stip-
ulate that she does not believe that the keys are in the car. This makes examples
like () different from an examples involving disagreement like ().
() a. John: Harry might be in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: No, he isn’t. I just checked and he wasn’t there.

In the case of () it makes sense to interpret Mary as denying that Harry is in
the ofﬁce. It would be less plausible to stipulate that she does not believe that
Harry is not in the ofﬁce.
It is important to note that the current objection does not assume the cor-
rectness of the disagreement constraint or an analogous constraint on agree-
ment. Instead, it rests on the assumption that a speaker must believe a propo-
sition in order to agree with it. A similar constraint on disagreement would be
the constraint that a speaker must believe the negation of a proposition in or-
der to disagree with it. Insofar as the disagreement constraint turned out to be
implausible, the current objection avoids these problems.
While an objection based on agreement avoids some of the problems with
an objection based on disagreement, this is not to say that it is unproblematic.
There are reasons to think that it is still not clear that the agreement must be
targeting the modal proposition. For instance, consider the dialogue in ().
() a. Alex: For all I know you left them in the car.
b. Billy: You’re right. Let me check.
It appears that Billy agrees with Alex, and that her response is appropriate. But
if Billy’s response in (a) is appropriate, it is not surprising that Billy’s response
is (a) is appropriate as well. After all, contextualists can treat () and ()
as having the same truth-conditions. In fact, the reasons for thinking that the
agreement cannot be targeting the modal proposition expressed by (a) are
also reasons for thinking that the agreement cannot be targeting the proposition
expressed by (a). Furthermore, nothing has changed as far as the embedded
proposition is concerned. We can still stipulate that Billy does not believe that
the keys are in the car.
This leaves us with several options. One option is to say that the agreement
is targeting the proposition expressed by (a) after all. Another option is to say
that there is a sense in which the agreement can target the embedded proposition
even if Mary does not believe that proposition. A third option is to say that the
agreement is targeting some other proposition. It is not clear what the right
option is. But whatever the correct explanation turns out to be, there is no reason
to think that it could not be extended to ().

There are more general reasons for not wanting to rely too heavily on con-
siderations involving agreement. Cappelen and Hawthorne () have drawn
attention to certain complications regarding the use of agreement reports. Sup-
pose that Mary is a basketball coach and only applies the predicate ‘tall’ to some-
one who is taller than  feet and  inches. However, John is just an ordinary
person and applies the predicate ‘tall’ to anyone over  feet. If Harry is  feet
and  inches tall, it does not seem correct to report that Mary and John disagree
whether John is tall. But if John is  feet tall, it seems appropriate to say that Mary
and John agree that Harry is tall. In this case, John counts as ‘tall’ by both Mary
and John’s standards. Based on these considerations, Cappelen and Hawthorne
conclude that one has to be careful about relying on judgements about agree-
ment. Loosely speaking, onemight say that agreement sometimes comes easier
than disagreement. If that is true, onemight be worried about relying exclusively
on considerations involving agreement.
The current objection to contextualist treatments of epistemic modals like
‘might’ is based on considerations involving agreement. However, we can gener-
ate similar problems involving disagreement if we shift the focus from epistemic
modals like ‘might’ to probability operators like ‘probably’ and ‘likely’. For
instance, consider the dialogue in () as taking place while Mary and John are
looking for Harry.
() a. John: Harry is probably in the ofﬁce.
b. Mary: That’s not true. He might be there, but it isn’t likely.
If a contextualist treatment of ‘probably’ is correct, it is problematic to treat the
disagreement as targeting the modal proposition. One would not expect Mary
to be rejecting a proposition about what is probable in view of what John knows.
Furthermore, it is also problematic to treat the disagreement as targeting the
embedded proposition. Mary does not have to believe that Harry is not in the
ofﬁce in order for her response to be appropriate. In fact, it is clear that she
does not take herself to be in a position to rule out that possibility that he is in
the ofﬁce. This suggests that this problem cannot be dealt with by interpreting
the disagreement as targeting the embedded proposition.
See e.g. also Cappelen andHawthorne () andWeatherson () for relevant discussion.
Thanks to Josh Dever and Brian Weatherson (p.c.) for making me appreciate this point.

I am not going to present a solution to this problem here. Doing so would
most likely require amore thorough discussion of probability operators like ‘prob-
ably’ and that is beyond the scope of the present discussion. My main concern
is with epistemic uses of modals like ‘might’, not with probability operators like
‘probably’. Having said that, we have seen how complicated matters involving
disagreement are. We have also seen that there are cases that are hard for rel-
ativists to explain. In light of these considerations, we should not jump to the
conclusion that cases like () call for a relativist treatment.
Conclusion
There seems to be a common assumption behind the use of both disagreement
and retraction data. The underlying assumption is that the disagreement and re-
traction must target the modal proposition, but as we have seen, that assumption
is highly suspect in both cases. I have argued that we can understand the disagree-
ment and retraction in the relevant cases as targeting the embedded proposition
rather than the modal proposition. If that is correct, it looks like we can hold on
to a contextualist semantics for epistemic modals while paying sufﬁcient respect
to the disagreement and retraction data.
I have also tried to answer a potential challenge to the proposal I am de-
fending based on the idea that disagreement and retraction can only target a
proposition that is believed or asserted. When a sufﬁciently wide range of cases
are examined, that requirement turns out to be too strong, both in the case of
disagreement and in the case of retraction. Perhaps there are weaker alterna-
tives available, but there is no obvious reason to think that they will rule out
the possibility that the disagreement and retraction are targeting the embedded
proposition in the cases involving epistemic modals.
As an alternative to thinking about the disagreement in terms of a difference
in outright beliefs, I have suggested that we can think about the disagreement
in terms of a difference in credences or degrees of belief. I have also explored
issues involving the pragmatics of epistemic modals. An interesting idea is that
we can think of sentences containing ‘might’ as being used to perform a speech
act involving the embedded proposition in addition to an assertion of the modal
proposition. It is not clear what the best way of implementing that idea is, but

using Swanson’s () notion of ‘doxastic advice’ seems promising.
In any case, this is not meant to be the ﬁnal word on these matters. For in-
stance, we have seen that there are also problems involving agreement. While
there are reasons to think that those problems can be dealt with, it is not clear
that we have a good understanding of exactly what is going on in the relevant
cases. Moreover, I have focused almost exclusively on epistemic uses of modals
like ‘might’. Shifting the focus from epistemic modals like ‘might’ to probabil-
ity operators like ‘probably’ introduces additional complications. Even if these
problems do not call for a relativist treatment, there is certainly more work to be
done.

Chapter 
Knowledge Ascriptions and
Indirect Speech Reports
Introduction
Contextualism about knowledge ascriptions remains a controversial view. Both
defenders and critics of contextualism have appealed to a variety of linguistic
evidence, either in an attempt to provide support for contextualism or to under-
mine it. The goal of the present discussion is not to settle whether contextualism
about knowledge ascriptions is true, or even whether the balance of evidence is
in its favour. Rather, the focus is on certain methodological issues. The overall
question is what different kinds of linguistic evidence can teach us about the se-
mantics of knowledge ascriptions. In particular, I want to discuss what we can
learn by looking at the behaviour of knowledge ascriptions embedded under at-
titude verbs like ‘says’ or ‘believes’. A number of philosophers have argued that
contextualism has problems when it comes to dealing with knowledge ascriptions
embedded in indirect speech or attitude reports.
I will argue that there are ways for contextualists to deal with these prob-
lems without compromising the important commitments of their views. From
this point of view, I will be arguing for a contextualist-friendly conclusion. But
See e.g. Hawthorne (), Cappelen and Lepore (), Brogaard (), andMacFarlane
().

the question is not just whether such evidence directly supports or undermines
contextualism. There is a more general question of what it can teach us about
the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. While considerations involving indirect
speech or attitude reports do not provide any direct evidence against contextu-
alism, it may still teach us something about the semantics of knowledge ascrip-
tions. In order to accommodate the relevant data, defenders of contextualism
may have to make further assumptions about the semantics of knowledge ascrip-
tions. These assumptions may in turn provide the basis for further inquiries. If
we look at it from this point of view, the considerations involving indirect speech
or attitude reports are still relevant for the overall assessment of contextualism.
In x. I say what a contextualist view about knowledge ascriptions amounts
to. In x. I explain why considerations involving indirect speech reports present
a problem for contextualism. In x. I present nonindexical contextualism as an
alternative to contextualism, and explain why it does better than contextualism
when it comes to dealing with indirect speech reports. In x. I argue that it is
not enough to say that the relevant reports are instances of mixed quotation. In
x. I argue that a salience-based account is also not going to explain all the data.
In x. I draw attention to Lewis’ () distinction between the semantic value
of a sentence and its propositional content. In x. I suggest, based on Lewis’
distinction and recent work by Ninan (forthcoming), that we can deal with the
problem of indirect speech reports by adding an epistemic standard parameter
to the index and letting ‘says’ shift the value of that parameter. In x. I distin-
guish this view from nonidexical contextualism. In x. I discuss another way of
dealing with indirect speech reports that makes use of the machinery of lambda
abstraction. In x. I point out that the accounts considered in x. and x.
are associated with substantive assumptions regarding the semantic implementa-
tion of contextualism. x. I brieﬂy discuss the possibility of treating ‘says’ as
a context shifting operator, a so-called ‘monster’, in order to avoid these com-
mitments. In x. I distinguish the problem of indirect speech reports from a
problem that has to do with attributions of truth and falsity.

. Contextualism about Knowledge Ascriptions
Contextualism about knowledge ascriptions is a view about the semantics of knowl-
edge ascriptions that has been defended, in one form or another by, among oth-
ers, Cohen (, ), DeRose (, ), and Lewis (). According to
this view, knowledge ascriptions are context-dependent in the sense that they ex-
press different propositions in different contexts. Furthermore, this is not meant
to include any context-dependence that is not associated with ‘knows’ or its cog-
nates, nor does it include any context-dependence associated with features like
tense.
For the purpose of the following discussion I will be talking about knowledge
ascriptions being associated with different epistemic standards in different con-
texts. According to contextualism, the epistemic standards that a subject must
satisfy in order for a knowledge ascription to be true, varies from context to con-
text. In one context, it might be sufﬁcient if the subject is in a moderately strong
epistemic position with respect to the relevant proposition, whereas in a different
context, a much stronger epistemic position might be required.
This way of presenting contextualism about knowledge ascriptions still leaves
it a fairly open question exactly howwe should characterise the context-dependence
of knowledge ascriptions. A natural thought is to treat ‘knows’ itself as an index-
ical that receives its value directly from the context. But the characterisation of
contextualism is also compatible with the context-dependence being traceable
to a covert element associated with ‘knows’.
I think it is safe to say that the question of how to implement contextualism
semantically has received less attention than, say, questions about how contextu-
alism can be applied to various epistemological problems. Cohen ()makes
It is useful to talk about knowledge ascriptions as being associated with different epistemic
standards in different context, but this is only in order to simplify the discussion. It is not meant
to be a substantive assumption in the sense that a contextualist semantics has to make essential
use of the notion of an epistemic standard. For instance, the view that Schaffer () calls ‘con-
trastivism’ is a contextualist view in the sense I am interested in, but it is not entirely natural to
characterise that view in terms of knowledge ascriptions being associated with different epistemic
standards in different contexts.
This does not amount to the claim that questions about the semantic implementation of con-
textualism has not received any attention at all. See e.g. Schaffer () and Ludlow (, )
for relevant discussion. Stanley () also pays a lot of attention to these issues in his critique of

it explicit that he is aware of the different possibilities when it comes to the se-
mantic implementation of contextualism, but he also claims that these issues do
not matter much from an epistemological point of view.
How from the view point of formal semantics should we think of this
context-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions? We could think of it as
a kind of indexicality. On this way of construing the semantics, as-
criptions of knowledge involve an indexical reference to standards.
So the knowledge predicate will express different relations (corre-
sponding to different standards) in different contexts.
But we could instead view the knowledge predicate as expressing the
same relation in every context. On this model, we view the con-
text as determining a standard at which the proposition involving
the knowledge relation gets evaluated. So we could think of knowl-
edge as a three-place relation between a person, a proposition, and
a standard.
These semantic issues, as near as I can tell, are irrelevant to the epis-
temological issues. As long as we allow for contextually determined
standards, it doesn’t matter how formally we construe the context-
sensitivity. (Cohen, , p. )
I suspect that Cohen is right that these semantic issues are not particularly rele-
vant to the epistemological issues. From an epistemological point of view, con-
textualists are warranted in setting aside these semantic issues. But insofar as we
are interested in assessing the overall plausibility of the project of providing a
contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions, we would do well in paying
attention to the semantic issues. In this paper I will be arguing that these is-
sues become relevant when we think about problems having to do with indirect
speech reports. In particular, I will argue that the most promising ways of deal-
ing with the problem of indirect speech reports require contextualists to make
substantive assumptions about the semantic implementation of contextualism.
contextualism.

. Indirect Speech Reports
According to contextualism, a sentence like () expresses different propositions
in different contexts.
() Smith knows that he has hands.
Suppose that Mary and John are in different contexts such ‘knows’ is associated
with different standards in their respective contexts. In that case, () might
express a true proposition in Mary’s context, but a false proposition in John’s
context. Suppose further that Mary sincerely utters (), and that John, having
heard what she is saying, reports what she says by uttering ().
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
Given that Mary and John are in different contexts, one would think that contex-
tualism predicts that () is false. By uttering (), John is reporting that what
Mary says is the proposition expressed by () in John’s context, not the propo-
sition expressed by () in Mary’s context. But there is no reason to suppose
that that is what Mary says, and we would thus expect () to be false. The prob-
lem is that this prediction does not seem to be correct. It appears that John can
make a true report of what Mary says by uttering () even if they are in different
contexts.
In order to appreciate the problem it might be helpful to look at an example
involving the indexical ‘I’. Suppose that Mary utters ().
() I am hungry.
It is clear that John cannot use () to report what Mary is saying.
() Mary says that I am hungry.
The problem is that the ‘I’ in () refers to John, not Mary. In order to report
what Mary says, John could use the third-person pronoun ‘she’, as in ().
() Mary says that she is hungry.
Alternatively, he could use direct quotation, as in ().
() Mary says, ‘I am hungry’.

Both () and () are acceptable ways of reporting what Mary says, but ()
is not. If contextualism was correct, we might expect knowledge ascriptions to
behave in a similar way when embedded under ‘says’, but that is not the case.
John can use () to report what Mary says by uttering () even if they are in
different contexts.
The challenge for contextualists is twofold. First, they need to account for the
apparent truth of (). Second, they need to explain why knowledge ascriptions
do not seem to exhibit the same embedding behaviour as indexicals like ‘I’.
. Nonindexical Contextualism
If contextualists were unable to deal with the problem of indirect speech reports,
it is natural to think of this as providing evidence for an invariantist view of knowl-
edge ascriptions. According to an invariantist view, knowledge ascriptions are not
context-dependent in any epistemologically interesting sense. Since invariantists
do not take knowledge ascriptions to express different propositions in different
contexts, they do not have problems when it comes to indirect speech reports.
However, there are other alternatives to contextualism. For the purpose of
the following discussion I will focus on a view that has recently been discussed by
MacFarlane (). He has argued that the problem of indirect speech reports
can be used tomotivate a view he calls ‘nonindexical contextualism’. Nonindex-
ical contextualism is interesting in this context because it promises to preserve
some of the original spirit of contextualism. According to this view, knowledge
ascriptions do not express different proposition in different context. Instead
they express propositions that are true or false relative to some appropriate pa-
rameter. For our purposes it makes sense to follow MacFarlane in taking this to
be an epistemic standard parameter.
This does indeed seem to get around the problem. On this view, () ex-
presses the same proposition in Mary’s context and in John’s context.
MacFarlane ultimately prefers a relativist treatment of knowledge ascriptions, but that does
not matter for our current purposes. The difference between the views is that according to a
relativist treatment of knowledge ascriptions, the epistemic standard parameter is determined by
the context of assessment rather than the context of use. See MacFarlane (a, forthcoming-b).
See also Brogaard () who offers a similar argument for a similar view.

() Smith knows that he has hands.
It is not a problem for this view that John can use () to report what Mary says.
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
The original worry was that John is reporting that what Mary says is the proposi-
tion expressed by () in John’s context, not the proposition expressed by ()
in Mary’s context. But that is the same proposition on this view. In this respect,
nonindexical contextualism is similar to invariantism.
This sort of view exploits the fact that the truth-value of a sentence can de-
pend both on the context insofar as it plays a role in determining the proposition,
and on the index with respect to which we evaluate the proposition for truth and
falsity. In other words, it exploits the fact that a sentence is true relative to both a
context and an index. Instead of treating the index as, say, just a possible world,
the nonindexical contextualist treats it as pair consisting of a possible world and
an epistemic standard. The standard contextualist and the nonindexical con-
textualist can agree on the distribution of truth-values, that is, which sentences
are true at which contexts. What they disagree about is whether the contextual
variation in truth-values is a result of different propositions being expressed at
different contexts, or the same proposition being true or false relative to different
indices.
We can give a simple semantics for ‘says’ and ‘knows’ that captures what the
nonindexical contextualists are after. This will be useful later on when we com-
pare nonindexical contextualism to other views. In order to do that, we need
to relativise the denotation JK of an expression  to a context c, an epistemic
standard n, and a possible world w. For the purpose of the following discussion
it will be convenient to assume that the context determines an assignment of val-
ues to variables and therefore I will not add a separate parameter for the variable
assignment. Moreover, in order to label the types of denotation, we can take e to
to be the type of individual, t to to be the type of truth-values, s to to be the type
of possible worlds, and j to be the type of epistemic standards. This allows us to
give a give a semantics for ‘knows’ and ‘says’ along the following lines:
See e.g. Lewis () and Kaplan () for a more thorough discussion of the motivations
behind this kind of semantic framework.
The semantics is based on the semantics for attitude verbs given by Heim and Kratzer (,

() JsaysKc;n;w = phj;hs;tii: xe: For every world w0 and epistemic standard
n0 compatible with what x says in w : p (n0)(w0) = 
() JknowsKc;n;w = phj;hs;tii: xe: For every worldw0 and epistemic standard
n0 compatible with what x knows relative to n in w : p (n0)(w0) = 
This semantics makes ‘knows’, but not ‘says’, sensitive to the epistemic standard
parameter of the index. A sentences like () has different truth-values relative
to different epistemic standards. However, it does not follow that a sentence like
() has different truth-values relative to different epistemic standards. Instead
of involving quantifying over just worlds, attitude verbs like ‘says’ and ‘knows’
quantify over worlds and epistemic standards. Simply put, the thought is that
() is true just in case the proposition that Smith knows that he has hands is true
relative to every world-standard pair compatible with what Mary says. Since we
are quantifying over epistemic standards, the truth-value of () does not depend
on the epistemic standards that are relevant in John’s context. This reﬂects the
idea that a proposition, what a speaker says, is true or false relative not only to a
world, but a world and an epistemic standard, and that () is true just in case
what Mary says is the proposition that Smith knows that he has hands.
If contextualists do not have a satisfactory answer to the problem of indirect
speech reports, this could be seen as providing motivation for nonindexical con-
textualism. However, while I agree that the problem of indirect speech reports
requires contextualists to make substantive assumptions about the semantics of
knowledge ascriptions, I do not think we need to go as far as to adopt a version of
nonindexical contextualism. In the next two sections I will look at two attempts
at dealing with the problem of indirect speech reports that do not require any
substantive assumptions about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. I will ar-
gue that these proposals fail to deliver a solution to the problem. Having done
that, I will look at other proposals that are more promising, but which require
more substantive semantic assumptions.
ch. ) and von Fintel and Heim (ms.).
For the purpose of the following discussion, I am ignoring some difﬁcult questions about
to handle the factivity of ‘knows’. See e.g. Stanley () and Brogaard () for relevant
discussion.

. Mixed Quotation
A proposal that has been put forward by Hawthorne () and Cappelen and
Hawthorne () is that the relevant examples could involve what Cappelen
and Lepore () have called ‘mixed quotation’. That means that part of the
sentence is quoted as in ().
() He now plans to make a new, more powerful absinthe that he says will
have ‘a more elegant, reﬁned taste than the one I’m making now’.
What is important for our purposes, is that the part of the sentence that is quoted
can contain context-dependent expressions. If there were no quotation marks
in (), the indexical ‘I’ would refer to the person making the report, but that
is not the case when the relevant part of the sentence is quoted. The question is
whether we can treat () as involving mixed quotation in the same way as ().
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
If the relevant parts of the sentence are quoted in this way, it is not surprising
that John can use () to report what Mary says. After all, there is nothing prob-
lematic about John using () to report what Mary says.
() Mary says, ‘Smith knows that he has hands’.
An immediate and obvious worry with this proposal is that there are no visible
quotationmarks in (). However, it is not clear that this is a decisive objection to
this line of response. Cappelen and Hawthorne argue that we should not expect
people to be careful when it comes to using quotation marks. As Hawthorne
(, p. ) puts it, ‘there are no use-mention police in the ordinary world’.
Cappelen and Hawthorne (, p. ) observe that it is natural to understand
() as involving amixed quotational use of ‘gay’ if Ameant ‘happy’ and Bmeant
‘homosexual’.
() A and B both said that they are gay, but they mean very different things
by that.
This example is from Cumming ().

Having granted this point, it still needs to said that these matters are somewhat
delicate. In the cases involving indexicals like ‘I’ it is much harder to hear the
relevant reports as involving mixed quotation unless quotation marks, or some
other way of indicating that a part of the sentence is quoted, are used. For in-
stance, consider the difference between () with and without the quotation
marks. In the latter case, it is natural to hear the ‘I’ as referring to the person
making the report.
In any case, it is not clear that appealing mixed quotation is enough to get
contextualism completely off the hook. There is a further worry which is that the
mixed quotation strategy does not explain why ‘knows’ does not behave in the
same way as indexicals like ‘I’ when embedded in indirect speech reports. If it is
relatively easy to hear () as involving mixed quotation, why is it much harder
to hear () as involving mixed quotation?
() Mary says that I am hungry.
It would be surprising if it was easy to have mixed quotation when the relevant
part of the sentence contains ‘knows’, but not when ‘I’ is involved. After all, there
are cases of mixed quotation involving indexicals, as illustrated by examples like
(). In order for there to be such a difference, the possibility of a report involv-
ingmixed quotation would have to be dependent on whether the relevant part of
sentence contains ‘knows’ or ‘I’. However, it is far from obvious that this should
make a difference as far as mixed quotation is concerned. Why should there
be such restrictions on mixed quotation? This makes it hard to see how mixed
quotation could provide a complete solution to the problem of indirect speech
reports. Anyone who tries to appeal to mixed quotation in order to explain why
it is easy to use to () to report what Mary is saying, faces the objection that this
account also predicts that it should be just as easy in the case of ().
There is certainly a case to made that we need to be aware of the possibility
that indirect speech reports may involve mixed quotation. In some cases, there
might even be strong pressure to think that mixed quotation is involved even if
the report does not contain any visible quotation marks. However, that does not
mean that mixed quotation can fully explain the fairly robust patterns of data
involving indirect speech reports and knowledge ascriptions.

. Salience and Parasites
A natural response on behalf of contextualism is to say that when John is report-
ing what Mary says, what is salient is what is going on in Mary’s context. The
standards associated with ‘knows’ in () are the standards in Mary’s context.
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
According to the terminology of Cappelen and Hawthorne (), John’s use of
‘knows’ is ‘parasitic’ on the relevant features of Mary’s context. According to this
proposal, the complement clause in () expresses the same proposition as in
Mary’s context because it is the relevant features of her context that are relevant.
This explains why we can hear () as true even though Mary and John are in
different contexts.
A response along these lines has been suggested by Hawthorne () and
Humberstone (), withHumberstone basing his proposal on certain observa-
tions made by Nunberg (). However, while they discuss problems involving
indirect speech reports, they have not primarily been concerned with knowledge
ascription. Instead, a lot of the discussion has focused on expressions like ‘local’
and ‘nearby’. These expressions seem to require a contextually determined lo-
cation, but they appear to be ﬂexible in terms of what the contextually relevant
location is. More speciﬁcally, the relevant location does not have to be the lo-
cation of the speaker. As Cappelen and Hawthorne () have pointed out,
someone uttering () could be talking about Naomi going to a beach nearby to
their own location, but they could also be talking about Naomi going to a beach
nearby to some other salient location.
() Naomi went to a nearby beach.
To see why this is relevant, suppose that someone overhears an utterance of ()
by Nicole. It appears that they can use () to report what Nicole says even if
they are not in the same location as Nicole.
() Nicole says that Naomi went to a nearby beach.
However, this is perhaps not very surprising given the ﬂexibility of ‘nearby’. It
could be that the use of ‘nearby’ in () is parasitic on the location that is relevant

in Nicole’s context. If this is right, () will come out as true even if the speaker
is not in the same location as Nicole.
There is also a story to be told about why ‘nearby’ and ‘I’ seem to behave
differently when embedded in indirect speech reports. The difference between
‘nearby’ and ‘I’ is that in the case of ‘nearby’ there is a certain amount of ﬂexi-
bility when it comes to determining the relevant location. It does not have to be
the location of the speaker. On other hand, it is much harder to get ‘I’ to refer
to someone other than the speaker. That is why we can typically only interpret
‘I’ as referring to John and not Mary in ().
() Mary says that I am hungry.
However, there are still several worries about this line of response. Even if this
is a good explanation of what is going on in the case of expressions like ‘local’
and ‘nearby’ it is not clear that this line of response can be extended to knowl-
edge ascriptions. While it is harder to recognise different readings in the case
of knowledge ascriptions, MacFarlane () has argued that there are reasons
for thinking that knowledge ascriptions are less ﬂexible than expressions like ‘lo-
cal’ and ‘nearby’ in the relevant sense. As Stanley (, p. ) has observed,
utterances of sentences like (a) and (b) are generally held to be infelicitous.
() a. Bill knows that he has hands, but Bill does not know that he is not a
bodiless brain in a vat.
b. Bill does not know that he is not a bodiless brain in a vat, but Bill
knows he has hands.
This would be surprising if the different occurrences of ‘knows’ could be associ-
ated with different standards. In that case, it should be possible to get a true
reading of sentences likes this, but such a reading does not seem to be avail-
able. According to MacFarlane, this makes it more difﬁcult for contextualists
to respond to the problem of indirect speech reports. The explanation of why
() can be true as uttered by someone who is not in the same location as Nicole
exploits the ﬂexibility of ‘nearby’ when it comes to determining the relevant loca-
tion. The worry is that knowledge ascriptions are not ﬂexible to the same extent.
MacFarlane argues that contextualists face a dilemma. If they want to explain
For further relevant discussion see e.g. Ichikwawa (forthcoming).

the apparent truth of () in this way, they must grant that sentences like (a)
and (b) can be true.
A worry with this argument is that there are several ways in which an expres-
sion can be ﬂexible. What examples like () show is that the epistemic standards
associated with ‘knows’ do not easily shift in such a way as to allow the different
occurrences of ‘knows’ to be associated with different standards. However, what
is at issue here is whether knowledge ascriptions are ﬂexible with respect to what
the relevant standards are and how they are determined. If these things can come
apart, it is not clear how effective MacFarlane’s argument is.
In any case, it is not clear how different ‘knows’ is from ‘nearby’ with regards
to acceptability of sentences like (a) and (b). Insofar as ‘nearby’ is fairly
ﬂexible with respect to what the relevant location can be, wemight expect () to
have a true reading on which the different occurrences of ‘nearby’ are associated
with different locations.
() Naomi took the bus to a nearby beach, but she did not go to a nearby
beach.
However, an utterance of () would typically be just as infelicitous as an utter-
ance of (a) or (b). In other words, it appears that MacFarlane’s reasons
for thinking that ‘knows’ is different from ‘nearby’ are not all that compelling.
In any case, there is a more straightforward reason to doubt that a salience-
based account of speech reports is adequate. Even if it captures what is going on
in examples like (), it fails to provide an account that can be extended to all
indirect speech reports. Cappelen and Hawthorne () argue that it does not
explain the apparent correctness of collective speech reports like ().
() Mary and John say that Smith knows that he has hands.
Even if Mary and John were in different contexts when they uttered (), it ap-
pears that Harry can use () to report what they are saying. But in this case
we cannot say that it is what is going on in the subject’s context that is relevant,
since Mary and John are in different contexts. The relevant standards cannot be
either the standards associated with ‘knows’ in Mary’s context or the standards
associated with ‘knows’ in John’s context. In either case, we would get the wrong
Thanks to Andreas Stokke for pointing this out to me.

result as the standards would either fail to match the standards in Mary’s context
or the standards in John’s context.
It therefore appears that the line of response under discussion does not do
very well when it comes to dealing with collective speech reports. Insofar as the
data seems to be just as problematic in the case of collective speech reports, con-
textualists need to ﬁnd a way of dealing with such reports. Having said that, there
still seems to be something right about the idea that we want the relevant stan-
dards to be the standards of the subject of the report. What examples like ()
show, is that such a story needs to be implemented differently or supplemented
with a different story that can handle collective reports.
. Semantics and Propositional Content
The proposals we have considered so far have not forced us to make any major
assumptions about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions or indirect speech re-
ports. While I do not claim that I have surveyed every possible way of explaining
the data without making signiﬁcant assumptions about the semantics of knowl-
edge ascriptions or indirect speech reports, it makes sense to see if we can do
better if we are willing to make such assumptions.
In order to see what kind of assumptions we have to make, we need to pay
attention to a distinction drawn by Lewis (). He pointed out that we can dis-
tinguish between the semantic value of a sentence and its propositional content.
The former is assigned as a part of providing a compositional semantics for the
language, whereas the latter is meant to play the role as the objects of attitudes
and speech acts. Lewis argued that the semantic value and the propositional
content of a sentence may come apart. In order to provide a compositional se-
mantics for a language that contains modal and temporal operators, we can take
indices to have a world and a time parameter that can be shifted by the rele-
vant operators. In that case we may think of the semantic value of a sentence as
being represented by a function from indices, world-time pairs in this case, to
truth-values.
As Lewis () pointed out it does not matter whether we think of sentences as having vari-
able, but simple semantic values or constant, but complicated semantic values. If it is the former,
semantic values can be represented simply as functions from indices to truth-values, but sentences

But this does not require us to treat the propositional content, the thing that
we assert, believe, doubts, and so forth, in the same way. It is compatible with
representing the propositional content of a sentence as a function from worlds
to truth-values. Lewis observed that we can deﬁne the propositional content of a
sentence  in a context c as the proposition that is true at a world w if and only if
 is true at context c and the index that results if we take the index ic of context
c and shift its world parameter to w.
In light of these considerations, there is a question about how to understand
the difference between standard contextualism and nonindexical contextualism.
Should nonindexical contextualism be understood as a view about the semantic
value or the propositional content of knowledge ascriptions? Insofar as MacFar-
lane does not distinguish between the semantic value and the propositional con-
tent of a sentence it is natural to think that he does not take them to come apart
in this case. In any case, this raises the possibility that one can take indices to
contain an epistemic standard parameter without being committed to the view
that the propositional content of a sentence is true or false only relative to an
epistemic standard. This raises the further question of whether we need to go as
far as to adopt a nonindexical contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions
in order to deal with indirect speech reports, or whether we can exploit Lewis’
distinction while preserving more of the spirit of the original contextualist pro-
posal. In the next section I will look at one proposal which promises to do just
that.
. The Operator Account
One way of trying to solve the problem of indirect speech reports is to argue that
indices contain an epistemic standard parameter and that ‘says’ is an operator
that shifts this parameter. This sort of response has recently been explored by
Ninan (forthcoming) in the case of epistemic modals. He is responding to a
challenge much the like the one facing contextualist treatments of knowledge
may have different semantic values in different contexts. If it is the latter, semantic values are
represented as functions from contexts and indices to truth-values.
Lewis () made it clear that this is not the only way in which one can deﬁne the propo-
sitional content of a sentence in a context. We can for instance also deﬁne something like the
diagonal propositional in Stalnaker’s () sense.

ascriptions. The worry is that contextualist treatments of epistemic modals can-
not explain the behaviour of epistemic modals that are embedded in attitude
reports. Ninan’s solution is to treat attitude verbs like ‘thinks’ as operators that
shift the relevant parameter of the index. In the case of epistemic modals he
simply takes this to be an individual parameter, and the attitude verb shifts the
value of this parameter to the subject of the report. In other words, if the subject
of the report is Sam, the value of the individual parameter is shifted to Sam.
However, Ninan points out that this does not mean that we have to treat the
propositional content as true or false relative to different individuals. This is just
an application of the point made by Lewis () regarding the relationship be-
tween the semantic value of a sentence and its propositional content. We can
still represent the propositional content as a function from worlds to truth-value,
even if we represent the semantic value of a sentence as, say, a function from
world-time-individual triples to truth-values. Just because the index contains an
individual parameter it does not have to be the case that the propositional con-
tent varies in truth-value across individuals.
A similar strategy is possible in the case of knowledge ascriptions. In this case,
we have an epistemic standard parameter instead of an individual parameter, but
it is still feasible to treat attitude verbs like ‘thinks’ or ‘says’ as shifting the value
of this parameter to the standards of the subject of the report. If the subject of
the report is Mary, the value of the epistemic standard parameter is shifted to
Mary’s standards. Let us call this the ‘operator account’. This is a view about the
semantics of both knowledge ascriptions and indirect speech reports.
In order to state the view more formally, we need to relativise the denotationJK of an expression  to a context c, an epistemic standard n, a time t, and a
possible world w. The only reason for including a time parameter is that it allows
us to talk about the epistemic standards of an individual at a time and in a world.
Let nx;t;w be the epistemic standards of a an individual x at at a time t in a world
w. The value of the time parameter will not be shifted by ‘says’ or ‘knows’, and I
am not going to discuss the interaction between attitude verbs and tense. When
it comes to the semantic types, we can take e to to be the type of individuald, t
to to be the type of truth-values, s to to be the type of possible worlds, i to be the
See Egan et al. () and Weatherson () for a more detailed discussion of this sort of
challenge for contextualist treatments of epistemic modals.

type of time, and j to be the type of epistemic standards. This allows us to give a
give a semantics for ‘says’ along the following lines:
() JsaysKc;n;t;w = phj;hi;hs;tiii: xe: For every world w0 compatible with what
x says at t in w : p (nx;t;w)(t)(w0) = 
This is meant to capture the idea that ‘says’ shifts the value of the epistemic stan-
dard parameter to the epistemic standards nx;t;w of individual x at time t in world
w. Since ‘knows’ is an attitude verb, we presumable want it to be able to shift the
epistemic standard parameter in the same way. We also want it to be the case
that the truth-value of a knowledge ascription is dependent on the value of the
epistemic standard parameter. The following semantics for ‘knows’ delivers both
these results:
() JknowsKc;n;t;w = phj;hi;hs;tiii: xe: For every world w0 compatible with
what x knows at t in w relative to n : p (nx;t;w)(t)(w0) = 
This view seems to deliver the right result in the case in which John is using ()
to report what Mary is saying when she utters ().
() Smith knows that he has hands.
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
The original worry was that by uttering (), John is reporting that what Mary
says is the proposition expressed by () in John’s context, not the proposition
expressed by () in Mary’s context. However, according to the view under dis-
cussion, ‘says’ shifts the value of the epistemic standard parameter to Mary’s stan-
dards. That means that () is true just in case all the worlds compatible with
what Mary says are worlds in which Smith knows that he has hands relative to
Mary’s epistemic standards. In other words, it is true just in case Mary stands in
the relation denoted by ‘says’ to the proposition that Smith knows that he has
hands relative to Mary’s epistemic standards. This seems to be what we want to
say in this case.
The view also seems to have the resources to deal with collective reports like
().
I am still ignoring issues concerning the factivity of ‘knows’.

() Mary and John say that Smith knows that he has hands.
The idea is that () is true at a context c and an index hn; t; wi just in case both
Mary and John have the property picked out by the verb phrase ‘says that Smith
knows that he has hands’.
() Jsays that Smith knows that he has handsKc;n;t;w = xe: For every world
w0 compatible with what x says at t in w : JSmith knows that he has
handsKc;nx;t;w;t;w0 = 
Roughly speaking, for both Mary and John to have this property is for each of
them to have the property of being an x such that x says that Smith knows that
he has hands relative to x’s standards. This seems to give us the kind of truth-
conditions that we want.
If something like this account is on the right track, we have in effect improved
on the idea that the relevant epistemic standards are the standards of the sub-
ject. Instead of understanding this in terms of the standards of the subject being
salient, we are treating ‘says’ as an operator that shifts the value of the epistemic
standard parameter to the standards of the subject. Still, it is worth noting that
in order to do this we have had to make certain assumptions about the seman-
tics of knowledge ascriptions as well as the semantics of indirect speech reports.
On the proposed semantics for ‘knows’, it is sensitive to the epistemic standard
parameter of the index. In this sense, it does not behave like an indexical that
denotes different relations between an individual and a proposition in different
contexts. At this point I am not making any claim as to whether that is a welcome
or an unwelcome consequence. The point is that it matters how we think about
the context-dependence of knowledge ascriptions.
. Nonindexical Contextualism After All?
At this point one might wonder whether the operator account just amounts to a
version of nonindexical contextualism. This looks suspiciously like a terminolog-
ical question that is not particularly philosophically interesting in its own right,
but I still think there is something to be said for thinking that the operator ac-
count differs from the kind of nonindexical contextualist view that MacFarlane

() is talking about, in certain important respects. According to the operator
account, there is a good sense in which we can still think of knowledge ascriptions
as expressing different propositions in different contexts, insofar as the proposi-
tional content varies from context to context. This is because, as Lewis ()
pointed out and as Ninan (forthcoming) has recently emphasised, we are not
compelled to identify the propositional content of a sentence with its semantic
value. If we adopt () as a deﬁnition of propositional content, knowledge as-
criptions will still have different propositional content in different contexts.
() The propositional content of a sentence  in a context c is the proposi-
tion that is true at a world w if and only if  is true at context c and the
index that results if we take the index ic of context c and shift its world
parameter to w.
A reason for thinking that the operator account looks similar to nonindexical
contextualism is that it does not treat knowledge ascriptions as having different
semantic values in different contexts. However, it is not clear that this is some-
thing we should attach a lot of importance to. Lewis () observed that it does
not really make a difference if we think of the semantic value of a sentence as a
function from indices to truth-values, with the sentence having different seman-
tic values in different context, or simply as a function from context-index pairs
to truth-values. In the latter case, even sentences containing indexicals like ‘I’
would not have different semantic values in different contexts.
Another sense in which the view is similar to nonindexical contextualism is
that the truth-value of a knowledge ascription does not depend directly on the
context, but on the epistemic standard parameter of the index. However, the
reason for having an epistemic standard parameter in the index is to make it
possible for it to be shifted by operators like ‘says’. Again, it is not clear why a
contextualist would attach a lot of signiﬁcance to this.
Furthermore, I want to point out that the operator account does not face the
same problems as nonindexical contextualism. Insofar as two views face different
problems, that is at least some reason to distinguish between them. For instance,
a nonindexical contextualist who takes the propositional content of a sentence
to vary in truth-value across epistemic standards has to defend the view that the
relevant propositional contents are suitable as the objects of attitudes and speech

acts. One might worry that it does not really make sense for the things that we
believe to vary in truth-value across epistemic standards, or one might worry that
it requires us to revise our picture of how assertion works. MacFarlane (,
p. ) discusses and attempts to address some concerns along these lines, but
the point is not so much whether these worries can be addressed or not. The
point is rather that a proponent of the operator account does not have to worry
about these problems in the ﬁrst place. The reason is simply that on this view
the propositional content does not vary in truth-value across epistemic standards.
This does not mean that the operator account does not face any problems, it only
means that it does not face exactly the same problems as nonindexical contextu-
alism.
While I want to avoid a potentially fruitless terminological discussion, these
considerations seem to support the idea that there is a sense in which the view
under discussion is interestingly different from the kind of nonindexical contex-
tualist view that MacFarlane is talking about. If that is right, there appears to be
sense in which considerations involving indirect speech reports do not give us
a reason for giving up contextualism in favour of nonindexical contextualism.
Given certain assumptions about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions and in-
direct speech reports, contextualists seem to have to resources to deal with the
problem of indirect speech reports.
. Lambda Abstraction
Once we have a proposal for dealing with indirect speech reports on the table, it
becomes natural to see whether there are similar proposals that can also get the
job done. In particular, one might be interested in whether there ways of doing
this without treating ‘knows’ as sensitive to the index rather than the context. In
this section, I will look at one such proposal. Cappelen and Hawthorne (),
following a suggestion by Stanley (), have advocated using the machinery
of lambda abstraction to make sense of otherwise problematic indirect speech
reports. I will call this the ‘lambda abstraction account’. While this strategy avoids
some of the commitments of the operator account, it will become clear that it is
I am ignoring the possibility of a more general challenge directed against the view that we can
represent the objects of attitudes and speech acts as functions from worlds to truth-values.

associated with certain other commitments.
A simple way to think of lambda abstraction is that it allows us to form an
expression that denotes a property. For instance, the expression ‘x (x is red)’
denotes the property of being red. This machinery already has other applica-
tions in semantics. Cappelen and Hawthorne point out that lambda abstraction
is used to account for the different readings of sentences like ().
() John loves his mother and Bill does too.
A sentence like () has two readings. On the so-called ‘strict’ reading, it is true
just in case John loves John’s mother and Bill loves John’s mother too. On the
so-called ‘sloppy’ reading, it is true just in case John loves John’s mother and Bill
loves Bill’s mother. It is the second reading that is interesting for our purposes.
In order to capture this reading, we can treat the pronoun ‘his’ as a variable that
is bound by a lambda operator. The relevant reading of the verb phrase ‘loves
his mother’ is then given by ().
() x: x loves x’s mother
We can think of () as denoting the property of being an x such that x loves x’s
mother. Simply put, () is true on a so-called ‘sloppy reading’ just in case both
John and Bill have this property.
Cappelen andHawthorne argue that the samemachinery can be used to deal
with the problems involving indirect speech reports. While their discussion fo-
cuses on expressions like ‘local’ and ‘nearby’, the basic strategy can be extended
to knowledge ascriptions in a relatively straightforwardmanner. The idea is to let
‘knows’ be associated with a variable that can be bound by a lambda operator. For
instance, we can think of ‘knows’ as being associated with a variable of the form
f (x), such that x is a variable over individuals and f is a variable over functions
from individuals to epistemic standards. When these variables are not bound,
they are assigned a value by the contextually determined assignment function.
When x is not bound we may assume that the value of x will typically, but per-
haps not invariably, be the speaker. There is probably a lot to be said about the
I am using the same notation as Cappelen and Hawthorne ().
The idea of treating knows as associated with a variable of the form f (x) is taken from Stanley
and Szabo ().

function that is assigned to f, but for our purposes it is convenient to think of it
as a function that takes us from an individual to the epistemic standards that are
relevant or appropriate to the individual in question.
What matters for our purposes is that by positing a variable that can be bound
by a lambda operator, we gain additional resources when it comes to dealing
with indirect speech reports. Since Cappelen and Hawthorne focus on lambda
abstraction as a means of dealing with collective reports, it makes sense to start
by looking at examples like ().
() Mary and John say that Smith knows that he has hands.
Instead of having the context assign a value to the variable x, we posit a lambda
operator that binds it. Roughly speaking, the relevant reading is given by ().
() Mary and John x (x says that Smith knows by f (x) that he has hands).
On this reading, () is true just in case both Mary and John have the property
of being an x such that x says that Smith knows by f (x) that he has hands. If we
assume that f is assigned a function that takes us from an individual to the stan-
dards of that individual, this seems to get us the right predictions. It is enough
for () to be true that Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands relative to
Mary’s standards, and that John says that Smith knows that he has hands relative
to John’s standards.
It is worth noting that Cappelen and Hawthorne talk about lambda abstrac-
tion as a means to deal with the problems involving collective reports. When it
comes to non-collective reports, reports like (), they seem to favour the kind
of salience-based account that was considered and rejected in x..
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
Insofar as the main reason for rejecting salience-based accounts was that they
could not deal with collective reports, a salience-based account of non-collective
reports might still be viable. Still, there is also the possibility of extending the
lambda abstraction strategy to non-collective reports. In that case, the relevant
reading of () would be ().
() Mary x (x says that Smith knows by f (x) that he has hands).

On this reading, () is true just in case Mary has the property of being an x such
that x says that Smith knows by f (x) that he has hands. These predictions are
similar to the predictions made by the operator account. The relevant standards
are the standards of the subject of the report.
The lambda abstraction account and the operator account are similar in
many respects. They basically account for collective reports in the same way.
What the operator account does by having ‘says’ shift the epistemic standard pa-
rameter of the index, the lambda abstraction account does by using the machin-
ery of lambda abstraction. Simplifying somewhat, we can think of both views as
taking () to be true just in case both Mary and John have the property of being
an x such that x says that Smith knows that he has hands relative to x’s standards.
However, the views differ in terms of the assumptions they make about knowl-
edge ascriptions. If we compare the lambda abstraction account to the operator
account, the former gives us a more traditional contextualist approach to knowl-
edge ascriptions. Instead of treating ‘knows’ as sensitive to the epistemic stan-
dard parameter of the index, the epistemic standards are supplied by the con-
text. The epistemic standards are determined by the values assigned to f and x
by the context, and the standards will typically be the standards of the speaker.
The semantics for ‘knows’ could be given by something along the lines of ().
() JknowsKc;w = phs;ti: xe: ye: For every world w0 compatible with what
x knows in w relative to f(y) : p (w0) = 
If we adopt this semantics for ‘knows’, there is no need to relativise the denotation
to an epistemic standard. The context-dependence of ‘knows’ is handled by the
assignment of values to variables that is determined by the context.
A potentially relevant difference between the views is that the lambda abstrac-
tion account is more ﬂexible than the operator account. This is a good thing if
the additional ﬂexibility is exploited in some way. However, it might be a less
attractive feature of the proposal if it turns out that the additional ﬂexibility is
not doing any work. If the operator account is correct, the value of the epistemic
standard parameter is always shifted to the standards of the subject. The shift
is obligatory. However, the lambda abstraction account allows for the possibility
that there is a reading of the relevant reports on which the variable associated
with ‘knows’ is not bound.

This means that if we account for the truth of () or () in terms of lambda
abstraction, we also predict that these sentences have a false reading. This is a
reading on which the variable x is not bound by the lambda operator, but instead
receives its value in context. After all, if a sentence like () also has a so-called
‘strict’ reading, and the lambda abstraction account is correct, we should expect
the same to be true of () and (). Insofar as Mary and John are in contexts
in which different standards are in play, we should expect () and () to be
false on this reading.
The question is whether a false reading of () and () is available. While
it is often easy to report what speakers say in this way, a case can be made that
there are cases in which there is something wrong with a report like (). DeRose
(, ) discusses an example like this. In his example, Thelma and Louise
are at a tavern where they are discussing whether Jim was at the ofﬁce yesterday.
The goal of the discussion is merely to decide who has to pay up a two dollar bet
on whether Jim was at the ofﬁce the day before. On the basis of testimony from a
reliable source, as well as having seen Jim’s hat in the hall, Louise sincerely utters
().
() I know that Jim was in the ofﬁce.
However, after leaving the tavern, Thelma is contacted by the police. They are
investigating a serious crime, and they are interested in Jim’s whereabouts the day
before. Louise has the same evidence as Thelma, she saw his hat in the hall and
she has testimony from a reliable source. But while she is being interviewed by
the police, this does not appear sufﬁcient for her to ascribe knowledge to herself.
In this context, an utterance of () by Thelma would seem appropriate.
() I don’t know whether Jim was in the ofﬁce.
What matters for our purposes, is that there might also appear to be something
wrong about her to using () to report what Louise said.
() Louise said that she knew that Jim was in the ofﬁce.
If this is evidence that the relevant speech report has a genuinely false reading,
this would be good news for the lambda abstraction account and bad news for the
operator account. The lambda abstraction account predicts that such a reading

should be available, whereas the operator account predicts that () should be
true as uttered by Louise. However, we should not be too quick to conclude
that () has a false reading. While there might be something awkward about
() in this context, () appears to be straightforwardly false.
() Louise didn’t say that she knew that Jim was in the ofﬁce.
If () was false, we should expect () to be true. This is some evidence that
the inappropriateness of () is not due to its falsity. Instead, it could be that an
utterance of () by Thelma is merely misleading. For instance, it might convey
that Louise has more evidence, or at least took herself to have more evidence,
than Thelma. Such an account would have to be backed up by a more detailed
pragmatic story, and that is not a trivial task. But the point still stands that the
evidence that () has a false reading, is pretty shaky. Insofar as we cannot
detect the relevant reading, it is problematic for the lambda abstraction account
to predict this kind of ambiguity. This is not in any way a decisive objection, but it
would be nice to have an explanation of why the ‘strict’ reading is not available.
It also means that DeRose’s example does not necessarily provide any evidence
against the operator account.
. Taking Stock and Looking Ahead
Both the operator account and the Lambda lambda abstraction account deliver
the right predictions when it comes to knowledge ascriptions that are embed-
ded in indirect speech reports. However, both accounts require contextualists
to make substantive assumptions about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions.
From the point of view of dealing with indirect speech reports, not just any se-
mantic implementation of contextualism will do. More speciﬁcally, neither ac-
count treats ‘knows’ itself as an indexical in the sense that it receives its value
directly from the context. According to the operator account, ‘knows’ is sensi-
tive to the index, and the context only plays a role insofar as it determines the
relevant index. According to the lambda abstraction account, ‘knows’ is not it-
self an indexical. Instead, it is associated with a covert variable that is assigned a
value by the context.
I am ignoring any complications having to do with the use of past tense.

This does not have to be construed as a problem for contextualism. It was
never clear that the best way of implementing contextualism was to treat ‘knows’
as an indexical. Schaffer () has offered independent reasons for thinking
that ‘knows’ is not an indexical that are not dependent on considerations involv-
ing indirect speech reports. What is interesting, is whether the assumptionsmade
by the operator account and the lambda abstraction account can be subject to
further empirical testing. A detailed examination of these issues are beyond the
scope of the present discussion, but I want to highlight certain avenues for future
research.
In the case of the operator account, there are at least two sources of in-
dependent evidence one might look for. The ﬁrst source of independent evi-
dence would be evidence that ‘says’ can shift other parameters in the same way
as the epistemic standard parameter. This would require looking at other expres-
sions than ‘knows’ and seeing how they behave when they are embedded under
‘says’.
The second source of independent evidence would be evidence that the epis-
temic standard parameter can be shifted by other operators. A natural candidate
would be expressions like ‘by the standards of x’. However, it is not clear that
we want to treat these expressions in this way. As Stanley (, p. ) has
pointed out, expressions like this can also occur in sentences like () that do
not contain ‘knows’ or any other epistemic terms.
() By the standards of chemistry, what is in the Hudson River isn’t water.
In this case it would be strange to think that what the expression ‘by the standards
of chemistry’ is doing, is to shift the value of the epistemic standard parameter.
Insofar as these expressions have a uniform semantics, this is evidence that they
See e.g. Schaffer () and Ludlow (, ).
It might be particularly interesting to compare knowledge ascriptions to epistemic modals.
See e.g. Ninan (forthcoming) for relevant discussion.
Ludlow () talks about expressions like these, but he does not treat them as operators that
shift a parameter of the index. They simply make the relevant epistemic standards explicit.
It is worth mentioning that Stanley’s () arguments are directed against the view defended
by Ludlow () to the effect that the context-dependence of ‘knows’ is traceable to a covert
element that is associated with ‘knows’. However, similar considerations can also be used to cast
doubt on the claim that expressions like ‘by the standards of x’ are operators that shift the value
of the epistemic standard parameter of the index.

are not operators that shift the epistemic standard parameter of the index. If
that is correct, we would have to look elsewhere for independent evidence of an
epistemic standard parameter that can be shifted by operators.
In the case of the lambda abstraction account, the key assumption is that
‘knows’ is associated with a variable that can be bound by a lambda operator.
This is most naturally construed as a syntactic claim about sentences containing
‘knows’. If this claim is correct, it would be surprising if this variable could not be
bound by an overt quantiﬁer like ‘everyone’. In other words, we should expect
a sentence like () to have a so-called ‘bound’ reading.
() Everyone knows that Smith has hands.
On a bound reading, () is true just in case every x knows by x’s standards that
Smith has hands. The existence of such a reading is controversial. It is difﬁcult
to simply hear a bound reading of (). Indeed, it might be difﬁcult to detect
such a reading directly. Instead one might want to look for a situation in which
() is true on a bound reading, but false on a normal reading. In any case,
this is not the time and the place to settle this question. For the purpose of the
present discussion, it is sufﬁcient to note that this is the kind of evidence one
might want to look for.
The point of this is to show that the kinds of assumptions that are made by
the operator account and the lambda abstraction account are themselves subject
to further empirical testing. It might turn out that these assumptions are more
or less plausible. That is something that will have to be addressed by further
research. In any case, this suggests that a proper evaluation of contextualism will
have to take into account a wide range of data. We started out by considering
how knowledge ascriptions behave when embedded in indirect speech reports,
There has been a lot of discussion about whether a bound reading should be taken as evidence
for the existence of a covert variable. See e.g. Stanley (). I am more interested in the claim
that if we posit a covert variable, we should expect to ﬁnd a reading on which it is bound. This
may still not be entirely uncontroversial. See e.g. Ludlow (, ).
Schaffer () argues that there is evidence of bound readings involving knowledge ascrip-
tions. His main example involves quantiﬁcation over tests or questions rather than individuals,
but it might be possible to produce a variant of his example that involves quantiﬁcation over indi-
viduals.
There are other considerations than binding that might be relevant. See e.g. Schaffer (,
forthcoming-a) for other kinds of syntactic evidence that might be relevant.

and we ended up looking at how knowledge ascriptions interact with quantiﬁers.
From the point of view of providing an overall assessment of contextualism, it
matters how the view is implemented linguistically.
. Monsters
N: My mommy always said there were no monsters. No real ones. But there are.
(James Cameron’s Aliens ())
If one does not want to make the assumptions about the semantics of knowledge
ascriptions that were required by the operator account and the lambda abstrac-
tion account, there is a further option that deserves serious consideration. That is
to treat ‘says’ as a context shifting operator, an operator that is capable of shifting
the context parameter. According to the operator account, ‘says’ is an operator
that shifts the epistemic standard parameter of the index. However, if ‘says’ were
a context shifting operator, we could provide a similar account of the data in-
volving indirect speech reports. Instead of shifting a parameter of the index, we
can think of ‘says’ as shifting a parameter of the context. This kind of view
would make more or less the same predictions as the operator account. When
‘knows’ is embedded under ‘says’, the relevant standards will be the standards of
the subject.
The existence of such operators is controversial. Kaplan () famously
called such operators ‘monsters’, and claimed that not only are there no such
operators in English, but that it is impossible to add such operators to it.
Are there such operators as ‘In some contexts it is true that’, which
when preﬁxed to a sentence yields a truth if and only if in some
context the contained sentence (not the content expressed by it) ex-
presses a content that is true in the circumstances of that context?
See e.g. Anand and Nevins () for a discussion of how to develop the idea that attitude
verbs are context shifting operators in a more precise and rigorous way.
I am not going to discuss whether a view that treats ‘says’ as a context shifting operator would
make exactly the same predictions as a view that treats it is an operator that shifts a parameter
of the index. This could for instance depend on the existence of other operators and how they
interact with the relevant attitude verbs. However, in the relatively simple cases that I am interested
in, this does not matter. Thanks to Derek Ball and Dilip Ninan for relevant and helpful discussion.

Let us try it:
() In some contexts it is true that I am tired now.
For [()] to be true in the present context it sufﬁces that some
agent of some context not be tired at the time of that context. [()],
so interpreted, has nothing to do with me or the present moment.
But this violates Principle ! Principle  can also be expressed in
more theory laden way by saying that indexicals always take primary
scope. If this is true|and it is|then no operator can control the
character of the indexicals within its scope, because they will simply
leap out of its scope to the front of the operator. I am not saying that
we could not construct a language with such operators, just that En-
glish is not one. And such operators could not be added to it. (Kaplan,
, p. , original emphasis)
However, it is not entirely clear what is going on in this passage, and on what
grounds is Kaplan denying that there could be monsters in English. If he is of-
fering an empirical argument, which is how Schlenker () appears to inter-
pret him, a generalisation based on a single case is not exactly overwhelming
evidence. Furthermore, it is also unclear how much weight we should put on the
claim that the existence of monsters conﬂicts with the principle that indexicals
are directly referential.
A thorough discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of the present dis-
cussion. However, recent work in linguistics by, among others, Schlenker (),
Anand and Nevins (), and Anand (), suggest that there could be mon-
sters in at least some natural languages such as Amharic, Slave, and Zazaki. In
particular, it is argued that attitude verbs are capable of shifting indexicals in
these languages. Having said that, it still remains controversial whether there
are any monsters in English. Schlenker () argues that certain temporal in-
dexicals like ‘two days ago’ can be shifted by attitude verbs, but Anand andNevins
() suggest that the relevant examples involve anaphora, not a genuine con-
text shift. In any case, while I do not want to take a stand on the more general
questions about the nature and existence of monsters, I think it is safe to say that
More recently, Santorio (forthcoming) has argued that all indexicals in English are shiftable

the jury is still out when it comes to the questions of whether there is independent
evidence that there are monsters in English.
Treating ‘says’ as a monster allows contextualists to explain how ‘knows’ be-
haves when it is embedded in indirect speech reports without having to posit an
epistemic standard parameter of the index or the existence of a covert variable
associated with ‘knows’. In particular, the view is compatible with a more tradi-
tional of understanding of ‘knows’ as an indexical that gets its value directly from
the context. However, given the controversial status of monsters, it is a serious
commitment if one wants to treat ‘says’ in this way for the purpose of defending
a more simple contextualist semantic for ‘knows’. The price one has to pay in
order to avoid having to make the assumptions about the semantics of ‘knows’
that were made in the previous sections, is to make some rather controversial
assumptions about the semantics of ‘says’. The operator account also required
us to make assumptions about the semantics of ‘says’. But in that case we were
mainly expanding on the role of ‘says’ as an intensional operator, allowing it to
shift the epistemic standard parameter as well as the world parameter. In either
case, ‘says’ is a shifting a parameter of the index, not a parameter of the context.
. Another Problem
At this point, one might worry that there is a further problem involving indirect
speech reports that has not been addressed. Let us consider how it would make
sense for John to reason with regards to what Mary said. Let us start out by
assuming that () is true in John’s context.
by attitude verbs and epistemic modals. If that is true, it would offer some support to a contextual-
ist who wants to treat ‘says’ as a monster in order to account for the behaviour of ‘knows’ when it
is embedded in indirect speech reports. But even if Santorio is correct to claim that all English in-
dexicals are shiftable, a contextualist would still have to hold that ‘knows’ is shiftable in a different
way than ‘I’. After all, an important part of the original problem was that ‘I’ and ‘knows’ behave
differently when embedded in indirect speech reports. This does not rule out of an account that
treats ‘says’ as a monster, but it means that one has to be careful about what counts as independent
evidence for that claim. The mere claim that indexicals are shiftable in some way or another, is
not sufﬁcient.
The way I am presenting this problem is similar to the way that Egan et al. () present a
similar problem involving epistemic modals. See e.g. also Hawthorne ().

() Mary says, ‘Smith knows that he has hands’.
So far we have focused on the question of how contextualists can make sense of
the inference from () to ().
() Mary says that Smith knows that he has hands.
I have argued that there are ways for contextualists to respect the judgement
that it is acceptable for John to make this inference. However, there is a further
problem. Let us suppose that () is also true in John’s context.
() Smith doesn’t know that he has hands.
In that case, one might think that it makes sense for John to conclude that ()
is also true.
() What Mary says is false.
The kind of strategies that I have explored on behalf of contextualism, do not
deliver this verdict. For instance, according to the operator account, what Mary
says is the proposition that Smith knows that he has hands relative to her epis-
temic standards. Since that proposition is true regardless of what the relevant
epistemic standards are, () is predicted to be false. Similar considerations
apply if we appeal to lambda abstraction or monstrous operators. In either case,
the prediction is that () is false.
I am not going to address this challenge here, though I will note that I ﬁnd
it less clear that () is true as uttered by John, than it is that () is a true
report of what Mary says. In any case, my concern is with the original challenge
involving indirect speech reports. However, I think it is worth noting that these
considerations do not provide any straightforward motivation for nonindexical
contextualism either. If we accept a nonindexical contextualist semantics for
knowledge ascriptions, () would be true in John’s context. What Mary says
is the proposition that Smith knows that he has hands and that proposition is
false relative to the epistemic standards that are operative in John’s context. This
Even if it is true in the case of knowledge ascriptions that John can say things like (), this
may not hold for other expressions. For instance, in the case of predicates of taste, it strikes me as
inappropriate to say things like ‘What she said is false’ on this kind of basis.

might seem like a good thing, but there are reasons why one might not want to
get too excited about this. Insofar as it is plausible that () is true in John’s
context, one might think that goes for () as well.
() Mary’s utterance of ‘Smith knows that he has hands’ is false.
But a nonindexical contextualist semantics does not predict that () is true.
Let us assume the deﬁnition of utterance truth given by MacFarlane ().
() An utterance of a sentence s in a context of use c is true relative to a
context of assessment c if and only if the proposition expressed by s in
c is true relative to the world of c and the epistemic standards of c
Given this deﬁnition of utterance truth, a nonindexical contextualist semantics
for knowledge ascriptions delivers the prediction that () is false in John’s
context. What this means is that nonindexical contextualism can deliver the pre-
diction that () is true, but that is at the cost of allowing the truth of what a
speaker says, propositional truth, to come apart from the truth of the utterance
in question. This is not a welcome consequence. For instance, as Cappelen and
Hawthorne (, p. ) have pointed out, it sounds strange to says things like
().
() Mary’s utterance is true, but what she said is false.
MacFarlane () takes utterance truth to be a technical notion, and he argues that we
should not put too much weight on judgements involving this notion. He argues that when it
comes to ordinary speech, truth is attributed to propositions rather than utterances. If one takes
this line, one might be less worried about utterance truth and propositional truth coming apart.
However, I am not entirely convinced by the reasons he gives. MacFarlane () follows Kaplan
() in taking semantics to be in the business of assigning truth-values to sentences rather than
utterances. I am sympathetic to this point of view. However, it is not necessary to believe that
utterance truth plays a signiﬁcant role in semantic theory in order to believe that we have an in-
dependent grip on the notion of utterance truth.
Furthermore, even if we grant that truth is typically attributed to propositions rather than ut-
terances in ordinary speech, and that propositional truth is somehow more fundamental than
utterance truth, it does not follow that utterance truth is a purely technical notion in the sense
that we have no independent grip on it. It still does not seem altogether implausible that we have
some grip on this notion and that this is reﬂected in our judgements about sentences like ().

If we want to predict that () is true as uttered by John, we need to go be-
yond nonindexical contextualism. According to the relativist treatment of knowl-
edge ascriptions defended byMacFarlane (a, forthcoming-b), sentences are
true or false relative to not only a context of use, but also a context of assessment.
If we adopt the deﬁnition of utterance truth in (), this kind of view allows us
to predict that Mary’s utterance is false relative to John’s context of assessment.
() An utterance of a sentence s in a context of use c is true relative to a
context of assessment c if and only if the proposition expressed by s in
c is true relative to the world, time, and location of c and the epistemic
standards of c.
Where does this leave us? If the choice comes down to giving up () and al-
lowing utterance truth and propositional truth to come apart, it is far from clear
that we should prefer the former. That is not to say that this does not constitute
a serious challenge for contextualism, only that it is not clear that nonindexical
contextualism fares much better. I have not said anything that rules out a rel-
ativist view of the sort defended by MacFarlane (a, forthcoming-b). There
is also the possibility of taking these considerations to motivate some kind of in-
variantist view about knowledge ascriptions.
While I am not going to try to provide an answer to this challenge on be-
half of contextualism here, I think that there are good reasons to separate this
challenges from the original challenge. It is the original problem involving in-
direct speech reports that I have been concerned with in this chapter. The orig-
inal problem was a problem concerning how speakers can report what another
speaker in a different context says or believes. The challenge that has been dis-
cussed in this section introduces another set of considerations. It has to do with
attributions of truth and falsity, and how speakers evaluate, not just report, what
another speaker says in a different context. While these problems are connected,
we do not have to go through indirect speech reports in order to generate prob-
lems involving attributions of truth and falsity. For instance, we can generate
similar problems using propositional anaphora. To the extent that it is appro-
priate for John to utter () when he overhears what Mary says, that is true of
() as well.

() That is false!
Someone who denies that John can use () to report what Mary says does not
avoid these problems. It still makes sense to attempt to respond to the original
problem involving indirect speech reports, even if a solution to that problem
does not necessarily amount to a solution to the problem that was presented
in this section. I have argued that contextualists can respond to the original
problem involving indirect speech reports if they pay sufﬁcient attention to the
compositional semantics of knowledge ascriptions and indirect speech reports.
What the additional challenge that has been discussed in this section illustrates
is that we should not expect these kinds of strategies to solve all the problems for
contextualism about knowledge ascriptions.
Conclusion
What is the upshot of all of this? The main conclusion is that there are ways
for contextualists to deal with the problem of indirect speech reports. More
speciﬁcally, it appears that we do not need to adopt a nonindexical contextu-
alist treatment of knowledge ascriptions in order to make sense of the behaviour
of knowledge ascriptions that are embedded in indirect speech reports. For in-
stance, according to the operator account, the index contains an epistemic stan-
dard parameter and ‘says’ shifts the value of this parameter to the standards of
the subject. This seems to be sufﬁcient to give us the right results in the prob-
lematic cases while preserving the spirit of the original contextualist proposal.
Along similar lines, the lambda abstraction account treats ‘knows’ as associated
with a variable that can be bound by a lambda operator.
However, in order to get these results we had to make certain assumptions
about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. This suggests that there is a sense
in which we can learn something about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions
by looking at the way they behave in embedded contexts like indirect speech
reports. The data involving indirect speech reports may not give us sufﬁcient
reasons for rejecting contextualism altogether, but it may still give us good rea-
sons for implementing contextualism in a certain way. Moreover, the assump-
tions made by the operator account and the lambda abstraction account can

themselves be subject to further testing. If we want to assess whether a contex-
tualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions is plausible, these are considerations
we ought to take into account.


Conclusion
In Chapter  I introduced some of the issues having to do with disagreement
and relative truth. I considered a simple relativist account of disagreement and
discussed an objection to that account. The objection was based on what hap-
pens to disagreement if propositional truth is relative to parameters like worlds
and times. I considered two lines of response on behalf of relativism. The ﬁrst
response was based on rejecting the premise that propositions are true or false
relative to parameters like worlds and times. The second response was based on
arguing that the parameters that relativists want to posit are different from pa-
rameters like worlds and times. In light of these considerations, the argument
against was found to be inconclusive. However, it was not clear to what extent the
relativist account of disagreement could be said to be independently motivated.
The focus in Chapter  was on more general questions about agreement and
disagreement. In particular, I focused on the question of what kinds of attitudes
may be involved when two parties agree or disagree. I argued against the so-called
‘doxastic view’, the view that agreement and disagreement is always a matter of
what the parties believe. Instead, I developed a more pluralist view of agreement
and disagreement by building on Stevenson’s (, , ) notion of ‘dis-
agreement in attitude’. According to this view, agreement and disagreement can
be a matter of what the parties believe, but it may also be a matter of what they
want, what they like, and so forth.
The idea that we should not assume a too narrow conception of agreement
and disagreement, has played an important role throughout a lot of the discus-
sion. In Chapter  I discussed contextualism and relativism about predicates of
taste. While contextualism is supposed to have problems with disagreement, I
argued that the argument against contextualism is based on a too narrow con-

ception of disagreement. If a sufﬁciently wide range of cases of disagreement are
taken into account, the argument against contextualism looks less convincing. In
Chapter  I argued for a similar conclusion regarding contextualism about epis-
temic modals.
While I have argued that the disagreement data do not give us reasons for
preferring relativism over contextualism in the case of predicates of taste and
epistemic modals, it should be clear that I am not offering anything like a sil-
ver bullet that can make all the problems involving agreement and disagreement
disappear. If we can draw any general lessons based on this discussion, it is that
agreement and disagreement are complicated phenomena. One should be care-
ful about relying on considerations involving agreement and disagreement, but
that is not a reason for dismissing these considerations out of hand. We have en-
countered recalcitrant data, for instance with respect to expressions like ‘prob-
ably’, that are difﬁcult to account for. I have also not made any claims about
whether the defence of contextualism about predicates of taste and epistemic
modals can be straightforwardly extended to other contextualist views. For all I
have said, it is still an open question whether contextualism about, say, knowl-
edge ascriptions is compatible with a satisfactory account of disagreement. That
question can only be addressed by paying close attention to the relevant disagree-
ment data.
Chapter  differed from the other chapters insofar as I did not talk about
disagreement. Instead, I focused on another problem for contextualist views,
namely the problemof indirect speech reports. Focusing on contextualism about
knowledge ascriptions, I argued that the there are ways for contextualists tomake
sense of the behaviour of knowledge ascriptions that are embedded in indirect
speech reports. However, in order to do that one must make certain assumptions
about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions and indirect speech reports. I also
suggested that insofar as these assumptions can be subject to empirical tests, this
can serve as the basis for further research. From the point of view of looking
for an overall assessment of contextualism, the issues involving indirect speech
reports are still relevant.
If what I have said is correct, the resources required to deal with disagreement
and the resources required to deal with indirect speech reports are not the same.
In order to deal with the problems involving disagreement, it is important to

appreciate what it takes to for two parties to disagree. We need to pay close
attention to the attitudes of the parties more generally and not just with regard to
what they believe. But when one is dealing with the problems involving indirect
speech reports, it becomes important to think about the compositional semantics
for the relevant expressions.
Torﬁnn Thomesen Huvenes
February 
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